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

THE

MILITARY HISTORY

OF THE

DUKE OF WELLINGTON

IN

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MILITARY HISTORY

OF THE

DUKE OF WELLINGTON IN INDIA.

THE lustre which the military fame of the Duke of Wellington derived from his campaigns in the Peninsula of Europe and from his crowning victory at Waterloo has cast into comparative shade the splendid commencement of his career. This sketch of his services in India is designed to bring that portion of the history of this great captain of the age prominently into notice, whence it will be apparent that his rare qualities, which experience matured and disciplined, were developed in a remarkable degree at an early age.

1.—*Birth, Parentage, and Entrance into the Army.—Campaign in Flanders.*

Arthur Wesley,—for this was his grandfather's name, and thus the Duke wrote his own name until after he arrived in India,—was the third son of the first Earl of Mornington, and was born in Ireland on the 1st of May, 1769. His father dying in 1781, he was left, at the age of twelve, to the care of his mother, eldest daughter of the first Viscount Dungannon, a lady of fine understanding and great mental accomplishments, the contributor of several papers to the *Archæologia*. Both parents carefully superintended the education of their children; and Arthur, after a brief residence at Eton, being designed for the army, was sent to the military seminary of Angers, in France, where he remained about five years.

On the 7th of March, 1787, when not quite eighteen, he received a commission as ensign in the 73rd regiment of foot, and in December of that year was promoted to a lieutenancy,—first in the 76th,

whence he moved into the 41st, and then into the 12th Light Dragoons. On the 30th of June, 1791, he obtained a company in the 58th foot, but exchanged the same year into the 18th Light Dragoons. On the 30th of April, 1793, he became major of the 33rd regiment, the lieutenant-colonelcy of which he purchased in September of that year, when he was only twenty-four years of age.

This was rapid advancement, for which the young officer must have been indebted, in some degree, to family influence.

In 1794, Lieutenant-Colonel Wesley embarked with his regiment at Cork for Ostend, to join the British army in the Netherlands, under the command of the Duke of York. The progress of the French troops caused the evacuation of Ostend, and the retreat of the British commander into Holland, followed by the French, with whom several affairs took place, in some of which the 33rd regiment was engaged. The retreat continuing, Lieutenant-Colonel Wesley was selected to command the rear-guard, consisting of three battalions, and in this very trying service, his skill and intelligence gave promise of future distinction.

Although this, his first campaign, was short, and there was no battle, it was upon a large scale, and he saw the troops of different nations, whose bearing and spirit he could note and compare with those of English soldiers.

2.—*Embarkation for, and Arrival in, India.—Expedition to Manilla.*

On the return of the army to England, in the spring of 1795, the 33rd regiment was ordered for the West Indies, and actually embarked; but tempestuous weather having compelled the fleet to put back, the destination of the regiment was changed for the East Indies. This accident, coupled with another,—the nearly contemporaneous appointment of his elder brother, Lord Mornington, to the post of Governor-General of India,—opened to the young officer a wider field of action, in which talents like his could not long lie concealed.

His corps embarked in April, 1796, but its lieutenant-colonel was

disabled from accompanying it by severe illness. As soon as he was in a condition to enter upon the voyage, he hastened to join it, and having overtaken it at the Cape of Good Hope, proceeded with it to Calcutta, where he landed in February, 1797. During the voyage, we learn from a fellow-passenger that "he passed much time in his cabin, diligently reading, to prepare himself for command and conduct in that country."

The Governor-General of India, at this date, was Sir John Shore (soon afterwards Lord Teignmouth), who was, however, about to relinquish the government. The lieutenant-colonel of the 33rd regiment brought a letter of introduction to Sir John from Marquis Cornwallis, who was the colonel of that corps, and it is amusing now to notice the guarded, though complimentary, terms in which the marquis couched his recommendation. The letter is dated "Whitehall, June 10th, 1796," and is as follows:—

"Dear Sir,—I beg leave to introduce to you Colonel Wesley, who is lieutenant-colonel of my regiment. He is a sensible man, and a good officer, and will, I have no doubt, conduct himself in a manner to merit your approbation."

Sir John Shore seems to have very promptly and acutely discerned the true character of the young soldier. The present Lord Teignmouth tells us that, at their first interview, at a levee, Sir John turned quickly round to his aides-de-camp, as Colonel Wesley retired, remarking,—"If that officer should ever have an opportunity of distinguishing himself, he will do it, and greatly." He was a frequent guest at the table of Sir John Shore, who, in after-life, often adverted to the union of strong sense and boyish playfulness which, he said, was at that time a peculiar characteristic of his young friend.

The Governor-General had resolved to despatch an expedition against Manilla and the Spanish islands, to consist of 1,400 infantry, with a frigate and five armed Indiamen, which he placed under the direction of Colonel Wesley, who immediately drew up a "memorandum," which, bearing as it does the striking features of his later

official compositions, amply justified the prognostic of Sir John Shore. The memorandum proposed a previous attack upon the Dutch settlements in the island of Java, the writer intimating that he had a plan prepared for protecting an establishment there; it detailed the information he had collected respecting the state of the Dutch force and the defences on the island, and suggested a judicious mode of operations for the capture of Manilla. The whole paper indicates a familiarity with the matter which, in so young an officer, who had been only a few weeks in India, is a remarkable proof of the activity of mind and assiduity in acquiring professional knowledge which, in after-years, gave the duke an abundant command of resources whenever and wherever they were needed.

An incident occurred soon after his embarkation in the *Heroine* frigate, as commander of this expedition, which, though slight in itself, is worth recording, as it illustrates that rare combination of opposite qualities so conspicuous in the duke,—firmness with temper, spirit with discretion. He received an order from General St. Leger that, in case of coming to action, the troops were to be under the command of the captains of the Indiamen. Colonel Wesley addressed to Sir John Shore immediately the following dignified and temperate remonstrance, in which may be discerned the same plainness and simplicity of style, and the same firmness of tone, which characterize his more recent official papers:—

"Sir,—I have just received an order from Major-General St. Leger, stating, that, 'in case of coming to action, the troops will be under the command of the captains of the ships.' In the different conversations you did me the honour to hold with me upon this subject, I uniformly stated it to be my determination that every assistance should be given to work and fight the ships. I told you that the directions of the captains of the Indiamen, upon those occasions, would of course be obeyed; and I communicated to you an extract of my instructions to the officers commanding the troops on board the different ships upon this subject, which you thought fully sufficient. Confiding, then, that there would be no order from

superior authority to put me, or the regiment I have the honour to command, in any situation under the command of the captains of the Indiamen (however I or every other officer might think it necessary that we and the men should obey their orders upon certain occasions), I embarked with the regiment;—a step which, however attached I may be to the king's service, I would sooner have quitted it than have taken, had I known that matter was to be arranged as I find it is.

"In addition to the objections I have to be under the command of persons who have thrown so many difficulties in the way of the service, and who are now throwing so many, that I shall probably be obliged to write an official complaint of some of them before the fleet sails—and in addition to the difficulties of *obliging* officers (particularly field-officers) to put themselves under the command of captains of Indiamen, or of taking the soldiers from under the orders of their own officers—there is this legal objection to the measure, viz., that the captains of the Indiamen have no legal method of enforcing obedience to their orders from their own seamen, much less will they have it of enforcing obedience from soldiers; and therefore, if it does not suit the pleasure of the men, they will not obey them. In my opinion, it would have been better to have left the matter where I placed it, and have trusted to the good sense and honour of the officers, and to the spirit of the soldiers, that every assistance would be given when the occasion might require it; and in that case, as they would not have felt themselves or their service disgraced, their exertions would have been greater, and their assistance more cordial than it can be expected to be under the existing circumstances.

"However, Sir, uncomfortable as I feel in embarking under such circumstances, I shall do everything in my power, and shall make those under me do everything in their power, to forward the service; and I hope that you will find that those whose ambitious claims have been complied with will do the same.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

"A. Wesley."

Sir John Shore returned a private answer, frankly admitting, with an expression of regret, that he had, through inadvertence, issued the order, which he instantly revoked.

The expedition proceeded to Penang, where orders were received from Lord Hobart, the Governor of Madras, for its return, his lordship (who had the sanction of the Bengal government for this step) having received advices from Europe of the treaty of Campo Formio, and being apprehensive of a design on the part of Tippoo Sultaun to invade the Carnatic.

Colonel Wesley accompanied his regiment back to Calcutta, whence he proceeded to Madras, to pay a visit to Lord Hobart, who was about to quit the government of that presidency and return to Europe. During a stay of two months on the coast, he examined the establishments at Madras and parts of the Carnatic, collecting, as was his wont, information which was afterwards turned to excellent account.

In May, 1798, the Earl of Mornington arrived at Calcutta, as successor to Sir John Shore in the general government of India, and, contrary to his expectation and that of the authorities by whom he was appointed, was speedily involved in a dangerous war. In order to understand the nature of this contest and to appreciate its difficulties, it is necessary to review the then existing political relations of British India with the chief native states, and the dispositions, views, and resources of the latter.

3.—*The Native States of India.*

Our possessions in India were at this period of far more limited extent than at present. In the letter which Lord Teignmouth left for the information of his successor, he stated that "the power of the British nation in India was most respectable, and that that, as well as their political reputation, was most generally respected. It has ever been," he added, "my anxious endeavour to promote it by a steady adherence to every engagement, by the sincerity of my public conduct, and by an attention to avoid any interference or measure which could excite jealousy or distrust. The line of non-

interference is so precisely delineated by statute, that it leaves little to the discretion of this government, and my experience fully confirms the wisdom of the legislative restrictions which have had a beneficial operation beyond the speculations of those who planned them." This passage distinctly enunciates the policy pursued by Lord Teignmouth, which was of a non-intervenient and non-repressive character.

The chief native princes with whom the Anglo-Indian government was at that time in relation were the Nawab-Vizier of Oude, the Nizam of the Deccan, the heads of the Mahratta confederacy, and the sovereign of the state of Mysore.

The authority of the Mohammedan emperor of Delhi, commonly called the Great Mogul, after the death of Aurungzebe, in 1707, rapidly declined, especially after the invasion of Nadir Shah, in 1739; and the soubahdars (viceroys of provinces) took advantage of this decay of power to make themselves independent. The Nawab-Vizier (now king) of Oude, one of these subordinate princes, attained a rank second only to the king of Delhi, in the estimation of the Mohammedan population, whilst in wealth and real power he was far his superior; but, since the year 1765, he had fallen gradually into dependence upon the British government of India, by a subsidiary alliance, whereby, for all objects of exterior policy, he became nearly a nonentity, and even in his interior administration he was restricted from adopting measures of importance without the concurrence of the Governor-General of India, signified through the British resident at his court. Just previous to the arrival of Lord Mornington, Sir John Shore had resorted to the extreme measure of deposing the reigning Nawab, Vizier Ali, who had succeeded the deceased sovereign, Asof-ud-Doulah, as his son; but the spuriousness of his birth was notorious, and his undisguised determination to emancipate himself from British influence and connection rendered his continuance on the throne incompatible with the engagements subsisting between the East-India Company and Oude. Sir John, therefore, substituted Saadut Ali, who evinced his gratitude by increasing the subsidy paid for the Company's protection, and by ceding the important fortress of Alla-

habad. By this change the British government secured a useful ally, and Sir John Shore hoped that by it "a foundation had been laid for political security, honour, and reputation in the country."

Saadut Ali's character, indeed, furnished no ground for expecting from him active or vigorous co-operation. He was timid and slothful, and, even under the guardianship of British protection, lived in constant dread of domestic intrigue, haunted by groundless suspicions that his nearest relatives were plotting against his throne and life. He accused his own brothers of having instigated attempts to procure his assassination,—a charge which was investigated by the resident, and proved to be void of any foundation. He was meanly parsimonious in his personal expenditure, and rigorous in his exaction of the revenue, his chief gratification being the accumulation of treasure. The curtailment of his income by the enforced alienation of a portion of his territories in commutation of a subsidy was a source of discontent, which, in conjunction with the interference of the resident, at a later period, disturbed his relations with our government.

The Nizam, or lieutenant of the Delhi monarchs, soubah (viceroy) of the Deccan, was another potentate who had converted delegated into sovereign power, but whom we had likewise, since 1768, enthralled in the meshes of our subsidiary system. The power of the reigning prince, Nizam Ali, as well as his health, was at this time declining, and his minister was anxious for a closer union with the Company's government. Although the Nizam's conduct subsequently excited some suspicion, and although he admitted French officers into his service, and augmented the corps they commanded, it appears that he did not really entertain views hostile to our power, but that the institution of the corps under French command was directed principally, if not solely, against the Mahrattas, who, in 1795, had compelled him to purchase security by an exorbitant sacrifice of money and territory.

This powerful Hindu nation had, like the Mohammedan viceroys, profited by the weakness of the Delhi monarchs to appropriate to themselves some of the finest portions of the empire, and, but for the

disunion created by quarrels for supremacy amongst their several leaders, they might have extended and prolonged their empire. Their object was plunder and rapine, and their irruptions into the countries south of the Ganges were marked by ruin and devastation. In 1770, they had spread themselves over Rajpootana, and occupied the whole country between the Jumna and that river.

The native seat of the Mahrattas is a region called by Hindu geographers Maharashtra, bounded on the west by the sea from Surat to Goa, and on the east by the river Warda. They are Sudras, an inferior caste amongst the Hindus, and, although smaller than the generality of their countrymen, are well made, active, and by no means deficient in courage. When the Mohammedans pushed their conquests into the south, or Deccan, they found the Mahrattas highly useful as light cavalry; large bodies of them were consequently taken into pay, and their leaders received grants of land. One of these Mahratta chiefs, named Shahjee, in the service of the Beejapore state, acquired by this means a territory of considerable extent in the south, and another in the north, including the city of Poonah. His son was the celebrated Sevajee, who, in the early part of the seventeenth century, combined the Mahrattas into one powerful nation.

The history of this extraordinary man might be wrought into an interesting narrative. At the age of nineteen, he had acquired renown as the leader of a party of marauders. He next possessed himself, by force or stratagem, of the hill forts in the neighbourhood of Poonah. Emboldened by this success, he seized a convoy of treasure belonging to the state of Beejapore, the sovereign of which threw his father into prison; but Sevajee obtained his release by transferring his own allegiance to the court of Delhi. The influence he acquired from his connection with the imperial authority favoured his schemes of aggrandizement, which were prosecuted with so little forbearance against the Beejapore state, that its ruler despatched an army against Sevajee. The manner in which the young Mahratta foiled his adversary will afford an insight into the deceitful, cruel, and unprincipled character of the man and of his nation.

The commander of the Beejapore troops, Afzul Khan, was induced,

by professions of repentance on the part of Sevajee, and his offers of submission, to send an envoy to him, a Bramin, whom the artful Mahratta, by appeals to his faith and interest, prevailed upon to join in a treacherous plot against the Mohammedan general. The Bramin, on his return, pretended that Sevajee was willing to surrender himself, but desired Afzul Khan's personal assurance of safety, and the Khan was inveigled by him into an interview with the wily Mahratta, under circumstances and at a spot favourable for the execution of the plot. Sevajee, a man of diminutive stature, clad in a cotton dress (which concealed a suit of chain armour), emerging almost alone from his fort, approached in a gait so abject and suppliant as to banish all suspicion from the mind of the Khan. Besides a dagger, concealed in his right sleeve, he had, however, fitted upon the fingers of his left hand a deadly weapon, of a peculiar shape, termed "a tiger's claw," a specimen of which (said, indeed, to be the identical instrument) may be seen in the East-India Museum. It is a steel bar, about three inches long, with rings at the ends for the fore and little fingers, and three curved blades, or claws, of steel, which are not noticed when the hand is partially closed. Afzul Khan, deceived by appearances, in order to banish all apprehension from his guest, advanced with open arms to embrace him, when the latter struck his steel claws into the bowels of the Khan, completing the assassination with the dagger. At a signal, a chosen band rushed from ambush upon the Khan's escort, whilst a large detachment of Sevajee's army attacked the Mohammedan troops, who, taken by surprise, and without a leader, were routed, leaving a rich spoil in the hands of the Mahrattas.

By such treachery as this, by intrigue and force, Sevajee compelled the Beejapore government to acknowledge his independence, and to cede to him a territory on the coast between Goa and Bombay. He now threw off the mask, and braved the imperial court itself; but being overmatched, he condescended to take a high command in the Mogul army. Subsequently, he recovered his territory, which he largely augmented, having in 1661 conquered the whole coast of the Concan. He established an admirable system of civil

administration, organized his numerous army, and at his death, in 1680, he had laid the foundations of a great power, which, within little more than half a century, made more than one-third of the Peninsula subject or tributary to it. The Mahrattas, in 1735, obtained authority to collect the *chout*, or fourth part of the net revenues of all the provinces of the Mogul empire, except Bengal.

At the period now in question, the Mahratta confederacy, through neglect of the sagacious maxims of Sevajee, the ambition of the leaders, who asserted their independence, and the disasters they had sustained, presented a different aspect. The head of the nation was the Ram Rajah, or rajah of Sattara; but he had become a mere instrument in the hands of the Peishwa, his nominal minister or vicegerent, though the real chief of the state, who resided at Poonah, and whose power, too, had at this time faded almost to a shadow: Scindiah, Holkar, the Bhonslah rajah of Berar, and the Guicowar, divided amongst them the real authority. The first of these chiefs is more immediately connected with the subject of this sketch.

Doulut Rao Scindiah was the adopted son of Madhajee Scindiah, whose ancestor had obtained a part of Malwa, and who, soon after the fatal battle of Paniput, in 1761, in which the Mahratta army was almost annihilated by the Affghans, became, by his talents and address, and the aid of De Boigne, a French adventurer, the most dominant of the Mahratta chiefs. Dying in 1794, he left his vast possessions, and an army better disciplined and equipped, as well as more efficient, than had ever been formed by a native prince in India, to Doulut Rao, then only fourteen years of age. In the following year, the violent death of the Peishwa, Madhoo Rao, involved the Mahratta princes in a series of intrigues, which disclose the most consummate baseness and treachery, in the course of which Scindiah, encouraged by the timidity, or the temporizing policy, of the new Peishwa, Bajee Rao, to whom he had secured the succession, interfered more arbitrarily in the state affairs of Poonah than any chief of the confederacy had hitherto done.

Holkar, whose territory grew out of a grant of parts of Malwa and Candeish, maintained a large army, and was only second in

power to Scindiah, whom he regarded as a rival, though his authority was much impaired by family divisions. The Bhonslah, or rajah of Nagpore, in Berar, though a Mahratta chief, who received his investiture from the Peishwa, and though nominally bukshi, or commander of the army, had little concern in the general politics of the confederacy, carrying on his administration independently. Since 1793, however, he had made some progress in power, at the expense of the Peishwa, the Nizam, and the Patan princes in Malwa, and his strength and consideration were on the increase. The Guicowar was still more estranged from Mahratta interests.

As a nation, or empire, the Mahrattas were connected with the East-India Company by treaties, which commenced so early as 1739, and separate compacts were likewise formed with different Mahratta chiefs, by which cessions and arrangements of territory were made between the parties. One of these separate treaties was concluded in 1781, with Madhajee Scindiah, through whose mediation a general treaty of peace with the Mahratta nation was agreed to and executed in 1782. A tripartite treaty between the Company, the Nizam, and the Peishwa, stipulated that, if the Sultaun of Mysore should attack either, the others should join to prevent him.

Of the actual condition of the Mahrattas, and our policy with reference to them, Lord Mornington thus wrote to the President of the India Board in 1798 :—

"I have always considered the precise situation in which the Mahratta empire stood, after the peace of Seringapatam, as the most favourable to our interests. The powers of the different co-estates were then sufficiently balanced amongst each other to prevent any danger of that degree of union which could, at any time, bring the whole of their force to operate in one consolidated mass against the British possessions. On the other hand, the influence of the Peishwa, or head of the co-estates, and of his minister, Nana, was such as to enable them to bring into the field a respectable force, whenever their engagements with us might require such an effort. This appears to me to be the position in which we ought to endea-

vour to maintain the Mahratta states, in which neither the government of Poonah, nor any branch of the empire, should obtain such an ascendancy as might enable it to concentre the formidable strength of the whole against us, while the head of this great body should still preserve such a degree of power over several of the leading chiefs, as to become a respectable ally to us in the moment of necessity. The present posture of the Mahratta power is directly the reverse, in one respect, of that which I have described. Fortunately, no one of the co-estates, nor the head of the empire, has yet acquired the means of wielding the united force of the whole body; but while some of the chiefs have made great and valuable acquisitions of dominion, and considerably increased their military strength, the authority and influence of the Peishwa has rapidly declined; and it would not now be expected that any respectable body of chiefs would be disposed to prosecute, under his direction, any common view, or joint operation, with any degree of zeal or vigour. This has been the effect produced by the late series of revolutions at Poonah. I believe it may justly be said that, since the foundation of the government, the power of the Peishwa never was so inconsiderable in the general scale of the Mahratta states as it is at this moment."

Tippoo Sultaun, the Mussulman sovereign of the Mysore, was the successor of the renowned Hyder Ali, who, though son of a naigue, or petty officer, in the service of a chief in the Deccan, erected a formidable empire in the Carnatic, and at one time "threatened, with no ideal terrors, the extinction of the British power in India." His son Tippoo inherited his father's ambition and his antipathy to the British, but not his talents. Having plunged into a war with the East-India Company in 1790, he was in 1792 besieged by Lord Cornwallis in Seringapatam, and compelled to sign a treaty, by which he ceded to the allied powers,—the British, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas,—half of his dominions. So severe a sacrifice, to which he submitted with bitter mortification, was not likely to extinguish his hatred of the English, and Lord Teignmouth, in his

letter to his successor, warned him that "Tippoo will certainly avail himself of any fresh opportunity to re-establish the power and reputation which he lost in his former contest with us."

These were the principal native powers with whom the government of Lord Mornington appeared to run any risk of becoming embroiled. The Nawab of the Carnatic, Mahomed Ali, the only other native sovereign of note, had, in 1792, concluded a new treaty with the Company, whereby all the forts in the Carnatic were to be garrisoned by British troops, and, in the event of war breaking out, the Company were to exercise full authority over the whole country.

Zemaun Shah, the sovereign of Affghanistan, at the close of the year 1796, had crossed the Indus, and, advancing by rapid marches into the Punjab, had taken Lahore. This invasion, for a time, excited much alarm at Calcutta; but, in the following year, the Shah, after committing great excesses in Lahore, was recalled to Cabul by the reported revolt of his brother.

Amongst the minor powers who might embarrass our Indian government may likewise be enumerated the Rohillas, whose chief, Gholam Mahomed, the leader of the rebellion in 1794, had returned into Rohilcund; and the Sikhs, then rising into strength, and who maintained a constant intercourse with the Mahrattas.

4.—*War with Mysore.*

It has been already observed, that when Lord Mornington quitted England, he had no reason to anticipate hostilities in India; and in a minute recorded by him, as Governor-General, on the 12th June, 1798, a month after his arrival, he says: "I perceive no circumstance, either in the present disposition, or in the actual strength and condition, of the native powers, which should afford reason to apprehend the approach of hostilities from any quarter." He did not deem it prudent, however, to reduce the army "until he should be enabled to ascertain with more accuracy the designs of Tippoo and of Zemaun Shah, and until the settlement of the province of Oude should have acquired more vigour and consistency." This fact will be a sufficient answer to the charge of Mr. Mill, who traces

the Mysore war to the anti-Jacobin enthusiasm of the new Governor-General. "Lord Mornington," observes that acute, but partial, historian, "arrived in Calcutta with a mind more than usually inflamed with the ministerial passions then burning in England, and in a state peculiarly apt to be seized both with dread and with hatred of any power that was French."

Nothing could be more pacific and friendly than the professions of the Sultaun of the Mysore. In a letter, addressed to Sir John Shore, received at Calcutta (after his departure) on the 26th April, 1798, —the same day on which the Earl of Mornington landed at Madras, —the Sultaun wrote: "You must impress Lord Mornington with a sense of the friendship and unanimity so firmly subsisting between us; my friendly heart is disposed to pay every regard to truth and justice, and to strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord established between the two states."

On this very day, the ambassadors sent by Tippoo to the Mauritius landed at Mangalore, accompanied by a French force, and it was proved, by a letter found in the palace of Seringapatam after the death of Tippoo, that he had, long before this, been in correspondence with M. Raymond, the commander of the French corps in the service of the Nizam at Hyderabad. He had, moreover, sent vakeels (envoys) to Poonah, and opened a communication with Zemaun Shah.

In the beginning of June, 1798, the Governor-General received a copy of a proclamation, dated the 30th January preceding (10th Pluviose, an 6), purporting to have been issued by M. Malartic, the French governor of the Mauritius, announcing the arrival of the two ambassadors from Tippoo Sultaun, with propositions for forming an alliance offensive and defensive with the French, in which he offered to maintain a body of their troops in India, declaring that "he only waited the moment when the French shall come to his assistance, to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desired to expel from India."

Lord Mornington at first doubted the genuineness of this document; but when convinced upon that head, he did not hesitate as to

the measures he should adopt. Authority was not wanting; the secret committee at home wrote to him in the following terms:— "Our empire in the East has ever been an object of jealousy to the French; we have no doubt that the present government of France would even adopt measures of a most enterprising and uncommon nature for the chance of reducing the British power and consequence in India. We recommend energy, promptness, and decision. Do not wait for actual hostilities on the part of Tippoo, should he have entered into a league with the French."

On the 20th June, in a secret letter to General (afterwards Lord) Harris, then the acting Governor of Madras, Lord Mornington communicated his determination "to call upon the allies, assemble the army upon the coast, and march directly upon Seringapatam."

When this bold measure was made known to the authorities at Madras, they were seized with consternation. Mr. Webbe, the chief secretary, a man of no pusillanimous character, and who was pronounced by the Duke of Wellington, in after-times, "one of the ablest and honestest men he ever knew," reflecting upon their unprepared state (a large proportion of the troops being otherwise employed, the treasury being empty, and the credit of the government low), bearing, too, in mind the horrors of Hyder's invasion of the Carnatic, exclaimed in dismay, "I can anticipate nothing but a return of shocking disasters from a premature attack upon Tippoo in our present disabled condition, and the impeachment of Lord Mornington for his temerity." In a very able memorandum, drawn up at the request of General Harris, Mr. Webbe set forth objections to the measure which would have staggered ordinary minds, adding in conclusion, that, "if war is inevitable, I fear our situation is bad beyond the hope of remedy." Colonel Close, the adjutant-general, declared that the Madras forces were not capable of defending the Company's territories, if attacked, much less of carrying on offensive operations, particularly in a country like Mysore, and that they could not possibly move before the spring of 1799. General Harris so far partook of the almost general feeling, that, although he avowed his determination to "follow orders to the utmost limit of his means,

and leave the issue in higher hands," he laid before the earl his own apprehensions, arising from the weakness of their force, the little dependence to be placed upon the allies, and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of equipping the army before February, and of feeding it during a rapid direct march to Seringapatam.

Lord Mornington had too well weighed and considered the subject to be deterred from his purpose by reasons which, in truth, only showed how much our political existence in India was at the mercy of a treacherous enemy, and he resolved to persevere, and to "reduce the power of Tippoo to such a condition as should render him unable to avail himself of the solicited assistance of France, or of any other collateral aid which the course of future circumstances may offer to him for the protection of his declared design of expelling the British nation from India."

On the 16th of July, the Governor-General addressed to General Harris a letter, containing a complete exposition of his views respecting the state of affairs. In this document, Lord Mornington stated that he had obtained the fullest evidence of the nature of Tippoo's design against the British power in India, and that he had made preparations for carrying them into effect: he observed that, whilst our army remained unprepared to take the field in the Carnatic, an implacable adversary enjoyed the advantage of selecting the time and mode of his long-meditated attack upon our defenceless possessions; that in such a state of weakness, his first assault must be successful, so that the question was whether, by continuing unarmed and unallied, the issues of peace, war, and victory should be abandoned to the discretion of a vindictive enemy, or, by meeting him in the field, the advantages he possessed be seized by ourselves. He then showed that every practical reduction of Tippoo's power was warranted by the principles of justice, and demanded by those of policy, and that it was the duty of the Indian Government to establish the security of the Carnatic upon a foundation more solid than that prince's forbearance. He added, that this object and the safety of our power in India demanded the co-operation of the Peishwa and the Nizam, and that the precautions he proposed to take

for the general defence of British interests included the restoration of those two members of the triple alliance to the power of fulfilling their engagements with us; not anticipating, he said, that Scindiah would be able to oppose any effectual obstacle to the success of a plan founded on the real interests of all parties. The remainder of this very able letter of the earl discusses the military details of the subject with a professional ability which leads to the conclusion, that, in this portion of it, he had the benefit of the advice and suggestions of his brother.

This "comprehensive explanation," as it was termed by General Harris, dispelled every doubt from his mind, and the assemblage of the troops commenced forthwith.

One of the collateral objects aimed at by the Governor-General was that of extirpating a French party that was growing up in the councils and armies of the native powers of India, and, whatever might be the motive of the Nizam in entertaining M. Raymond and his companions, Lord Mornington determined to remove them from his capital. A force was accordingly collected, which, after some opposition on the part of the Madras council, was marched to Hyderabad, under Colonel Roberts, in October, 1798, and this important measure was effected without opposition, though the number of French officers was 125, and the force under them consisted of 14,000 well-disciplined infantry.

In furtherance of the Governor-General's plans, a new treaty of alliance was formed with the Nizam, in which the Peishwa concurred, which stipulated for the neutrality of the head of the Mahratta confederacy, and both princes were placed upon the footing of allies of the British in the meditated war with Mysore.

Preparations now went on with unusual vigour for the campaign. The repugnance of Mr. Webbe and other functionaries to Lord Mornington's enlarged views for tranquillizing India gradually yielded to maturer reflection; Lord Clive, the new governor of Madras, heartily seconded the Governor-General's wishes, and before the close of 1798, a force of 21,000 men, of which number 4,300 were Europeans, perfect in all points, was equipped for

service, besides two corps on the Malabar coast and to the southward, intended to co-operate with the grand army. The reinforcements sent from Bengal included the 33rd regiment, under the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Wellesley,—as he was now named.

In November, the greater part of the troops had assembled at Wallajabad, the command of whom, on the death of Colonel Ashton, devolved upon Colonel Wellesley; and his attention to the discipline and comfort of the troops, whom he practised in combined movements, and the admirable system he adopted in supplying the bazars (or military markets), attracted the notice of General Harris, when he assumed the general command of the army at Vellore, and he published a general order commending the arrangements. He likewise forwarded the following letter to the Earl of Mornington:—

"Camp, near Vellore, Feb. 2, 1799.

"My Lord,—Having had leisure, since my arrival here, to inspect the division of the army which has been since its formation under the orders of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, I have much satisfaction in acquainting your lordship, that the very handsome appearance and perfect discipline of the troops do honour to themselves and to him; whilst the judicious and masterly arrangements in respect to supplies, which opened an abundant free market, and inspired confidence into dealers of every description, were no less creditable to Colonel Wellesley than advantageous to the public service, and deservedly entitle him to my thanks and approbation."

The Governor-General proceeded from Calcutta to Madras, in order to be near the scene of action. In November and in January he had addressed two letters of remonstrance to the Sultaun, to which no reply was returned until the 13th February, when his highness informed his lordship, curtly, that he was going on a hunting excursion, and desired that Major Doveton (whom Lord Mornington had proposed to depute as his agent to re-establish a good understanding) might be sent to him slightly attended (or unattended). On the 22nd February, 1799, the Governor-General issued

a declaration of war against the Mysore prince on behalf of the Company and their allies, the Nizam and the Peishwa. In this document he charged the Sultaun with sending embassies and making military preparations hostile to the interests of the allies, in spite of their pacific disposition and good faith (which he had himself acknowledged, with amicable professions), since the treaty of Seringapatam; and taxed him with contracting engagements with the French in direct violation of the treaty and of his protestations of friendship; with employing evasions and subterfuges, in reply to reasonable proposals of accommodation, and treating the communications of the Governor-General with obstinate silence, the tardy reply vouchsafed being tantamount to a rejection of all amicable negotiation, whereby he had compelled the allies to arm in defence of their rights, their happiness, and their honour.

Before the army commenced its march from Vellore, it was joined by the British detachment serving with the Nizam, numbering 6,500 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts; an equal number of the Nizam's infantry (including some of the sepoys lately under French officers), commanded by Captain (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm; and a large body of the Nizam's cavalry, under Captain Walker. The aggregate force assembled, under General Harris, amounted to upwards of 30,000 men, in the finest order, in respect to equipment and discipline; whilst an army on the western coast, of equal excellence, under Lieutenant-General Stuart, consisting of 6,400 men (including 1,600 Europeans); a detachment of 4,000 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, and another of 5,000, under Lieutenant-Colonel Read, in the southern districts of the Carnatic and the Baramahl, were ready to co-operate with the commander-in-chief, and to bring supplies. "An army more perfect in all its parts," observes Mr. Lushington, in his *Life of Lord Harris*, "had never taken the field in India."

To appreciate the exertions made, not merely in assembling so large a force, but in perfecting its discipline in so short a period of *time, the then state of* our native army must be taken into consideration, *and the impediments* offered by the subordinate authorities

to the measures necessary for carrying into effect the views of Lord Mornington. Upon the first point we have the testimony of General Sir James Craig, of the King's service, who, "in the confidence of a private communication" to the earl, thus describes the condition of the army :—

"Neither the discipline of the army, or the knowledge of the officers, is such as to admit of our being insensible to other disadvantages. My view is, that your lordship may be aware of the state of the army, which it is at least possible you may not be through any other channel. Three-fourths of those with whom you act do not themselves know it, and the other fourth will not confess it. It is a fact, however, past controversy, that, within these four years, and owing to these very circumstances, of want of discipline and knowledge, the fate of our empire in India, probably, hung by a thread of the slightest texture."

The second point is strongly adverted to in a private letter from Colonel Wellesley to Lord Harris, dated 3rd October, 1798, wherein he complains of the proceedings of those "whose aim," he says, "one would almost believe to be to throw impediments in the way of everything that is to be done for the public service at the present moment." Even the new Governor of Madras, Lord Clive, who arrived in August, 1798, in the midst of the bustle of preparation, and who seems to have felt from the first a desire to forward the views of the supreme government,—his alacrity and zeal being acknowledged by Lord Mornington,—could not restrain himself from confessing to Mr. Dundas that "they were in a far more distressing situation than he had any conception of."

The spirit infused into the heads of the Madras government by the energetic letters of Lord Mornington, and, above all, by the presence and exertions of Colonel Wellesley at the presidency, wrought so great a change, that, when the Governor-General arrived at Fort St. George in December, he had the satisfaction of seeing all hearts and hands united for the execution of his measures. "I cannot express to your lordship," says Lord Clive, writing to the Earl of Mornington on the 22nd August, "the satisfaction I

feel in the arrival of Colonel Wellesley; I find him so easy in his manners, and so friendly in his communications."

5.—*March to Seringapatam.—Battle of Mallavelly.*

The command of the army of the Carnatic was conferred upon General Harris, with an extent of power never before reposed in a commander in India, but which the Governor-General knew was essential to the success of such an enterprise. He was authorized to call upon all the servants of the Company, civil and military, for every aid and resource they could supply, and their knowledge that Lord Mornington was at Fort St. George, prepared to enforce the just exercise of these powers, inspired prompt obedience and vigorous exertion. The general was further assisted by a commission, political and diplomatic, to act in subordination to him, consisting of Colonels Wellesley, Close, and Agnew, and Captain Malcolm, with the view of carrying on negotiations with tributaries and principal officers who might be disposed to throw off their allegiance to Tippoo.

In order to give the Nizam's contingent (under Meer Allum, his highness's minister,) the utmost respectability, and as much efficiency as possible, General Harris had deemed it proper to strengthen the detachment of sepoys joined with it with an European regiment, and form the whole into a separate division. He selected the 33rd regiment for this purpose, and, Colonel Roberts having expressed a wish to be relieved, the general command of the division was given to Colonel Wellesley, the commander of the king's corps. This arrangement, in some respects an accidental one, was very agreeable to the Nizam and to Meer Allum, who had expressed a wish that the Governor-General's brother should be appointed to command his highness's forces. It placed Colonel Wellesley at the head of a respectable force of eleven battalions, and furnished him, shortly, with an opportunity to display his talents in the field.

This is one of the appointments upon which was founded a charge of partiality and favouritism brought against General Harris by Sir David (then Major-General) Baird, and since revived by his bio-

grapher, Mr. Theodore Hook. The substance of the charge is, that, by the selection of Colonel Wellesley to command the Nizam's subsidiary force, he disregarded the superior claims of Major-General Baird, and that this partiality originated in a servile deference to the secret commands or private wishes of the Governor-General.

When Colonel Wellesley was selected to command the Nizam's force, there were three major-generals in the army senior to General Baird, and consequently superior to Colonel Wellesley in rank; but the agreement with the Nizam provided only for the pay of a colonel commanding; consequently, the Contingent could be commanded only by an officer of that rank. When the 33rd regiment was selected to join the Contingent, the temporary command of that force necessarily devolved upon Colonel Wellesley, he being the senior officer of the European regiments with the army. Moreover, this was a political as well as a military appointment. Ultimately, General Baird, who at first resented the supposed slight, acknowledged his error.

The army had to traverse 270 miles of hostile country before it could reach Seringapatam, and the difficulties of such a march can be rightly estimated only by those who are familiar with the climate and other obstacles which nature and the state of society oppose to military movements in India. The roads are always bad, and sometimes, from the nature of the soil, for days, and even weeks, impassable. In the mountainous parts they are narrow and rocky passes, requiring immense labour in the transport of artillery; whilst every river, and at some seasons every stream, offers a serious obstruction. The difficulties and sufferings experienced in 1791, by the army of Lord Cornwallis, in his advance to Seringapatam,—who was compelled to abandon and destroy his battering train, and lead back his victorious army in a state of miserable destitution,—and of which General Harris had been himself a witness, are feelingly described by Major Dirom. On its advance, it had suffered extremely from the climate, weather, and fatigue in bringing on the artillery, which, partly from Bangalore to Caniambaddy, and entirely thence to Seringapatam, had been dragged by hand.

The strength of the enemy was not well known. The army of Tippoo was supposed to have suffered essentially both in numbers and discipline since the last war; his finances were, like those of most native princes, in great disorder; his councils were distracted by various contending factions, and his spirits might easily be supposed to be dejected by the premature discovery of his projects, by the disappointment of his hopes of French assistance, by the retreat of Zemaun Shah, by the failure of his intrigues at the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, and by the unexampled vigour and extent of our military preparations. On the other hand, he had resources in a still extensive territory, in the enthusiasm which religious antipathy might inspire into a portion of the population, and in the resolution he had formed to defend himself to the last extremity, and bury himself in the ruins of his capital.

After receiving a heart-stirring letter from Lord Mornington, General Harris entered the Mysore territory on the 5th of March, 1799, and commenced hostilities by taking possession of several hill-forts within the enemy's frontier. The army was not, however, in a condition to make its united movement upon Seringapatam until the 9th of March, many delays having occurred through the want of sufficient means of transport, not only for the equipment and materials for the siege, but for the cumbrous baggage of the Nizam's army, and crowds of brinjarries (grain-dealers) and camp-followers.

Meanwhile, Tippoo Sultaun was not idle. His first movement was towards his eastern frontier, giving out that he meant to confront our grand army; but, suddenly and secretly, he turned in an opposite direction, and advanced rapidly with the flower of his infantry towards the western army, under General Stuart, which had assembled at Cannanore, and was on its march to co-operate with the main body. The design was skilfully conceived. The Sultaun hoped not only to make a serious impression upon the Bombay troops, but to embarrass and delay their future movements until the *state* of the river Cavery in May should render the siege of the *capital impracticable* until the following season. Upon the advance

of the Bombay troops reaching Seedaseer, the tents of the Mysoreans were observed accidentally by the rajah of Coorg (an ally of the British) and a party of English officers whom he had conducted to the top of a high hill. The country being full of jungle, or tall, thick underwood, favourable for concealed movements, their force could not be ascertained. General Stuart, who little dreamed of the Sultaun being in his front, had posted four native battalions in advance, under Colonel Montresor, the rest of the troops being, some eight, some twelve miles, in the rear. The enemy, having penetrated the jungle, came suddenly upon the four battalions, who, though pressed by superior numbers in front and rear, received their assailants steadily, and defended themselves resolutely for five hours, until General Stuart arrived to support them, just when they were exhausted with fatigue and their ammunition was almost expended. The enemy then gave way and retired in disorder to their camp of Periapatam. In this action, in which the combatants on both sides were natives, the Sultaun had more than 11,000 men, and the British only 2,000. The former lost 1,500 men; the latter 140. On the 11th of March, the Sultaun marched from Periapatam to Seringapatam, to meet the army of the Carnatic.

That army had encountered obstacles which amply excused the apprehensions of Mr. Webbe and the Madras authorities. The draught cattle died in vast numbers, owing to severe labour in dragging the guns, scanty food, and being confined to water impregnated with the soil of Mysore, to which they were unaccustomed. After each day's march came mournful reports of the death of carriage-bullocks, the abandonment of stores (left with the dying cattle in the jungles) and of rice, indispensable to the sustenance of the fighting men, as well as to the crowds of followers. To replace these losses in the enemy's country was hopeless, and at one time they had accumulated so rapidly, that General Harris apprehended that it would be absolutely necessary to drag the guns forward by the hands of the Europeans. The evil originated with the native contractors, who, finding themselves abridged, by some new regulation, of their *customary fraudulent* gains, threw impediments in the way of sup-

plies, which no prudence could foresee and no exertions remove. The insight which this incident gave him into the native character, as Major Sherer observes, was not lost upon Colonel Wellesley, as his rapid marches in the Deccan, at a later period, abundantly testify. The British army never had a general so minutely attentive to the commissariat department, the means of transport, his depôts and supplies.

The arrangements necessary in order to remedy these impediments compelled the army to make repeated halts. On the 21st it encamped at Kankanelly, having yet experienced no molestation from the enemy, who even retired from the strong heights on the eastern bank of the Muddoor river, without disputing the passage, on the arrival of the forces on the 24th.

General Harris received no authentic intelligence of the action at Seedaseer until the 25th of March, when it was hailed with satisfaction by the grand army. The following day, General Floyd, with the cavalry in advance, reported that a large body of cavalry was on his right, and Tippoo's army in front. General Harris says, in his journal: "Colonel Wellesley's column not having yet made its appearance, I directed ours to move very slow, and sent off a note to him to move on briskly; but before he could get parallel, we had gained the rising ground the army was prepared to encamp upon, and found, if Tippoo was in our front, he was now moving off in the direction of Mallavelly." The general had determined not to seek an action with Tippoo until he sat down before Seringapatam; but, the army being stopped on the high road, and fired upon, a battle was unavoidable.

The Sultaun had chosen his own position, and a finer field of action it would be difficult to find, the high ground beyond the plain of Mallavelly, nearly 230 miles from Vellore, and about forty miles from the capital.

On the 27th of March, the army marched for the town of Mallavelly, expecting to be cannonaded while crossing the swampy ground before it, but which was found to be abandoned. On reconnoitering

from a cavalier in the fort, Tippoo's army was perceived in motion, about three miles off, and, soon after, a cannonade opened, and large bodies of infantry and cavalry appeared in the hollow and at the ridge of the hill. They showed a bold front, and did not flinch as our forces advanced, which were thus disposed:—

The British army, under General Harris, formed the right wing; the Nizam's contingent, with the British regiments, including the 33rd, under Colonel Wellesley, composed the left. The right wing, having deployed into line, began to advance, and an opening being left between two brigades, the Sultaun in person led against them, with much spirit, a body of cavalry, but produced no disorder in the British ranks, the Scotch brigade pouring in a close fire upon them. The infantry, on the enemy's left, advanced, firing irregularly, with the intention (as it afterwards appeared) of charging with the bayonet; but their resolution failed them, for, after receiving a heavy fire from his Majesty's 12th regiment, they broke and ran. The right wing now moved on in line, but the enemy, both horse and foot, ran too fast to be caught; and here the operations of that wing, which had followed and cannonaded the enemy for nearly two miles, terminated.

In the meanwhile, the division commanded by Colonel Wellesley, formed nearly opposite the enemy's extreme right, which was strongly posted on the elevated crest of a rocky ridge, advanced in echellon of battalions, supported by three regiments of cavalry, when a column of the enemy's infantry, about 2,000, moved forward, with much resolution, in excellent order, towards the 33rd regiment. This corps reserved its fire, with the utmost steadiness, after receiving that of the enemy, till at the distance of about sixty yards, then, quickening its advance, led by Colonel Wellesley in person, charged with the bayonet. The column gave way, and was thrown into disorder. General Floyd, with the cavalry, seized this critical moment, and a charge, led by Major (afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas) Dallas, amidst their broken ranks, destroyed great numbers, six standards being also taken.

After this, the retreat of the enemy became general, and the action ceased. In a memorandum written by Lord Harris, not long before his decease, he thus refers to the affair of Mallavelly :—

"There can be no doubt that the failure of this attempt decided the battle in Tippoo's mind, as his army instantly retreated; but Poorneah (his minister) afterwards confirmed it to me, and explained his hope of breaking our line by 300 devoted men (who, under the influence of stimulants, charged the Scotch brigade), and then of pouring in his whole cavalry."

Military authorities do not scruple to affirm that the defeat of the enemy's right wing, which was complete, by the division of Colonel Wellesley, was the great feat of the day.

This affair cost the British army only sixty-six men, killed, wounded, and missing; whilst the loss of Tippoo was nearly 2,000 amongst whom were some of his best men and bravest officers.

6.—*Arrival at Seringapatam.—Affair of the Sultanpettah Tope.*

His discomfiture at Mallavelly made a deep impression upon the Sultaun; but he prepared, nevertheless, to dispute the advance of the British troops in the route by which he felt assured they would march from thence to Seringapatam. On the following day, the army moved about four miles towards the Cavery, halting at Angarapooram, in the usual road, where General Harris prepared to execute a plan he had formed, of crossing the Cavery near Soosilly, and attacking Seringapatam on the western side, in order to facilitate the junction of the Bombay army, and the reception of the supplies of grain through the Caverypooram pass, escorted by the detachments of Colonels Read and Browne. The country was reconnoitred in the evening of the 28th of March, and found to be open along the projected route, with a gentle descent to the river, distant about nine miles, where there was an easy ford. The general thereupon determined to march to the Cavery that morning, delaying the order to move, however, until the last moment. By this precaution, the left

wing of the army, under Colonel Wellesley, had crossed the Cavery before night, whilst Tippoo was still looking for them on the direct road to Seringapatam. On the 30th, the remainder of the force, the park and ordnance, passed the river, and encamped near the fort of Soosilly, where they found abundance of forage, grain, cattle, and sheep.

When the intelligence of this movement reached Tippoo, it filled him with alarm, and, assembling his principal officers, he said, "We have arrived at our last stage,—what is your determination?" The general reply was, "To die with you." He fell back slowly upon Seringapatam, keeping the British army in view, which on the 5th April took up its position for the siege of the fortress.

A line of intrenchments had been constructed by the enemy between the Doulut Baug and the Periapatam Bridge, covering that part of the fort. Between these works and the river Cavery, the infantry of Tippoo were encamped. The British camp was formed opposite the west face of the fort, at the distance of 3,500 yards. The right, fronting the east, was posted on high commanding ground, whence it gradually descended to the left flank, which was doubly secured by an aqueduct, or water-course, and the Cavery. From the left of the position, this aqueduct took an easterly direction, till within 1,700 yards of the fort, where it turned off towards a tope, or grove, called the Sultanpettah Tope, serving, in many parts of its winding course, as a strong intrenchment, and several deep and difficult ravines in the rear of the encampment gave it protection from the sudden irruption of the enemy's horse.

The position, however, was found to be exposed in some parts to annoyance from the enemy's advanced posts, several ruined villages and rocky eminences in front affording cover to their rocket-men. It became indispensable, therefore, to the security of the camp, to dislodge the enemy from these posts. These preliminary operations having been much misunderstood and misrepresented, especially in respect to the share which fell to the lot of the late duke, it will be proper to detail them with some degree of minuteness, *from the authentic* statements published by Mr. Lushington in

his *Life of Lord Harris*, furnished by three different but most trustworthy authorities,—the private, general, and public despatches of Lord Harris, the letters of Colonel Wellesley, and the corroborating testimony of Major-General Baird.

The last-named officer was the first employed upon this duty; being ordered to clear the Sultanpettah tope with the flank companies of his Majesty's 12th, 74th, and Scotch brigade, and the battalion companies of the 74th. He left the camp at ten o'clock at night, traversed the tope, which he found unoccupied, and, not thinking it necessary to remain in possession of it, was returning to the camp, when he missed his way, and was actually marching to the fort, until one of his officers (Lieutenant Lambton, afterwards the celebrated surveyor) convinced the major-general, from his observation of the stars, that he was going north instead of south, when the party faced about, and did not reach the camp until four o'clock in the morning. They had no sooner arrived, than the enemy were seen returning to the tope, which they had only quitted during the night. General Harris determined to retain possession of the tope, and also to occupy a post which extended further to the westward and nearer to the fort. Colonel Shawe, with his Majesty's 12th regiment, and two battalions of sepoys, was directed to attack the post on the left, which was a watercourse, with its embankment, running between the fort and the encampment; and Colonel Wellesley was ordered to assault the tope, with the 33rd regiment and a native battalion. It was with reference to this service that the latter wrote the following note to General Harris:—

"Camp, April 5, 1799.

"My dear Sir,—I do not know where you mean the post to be established, and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will do me the favour to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines, and show it to me. In the mean time, I will order my battalions to be in readiness.

"*Upon looking at the* tope as I came in just now, it appeared to

me that, when you get possession of the bank of the nullah, you have the tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former. However, you are the best judge, and I shall be ready.—I am, my dear Sir, your most faithful servant,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

The part of the Sultanpettah tope nearest to the camp was about 900 yards off, and Colonel Shawe's post about 1,700 yards; but the watercourse, where it went through the tope, ran in a serpentine direction, and the enemy were posted under cover of its windings in the tope, so that, whichever way the attacking party placed its front, it was flanked by them.

The party under Colonel Shawe left the camp at eight o'clock in the morning, and seized a ruined village, within forty yards of the watercourse. At nine o'clock, heavy firing of musketry was heard everywhere in front, and information was brought to the camp that his two sepoy battalions had separated from the 12th regiment, which was in possession of the watercourse. It afterwards appeared that one of the battalions of sepoys, getting into confusion, paid no regard to orders, and its commander was killed while endeavouring to rally them. Colonel Shawe found it in this state, firing in every direction, but refusing to come forward. The other sepoy battalion had moved more forward, but the fire of the enemy coming thick upon them, they fell back.

Colonel Wellesley entered the tope at the same time, with the flank companies of the 33rd regiment, supported by the battalion companies under Major Shee, he was immediately assailed by a hot fire in front and flank, and owing to the unevenness of the ground and the darkness of the night, the advanced party was separated, and several men and an officer were killed. Major Shee, with five companies of the 33rd, lost his way, and falling in with Colonel Shawe, took shelter under the embankments of the watercourse he occupied, where he remained until daylight, and then returned to camp, reporting that Colonel Wellesley and one company were *missing*. The colonel, however, had arrived at the commander-

in-chief's tent at twelve o'clock at night, and reported the failure of his attack on the tope.

The affair is thus noted in the journal of General Harris:—

"6th April, 1799. Remained under great anxiety till near twelve at night, from the fear our troops had fired on each other. Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe very soon reported himself in possession of the post; but a second firing commenced, and as he had previously sent to know what had become of the two native battalions, I could not be satisfied but that, in the dark, they had mistaken each other. It proved that all the firing was from the enemy, his Majesty's 12th regiment scarcely firing a shot the whole night. Near twelve, Colonel Wellesley came to my tent, in a good deal of agitation, to say he had not carried the tope. It proved that the 33rd, with which he attacked, got into confusion, and could not be formed, which was a great pity, as it must be particularly unpleasant to him. Altogether, circumstances considered, we got off very well. General Baird's expedition of last night so far answered our expectations, as he fell in with a small party of the enemy's horse, and cut up eight or ten of them, which will tend to prevent their plaguing us with rockets, I trust. He missed his road coming back, although one would have thought it impossible; no wonder night attacks so often fail."

At daylight, on the 6th, large bodies of Tippoo's infantry crossed over from the island and the fort, to support those in the tope and watercourse, and a strong party of cavalry took post in the rear of the tope, evidently with a determination to dislodge Colonel Shawe. Observing this, General Harris determined to make another attack on the tope, both to clear and occupy it, and to support that officer with a force that should exclude the risk of another failure, and drive the enemy from their whole line of outposts, from the tope to the Cavery.

The Scotch brigade and two battalions of sepoys were first ordered for the service, under Colonel Wellesley, but when more of *the enemy, cavalry* and infantry, were seen marching in the direc-

tion of the tope, four 12-pounders were added, and the 25th regiment of Light Dragoons, under Colonel Cotton (now Lord Combermere), with the 2nd regiment of Native Cavalry, under Colonel Pater, were directed to support the right flank. Colonel Wallace was also sent, with a company of the 74th and four companies of sepoys, to occupy a rock on Colonel Shawe's left. When all was ready, Colonel Wellesley, who had been named for the command, was not present, an omission in the adjutant-general's office having delayed the notice of his being warned for the duty; and General Harris, having inquired the reason of the colonel's absence, which no one could tell, directed General Baird, who was upon the spot as a spectator, to take the command. He drew his sword, and was moving towards the column, when General Harris said, "I think we must wait a little longer for Colonel Wellesley," at which General Baird expressed his great satisfaction; "because," as he afterwards stated to Colonel Shawe, "he felt it could not fail to be painful and mortifying to Colonel Wellesley if any other person was employed to complete the operation he had begun." Colonel Wellesley appeared a few moments after, explained the cause of his absence, and led the troops to the attack, which was directed upon three points,—the right flank of the enemy, their left, and their centre.

The troops advanced under cover of the fire of the 12-pounders, the head of the column entering the left of the tope, and, in less than twenty minutes, Colonel Wellesley had complete possession, without any loss, of what had caused so much confusion and anxiety the two preceding nights. At the same moment, Colonel Shawe rushed upon the enemy from the ruined village, at the head of the 12th regiment, and, at the point of the bayonet, drove from the watercourse, with considerable slaughter, the troops which had filled it from the fort. Whilst this was going on, a third movement, by Colonel Wallace, dislodged the enemy from a village on the right flank. "The effect of the whole attack," the commander-in-chief observed, "was very fine."

This operation gave the besiegers the possession of a strong and *well-connected advanced* line of posts, nearly two miles in extent,

forming, in fact, an excellent contravallation, well covered from the fort, and within a mile of it. "Walked down to the advanced post," is the entry of the general's journal, on the 7th April; "found it very strong against so contemptible an enemy as we have to deal with, and such as may, with a little trouble, be made very strong against any. How fortunate thus to find a good parallel prepared to our hands!"

These transactions have been made the subject of various misrepresentations. The biographer of Sir David Baird, upon the alleged authority of this officer, has related a conversation between General Harris and him upon the parade, respecting the command of the troops at the last attack of the tope, on the 6th of April, which is negatived by the testimony of Sir David himself, only the year before he died, in reply to an inquiry by Colonel Meyrick Shawe. Mr. Hook has likewise represented the failure of Colonel Wellesley's attack on the 5th of April, as having caused a strong sensation in the camp, unfavourable to that officer; whereas the extracts from General Harris's journal (printed by Colonel Gurwood and Mr. Lushington), the letter of the general to Lord Mornington on the 7th of April, reporting his arrival at Seringapatam, and the short notes of Colonel Wellesley to General Harris, on matters connected with the siege, during the next and following days,—above all, the selection of Colonel Wellesley for the last attack,—conspire to show that the confusion of the troops, causing the ultimate failure on the 5th, was a matter of transient regard, being attributed to the effects incidental to night attacks. Owing to this cause, Sir David Baird, without meeting an enemy or firing a shot, had missed his road in returning from the tope, "although," as General Harris remarked, "one would have thought it impossible."

The ill feeling engendered amongst the partisans of Sir David Baird and individuals who were jealous of the rising greatness of the young colonel of the 33rd regiment gave rise to malicious reports of even *cowardice*. Mr. Lushington states that, in 1800, *when in the Poligar* country, an officer of great gallantry and good

conduct assured him, in a solemn whisper, "that Colonel Wellesley was frightened, and ran away to the commander-in-chief's tent on the night of the 5th, and, therefore, General Harris had ordered General Baird to take the command, on the morning of the 6th, which General Baird declined from personal consideration for Colonel Wellesley!

Another mistake or misapprehension, which it would be hardly worth while to notice but for the high authority of the writer, refers to the behaviour of Colonel Wellesley after his return from the tope on the night of the 5th. Sir A. Alison, in his *History of Europe*, giving an abstract of the campaign in Mysore, and very excusably adopting Mr. Hook's biography of Sir David Baird, as containing an authentic narrative of facts, was led to represent that Colonel Wellesley entered "a rocky eminence near the Sultanpettah Tope," with the 33rd regiment "and a sepoy battalion;" that he was assailed with so severe a fire that the troops were thrown into disorder, and he was obliged to fall back upon the camp; that, such was the confusion, owing to the darkness of the night, that he arrived there with only a single officer; that he proceeded to the general's tent, at first much agitated, but finding General Harris not yet awake, he threw himself on the table of the tent, and *fell asleep*,—"a fact," added the historian, "in such a moment, singularly characteristic of the imperturbable character of the future hero of Torres Vedras." This "fact," which has been repeatedly commented upon, sometimes to the advantage, sometimes to the discredit, of the illustrious commander, is (as will he seen from the particulars before detailed) a pure fiction.

7.—*Siege, Assault, and Capture of Seringapatam.*

Seringapatam is built upon a rocky island, about a mile in width, in the river Cavery, which is thereby separated into two tolerably wide channels, which reunite about three miles below the fortress. The city is situated at the upper end, and was fortified in the old Indian fashion, obstacles being multiplied, wall rising after wall, *especially at the south-west angle.* Many of the bastions are

square; a few had the regular European form, but connected by long, straight, lofty walls, in the Indian manner of fortification. The attack, it will be seen, was directed against the western angle of the fort,—a different quarter from that assailed by Lord Cornwallis, and where Tippoo, expecting that General Harris would pursue the same course, had expended his chief preparations for resistance. At the point selected, the river was low, its bed wide, with plenty of ground to form on, clear of the rocks, and it was evident that the defences at this angle of the fort were in a very imperfect state.

The active operations of the siege were not begun till the 17th of April. In the meanwhile, on the 6th, General Floyd was detached with the cavalry, a considerable body of infantry, and twenty field-pieces, to cover the advance of General Stuart. Tippoo despatched a strong detachment of horse to intercept them; but, though the enemy hovered over their line of march, both parties joined the camp on the 14th, without loss. Unhappily, the Bombay army brought no supplies of provisions (owing to the loss of 4,000 bullocks by disease); and, on the 16th, the general records in his journal, "on measuring the rice to-day, in order to ascertain the exact quantity in store, we discovered that, from loss or fraud, only eighteen days' rice, at half-allowance, is in camp for the fighting men; unless Colonel Read's supplies arrive before the 6th of May, the army will be without provision." On the 19th, he writes, "Stuart sent to acquaint me that he had but two days' provision in camp for his Europeans."

During the advance of the army, Colonel Read and Colonel Browne were reducing the country and collecting supplies in the interior of Mysore. The operations of the former were intended to have embraced a wide range, and he had made considerable progress in them, when the more urgent service of convoying to the grand army the large supplies collected in the Baramahl made it necessary for him to change the direction of his march. To the southward of the *Carnatic* and Mysore, Colonel Browne began his operations by *reducing Caroor*, and was occupied in the reduction of other places

in Coimbatoor, when he was likewise obliged to suspend his operations, and unite with Colonel Read, to protect the large supplies proceeding to Seringapatam.

On the 9th, a letter from Tippoo was brought to the British general, which was of the briefest nature. After acknowledging (for the first time) the receipt of Lord Mornington's letter of the 22nd of February, "I have adhered firmly to treaties," he said; "what then is the meaning of the advance of the English armies and the occurrence of hostilities? inform me!" The comment in General Harris's journal is: "Insolent enough; but, under Providence, I trust he will be humbled." The reply was a reference to the several letters of the Governor-General.

On the 17th, a detachment of the Bombay army, consisting of his Majesty's 75th regiment, and two battalions of sepoys, supported by the 74th regiment and a battalion from the main army, all under the command of Colonel Vaughan Hart, attacked and drove the enemy from their posts near the village of Agrar, on the north side of the river. The troops advanced under a severe cannonade, and took possession of the ruins of an old redoubt and village, about 900 yards from the east angle of the fort. A breastwork was thrown up, which afforded good cover, and a battery was completed in the night, on the right of the redoubt, to enfilade the enemy's intrenchment on the south side of the river. Another attack was made about the same time on a nullah, called the Little Cavery, in advance of Shawe's post, which was taken possession of by a native battalion. These advantages were obtained with very little loss. The enemy's intrenchments on the south side of the Cavery, in front of the intended attack, were battered on the 19th, and the next evening the most advanced of these intrenchments was carried by our troops, and a parallel was established on the spot, within 780 yards of the fort. On the 21st another battery was erected, and upon that night a furious attack was made on all General Stuart's posts, by a column of the enemy's infantry, 6,000 in number, with Lally's French corps. They were received with steadiness, and, after reiterated *efforts*, were compelled to retire with the loss of 600 men.

During these preliminary operations, Colonel Wellesley was in command in the trenches. On the 26th, General Harris determined to attack the enemy's intrenchments raised, in front and on the right, behind the bank of a watercourse, within 380 yards of the fort, and the direction of this attack was intrusted to Colonel Wellesley. This was the most important of all the operations before the assault; its success furnished the ground where the breaching batteries were to be erected. Colonel Wellesley's order for the attack was as follows:—

"The troops are to move out in two divisions, one to the right of the four-gun battery, consisting of four companies of the 73rd regiment, supported by four companies from the 2nd battalion Bengal Volunteers, and commanded by Colonel Moneypenny: the left division to consist of four companies of the Scotch brigade, supported by four companies of the 2nd battalion Bengal Volunteers, under the command of Major Shelly."

In the evening, at the hour fixed, the guns from the batteries commenced a heavy fire, which was the signal for the attack, when the troops moved out of the trenches. The enemy, seeing the movement, began an active fire from behind their breastwork, whilst guns opened with great effect from the fort. The European companies pushed on, with great spirit and rapidity, to the works of the enemy, who fled in dismay and confusion, many falling by the bayonet. The relief from the trenches, under Colonel Sherbrooke, including part of the 74th regiment and the regiment De Meuron, having arrived, was ordered to advance in support of the attack, and pushed on to the right. A heavy fire was continued from the ramparts, and some of the enemy who had fled made a desperate stand behind traverses. The Europeans, however, dashed in, forcing the traverses, until they reached the turn of the nullah towards the stone bridge, where there was a redoubt, open to the south-east angle of the fort, but which flanked a watercourse running parallel and close to the intrenchment that was carried. This redoubt was *stormed* by the 74th regiment, and left in their possession, while *Lieutenant-Colonel* Campbell, with a small party of that corps and

De Meuron's, pushed along the intrenchments and the road, till he came to the bridge leading over the great river; Colonel Wallace, at the same time, advancing more to the right, took possession of the enemy's post at the stone bridge, on the road to Shawe's post. Colonel Campbell crossed the bridge, and went some distance on the island, but found it prudent to retreat, and he made his way, under a heavy fire, to the redoubt, where Colonel Wallace, having withdrawn from the stone bridge, had taken post, with the few of the 74th who remained with him. The enemy continued to fire at intervals all night, and at daylight, discovering the critical state of our men, they collected in great force on the right flank, and at the post near the stone bridge. Colonel Sherbrooke, on receiving intelligence of their situation, ordered all the Europeans who remained in the trenches to proceed, each with a pickaxe, to the post occupied by Colonel Wallace, who, in the mean time, had dislodged the enemy from the bridge, and the Europeans arriving, with the pioneers, threw up an intrenchment, which the enemy made repeated but unavailing efforts to enter. The post at the bridge secured the rear of the other, and presented a new front; it was strengthened by three companies; and in a short time the whole were under cover, the attack having had all the success desired. Our loss was, however, severe, amounting to 307 officers and men.

This was the last effort of any vigour made by Tippoo, and from this time the siege proceeded actively, with very little disturbance from the enemy. A breaching battery opened on the 30th, and in the course of the day demolished part of the outer wall of the west angle of the fort, considerably shaking the masonry of the bastion within. On the 2nd of May another battery opened upon the curtain to its right; these and the supporting batteries beat heavily upon the walls, exploding a magazine of rockets in the fort. Tippoo did all in his power to repair the first breach, and he succeeded in some measure, the working of our people in front preparatory to the assault having prevented the fire upon the breach. On the morning of the 3rd, Colonel Wellesley reported the completion of *this preparatory* work in the following letter to General Harris:—

"My dear Sir,—We did all our work last night, except filling the sand-bags, which could not be done for want of tools: I shall have them filled in the course of this morning, and there will be no inconvenience from the delay, as it was not deemed advisable last night to do more than look for the ford; and it is not intended to do anything to it until the night before it is to be used.

"Lieutenant Lalor, of the 73rd, crossed over to the glacis, I believe, on the left of the breach. He found the wall, which he believes to be the retaining wall of the glacis, seven feet high, and the water (included in those seven feet) fourteen inches deep. It is in no part more so, and the passage by no means difficult. Several other officers crossed by different routes; but none went so far as Lieutenant Lalor. All agree in the practicability of crossing with troops. The enemy built up the breach in the night with gabions, &c., notwithstanding the fire which was kept up upon it. It was impossible to fire grape, as our working party was in front of the five-gun battery, from which alone we could fire, as we repaired the other.

"Lieutenant Lalor is now on duty here with his regiment, but, if you wish it, he will remain here to-night, and try the river again.—I am, my dear Sir, &c.,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

On the evening of this day, a breach had been made in the *fausse-braie* wall, and the main rampart was a heap of ruins. The commander-in-chief, therefore, proceeded to make arrangements for the assault on the day following.

During the progress of the siege, there was a faint attempt on the part of the Sultaun at negotiation; but he soon discovered how vain it would be to expect any respite or delay by this expedient, and the terms tendered to him were too hard for his proud stomach. On the 20th of April, a letter, without date, and in abrupt terms, was received from him suggesting "a conference and renewing the business of a treaty." General Harris, having received full and precise instructions from the Governor-General for his guidance in *all probable cases, after* a consultation with the commissioners and

with Meer Allum, the Nizam's minister, transmitted to the Sultaun, in reply to his letter, a draft of preliminaries, which Lord Mornington had recommended him to offer to Tippoo before the assault. They stipulated that the Sultaun should dismiss from his service and dominions all Europeans and others, natives or subjects of countries at war with Great Britain, renounce all connexion with the French nation, and engage that none of that nation shall be allowed to reside in his dominions; that one-half of the dominions he possessed before the war should be ceded to the allies; that he should relinquish all claim to certain disputed districts, and pay two crores of rupees (two millions sterling) to the allies, four of his sons and four of his principal officers to be delivered as hostages. No answer was returned to these proposals.

The preparations for the assault were made with all practicable secrecy. Scaling-ladders, fascines, and other necessary articles, were sent into the trenches after sunset on the 3rd of May. The troops intended to be employed were stationed in the trenches early in the morning of the 4th, although the commander-in-chief had determined to make the assault in the heat of the day, when even Asiatics are invaded by an enervating lassitude, and the enemy, being accustomed to take repose, would be least prepared for resistance. Major-General Baird, having been informed that General Harris had selected him to command the assault, was sent for to receive his instructions.

The major-general was directed to make the capture of the ramparts his first object; with this view, the force for the assault was divided into two columns, one to move along the northern rampart, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop; the other, commanded by Colonel Sherbrooke, along the southern rampart, joining on the east face, and making the entire circuit before descending into the town for any purpose. The different corps were to place themselves in the trenches during the night in the order in which they were to march to the assault; so that every officer and man would be ready to move on the signal being given.

The left attack, under Colonel Dunlop, consisted of six flank

companies of Europeans, to lead the attack; his Majesty's 12th and 33rd regiments; ten companies of Bengal sepoys, and fifty artillerymen. The right attack, under Colonel Sherbrooke, consisted of four companies of European flankers from the Scotch brigade and De Meuron's corps; his Majesty's 73rd and 74th regiments; eight companies of Madras, and six of Bombay sepoys; with fifty artillerymen. The total number of the troops was 4,476, the Europeans being 2,594 and the natives 1,882, including 200 of the Nizam's troops. Colonel Wellesley remained in the advanced trenches in command of the reserve to support the assault in case of necessity.

A heavy fire had been kept up all night from our batteries, preventing the enemy from repairing the breach, which at daylight of the 4th was reported by the chief engineer to be practicable.

Mr. Lushington has recorded an incident, related to him by Sir John Malcolm, and not contradicted by General Harris, to whom he communicated it, which shows the deep anxiety of the general at this critical moment. The hour appointed by the commander-in-chief for the storm, 1 o'clock, had nearly arrived, when, a little before this time, while he was sitting alone in his tent, Sir John (then Captain) Malcolm entered, and seeing him full of thought, exclaimed, "Why, my lord, so thoughtful?" The general replied sternly (with reference to the title he had bestowed upon him by anticipation), "Malcolm, this is no time for compliments; we have serious work on hand; don't you see that the European sentry over my tent is so weak for want of food, and from exhaustion, that a sepoy could push him down? We must take this fort, or perish in the attempt. I have ordered General Baird to persevere in his attack to the last extremity; if he is beat off, Wellesley is to proceed with the troops from the trenches; if he also should not succeed, I shall put myself at the head of the remainder of the army, for success is necessary to our existence."

The moment which was to decide this great issue arrived. At half-past one o'clock, General Baird drew his sword, and stepping out of the trenches, under a scorching sun, addressed the storming party,

"Now, my brave fellows, follow me, and prove yourselves worthy of the name of British soldiers." This brief and inspiring appeal was answered by the forward rush of the forlorn hope of each attack, followed by the flank companies and supporting corps, who, under a heavy fire from our batteries, entered and crossed the river in the face of rockets and musketry from the fort. The width and rocky channel of the Cavery, though it contained but little water, and its exposure to the fire of the fortress, rendered the assault a difficult operation against a skilful, prepared, and resolute enemy. In less than seven minutes, however, from the period of issuing from the trenches, the British colours were planted on the summit of the breach by a sergeant of the "forlorn," who had scarcely displayed it before he fell dead.

The attacking parties ascended the glacis and the breaches in the *fausse-braie* and rampart together. Some opposition was made, but the enemy were soon repulsed or cut down. The summit of the breach being gained, and the angle of the fort not being insulated by a trench, as the Sultaun had been advised to do by his officers, the leading companies of the two divisions took their respective routes along the northern and southern ramparts, followed by the rest of the troops as they emerged from the bed of the river. The right attack, under Colonel Sherbrooke, marched rapidly on the southern rampart, meeting with little opposition until they came to the Mysore gateway, when a large body of the enemy endeavoured to resist their entrance within the interior rampart; but they were driven out with great slaughter. Colonel Sherbrooke continued his progress, taking possession of the cavaliers in his way, with very inconsiderable loss, the enemy flying as if panic-struck. One body of the fugitives escaped by lowering themselves from the high wall with their long unrolled turbans; many of them were, however, dashed to pieces upon the rocky bed of the ditch.

The other attack encountered more resistance. Colonel Dunlop was wounded at the breach, in a personal conflict with one of Tippoo's sirdars, and obliged to remain behind. Some of the traverses were obstinately defended, Tippoo himself being here present, firing

from behind a traverse like a common soldier; but a party of the 12th regiment, having got across the ditch, between the exterior and inner rampart, forced their way within the parapet where the enemy were posted, flanked the traverses, and drove them out. The double fire soon cleared the rampart, the fugitives crowding into a gateway, where they were met by a part of the 12th regiment, and multitudes lost their lives between the two fires,—indeed, neither officers nor men knowing when to stay the slaughter, the carnage did not cease until the two divisions actually joined on the eastern rampart. All resistance was here at an end, for the whole works of the fortress were in the possession of our troops, nothing remaining unoccupied but the palace of Tippoo.

Resistance continued to be made from the palace for some time after all firing had ceased from the works. Two of Tippoo's sons were there, and great confusion prevailed within, owing to the ignorance of the Sultaun's family as to where he was, or what had befallen him since he left them in the morning. A report had been brought to the killedar (or governor) that he had been shot, and was lying dead under one of the gateways; but, doubtful of the fact, they durst not open the gates of the palace without his sanction. They feared, too, a retaliation, on the part of our soldiers, of a cold-blooded murder, by Tippoo's express orders, a few days before, of twelve of the grenadiers of the 33rd regiment, who had fallen into his hands.

General Baird employed Major (afterwards Sir Alexander) Allan, an officer well fitted for the humane and delicate office, to treat with the family in the palace, which was surrounded by the British troops (including part of the 33rd regiment), prepared to storm the walls. Having fastened a white cloth upon a sergeant's pike, he proceeded to the palace, and several of Tippoo's people having shown themselves in a balcony, apparently in great consternation, he informed them that he was deputed by the general in command of the British troops in the fort to offer them their lives, provided they made no resistance. In a short time, the killedar and other officers appeared, and, after some objections, they allowed Major *Allan to enter the palace*, where he had an interview with the two

princes. Their fear, which they struggled to conceal, was, he says, too evident; but his kind assurances banished their apprehensions, and after giving them the strongest pledges of safety, they allowed the gates to be opened, on condition that a guard of their own sepoys should be posted within the palace, a party of Europeans taking post on the outside. On opening the gate, finding that General Baird had arrived with a large body of troops, Major Allan returned to the palace to conduct the princes to the general, whose indignation had been roused by a report that Tippoo, of whose fate he was ignorant, had murdered all the Europeans who had fallen into his hands during the siege. "This was heightened," Major Allan observed, "by a momentary recollection of his own sufferings during three years' imprisonment (with other officers of Colonel Baillie's unfortunate detachment) at that very place." At the sight of the princes and their dejected aspect, however, he was touched with pity; he received them with every mark of regard, and reiterated promises of protection. They were conducted to the camp, escorted by a company of the 33rd, the troops being ordered, as they passed, to present arms.

General Baird now commenced a search for the Sultaun. The killedar protested that he was not in the palace, but that he had been wounded and lay in a gateway on the north face of the fort, offering to show the spot. General Baird accordingly proceeded with several officers, including Colonel Wellesley, who had entered the fort immediately after the assault, to the gateway, which was heaped with slain. The darkness of the place rendered it difficult to distinguish features, as the bodies were dragged out and examined by the killedar. Torches were lighted, and, during this sickening process, a wounded Mysorean was discovered lying under the Sultaun's palanquin; he proved to be one of his confidential servants, who had attended his master during the whole day. He pointed out the spot where Tippoo fell. By the faint glimmering light, the killedar could scarcely recognise the lineaments of a corpse, which, when brought out, proved to be that of the late *sovereign of Mysore*. The features were not distorted, and wore an

expression of stern composure. The eyes were open, and the body was so warm, that, for a few moments, Colonel Wellesley and Major Allan doubted whether he was not alive; but the pulse was found to be still. He had received four wounds, three in the body and one in the temple. The turban, sword, belt, and all the ornaments of his person were gone; but an amulet, which he always wore bound upon his right arm, was untouched, as if to proclaim the folly of the owner in relying upon its virtue. This talisman consisted of a brittle metallic substance, of the colour of silver, sewed up, with some magical writing in Arabic and Persian, in pieces of fine flowered silk. The remains were placed in a palanquin and conveyed to the palace. The next day they were consigned, under the delicate care of Colonel Wellesley (who then commanded in the city), with military honours, to the mausoleum of his father, Hyder Ali. A violent storm, in which several Europeans and natives were destroyed by the lightning, occurred during the ceremony, and gave an awful, preternatural interest to the last rites paid to one whose career had been one of ambition, perfidy, and cruelty.

The particulars of his death, which were afterwards collected, prove that, however devoid of military skill and judgment, the Sultaun was by no means destitute of courage.

During the siege, Tippoo had been daily on the ramparts, varying his position according to exigency. The general charge of the angle attacked had been given to Syed Sahib and Syed Goffhar,—the last an able officer, who began his career in the English service; but Tippoo paid less attention to their advice than to the counsels of the young parasites who surrounded him, and who pretended that the fort was too strong to be taken. On the morning of the 4th, Syed Goffhar, inferring, from the number of men in our trenches, that an assault was meditated, sent information of it to the Sultaun, who, being engaged in absurd astrological mummeries on the subject of the siege, returned for answer that the assault would not take place till night. Syed Goffhar hurried, in a fit of rage and despair, towards the Sultaun, vowing he would drag him to the breach, and *make him assured of* the truth, by the testimony of his own eyes.

Turning aside for a moment to direct a party of pioneers to cut off the approach to the southern rampart, this brave officer was killed by a cannon-shot.

The Sultaun was about to begin his mid-day repast, under a pandal (thatched shed), on the northern face, when the news reached him of Syed Goffhar's death. "Syed Goffhar did not fear death,—let Mahomed Cassim take charge of his division," was the Sultaun's brief remark; but he manifested strong emotion, which increased when he was informed, before the repast was finished, that his faithful officer's prediction was true, and that the assault had begun. He rose, washed his hands, called for his sword, ordered the troops about him to stand to their arms, and, commanding his personal attendants to load their carbines, hastened along the northern rampart towards the breach. In his progress, he encountered the grenadier companies of the left attack; rallying his people behind traverses (as before mentioned), he fired repeatedly, and as his attendants averred, brought down several of our men. When the party of the 12th regiment got within the inner rampart,—which they effected by discovering a narrow slip of the *terre pleine* left for the passage of workmen,—and reached the flank of the traverse defended by the Sultaun, he retired along the rampart, which, as the storming party eagerly advanced, became crowded with fugitives. Tippoo, complaining of fatigue, and of pain from a wound he had formerly received, mounted a horse, and rode slowly towards a bridge that crossed the inner ditch, and led by a covered gateway into the city, intending probably to endeavour to reach his palace. As he entered the arch, which was choked up with fugitives rushing in opposite directions,—the assailants now pressing on both sides,—he received a wound in the body from a musket-ball, and the cross fire of the storming parties, rapidly nearing each other, having filled the gateway with a heap of dead and dying, the Sultaun could not extricate himself. His horse fell, wounded; his attendants, disengaging their master from the saddle, placed him upon his palanquin. In a few minutes, the English soldiers were forcing a passage through the archway with their bayonets. One of them, attracted

by the glitter of a gold buckle, snatched at the rich sword-belt of the Sultaun, who had been thrown out of the palanquin. Tippoo made a cut at the soldier, and wounded him in the knee. The man, little knowing who his assailant was, raised his piece to his shoulder, and deliberately shot the Sultaun through the temple. He fell back, and was soon covered by a heap of slain.

8.—*Occupation of Seringapatam.*

"The strength of the fort is such," General Harris observed, in his despatch to the Governor-General, "both from its natural position, and the stupendous works by which it is surrounded, that all the exertions of the brave troops who attacked it were required to place it in our hands." The Sultaun's forces, on the 4th May, consisted of 48,000 men, of whom 22,000 were in the fort, or the intrenchments. The British army, under General Harris, after the junction of the Bombay corps, was composed of 8,026 Europeans, and 33,569 natives; in the whole, 41,595 men. The loss sustained by the assailants was far less than might have been anticipated. Nine officers were killed and wounded in the left column; eleven in the right, and three in the pioneers, engineers, and artillery, employed in the assault; the total of killed, wounded, and missing, was 386; not one-fourth of the whole loss sustained during the seige. It is remarkable that the number of killed was precisely the same in both the columns of attack. On the other hand, the whole loss of the Mysoreans was nearly 9,000. In the assault, the carnage amongst them was very great, especially round the principal mosque, where the Mussulmans offered a deadly resistance. Many of Tippoo's chiefs fell, besides his oppressive minister, Meer Saduck, a man detested by the people, who testified their hatred of him by the foul indignities they inflicted upon his corpse.

The fall of the fortress placed in the possession of the victors 929 pieces of ordnance, whereof 287 were mounted on the fortifications, a large amount of military stores, and specie and jewels exceeding in value £1,000,000. The Mysore troops were disarmed; *M. Chapuy*, and most of the French officers in the

garrison, who had commissions from the French government, were prisoners.

The speedy issue of this brilliant campaign was an event of great importance to the besieging army; for, although a casual supply of provisions had been fortunately received, it sufficed for only a few days; and General Floyd, who had been despatched to convoy the supplies from the south, did not return with them until the 13th May. It appeared that Colonel Read, though he reached Caverypooram on the 22nd April, could not clear the pass before the 27th; and it was the 6th of May before the whole of the brinjarries had ascended. On that day he was joined by Colonel Browne's corps, and on the following day by General Floyd, when the whole convoy moved to Seringapatam. Tippoo's cavalry, under his best general, had closely followed General Floyd, and would have greatly embarrassed and retarded the progress of the convoy, but for the fall of the fortress and its master. So critical was the situation of the British army.

The city, crowded with inhabitants, being in great confusion, upon the cessation of the assault, the surrender of the princes, and the discovery of the fate of Tippoo, Major-General Baird communicated to the commander-in-chief his request, that he and the storming party might be relieved that night, as they were much fatigued with the labours of the day. General Harris, on receipt of this communication, directed the adjutant-general, who was sitting in his tent, to put the officer next for duty in orders to relieve Major-General Baird, and Colonel Wellesley being accidentally that officer, he was directed to take the temporary command of the garrison and city.

As this is another matter in which favouritism has been supposed to have elevated Colonel Wellesley at the expense of Sir David Baird, the circumstances of the case, which are few and simple, ought to be explained, in order to dissipate misapprehensions which originated in the petty scandal of military gossips, but which still linger in the minds of many, although Sir David latterly acknowledged his *error in* sending the following complaining letters on

this subject to General Harris, who, at his request, cancelled them, although it seems they were preserved by the writer.

On the 6th of May, Major-General Baird wrote to the commander-in-chief, observing that, having had the conduct of the assault of the fort, and having executed it to his satisfaction, he naturally concluded that he should have been permitted to retain the command of Seringapatam, or at least that he should not be superseded by a junior officer. He then proceeded thus:—

"Judge then my surprise, expecting to have the honour of delivering to you the keys of Seringapatam in the palace of the late Tippoo Saltaun, and of congratulating you on the most brilliant victory that ever graced the British arms in India, to have an order put into my hands by Colonel Wellesley, by which I found myself instantly superseded in the command by that officer. I am really ignorant what part of my conduct could merit such treatment. When, on a former occasion, Colonel Wellesley was appointed to the command of the detachment serving with his highness the Nizam, while I remained in charge of a brigade, you informed me that matters of a political nature made it necessary to have that officer with the Nizam's army. Although I severely felt the appointment of a junior officer to so distinguished a command, while I remained in an inferior station, I submitted to the necessity which, you informed me, dictated the measure; but this second supersession I feel most sensibly, as it must have the effect of leading his Majesty and the commander-in-chief in England to believe that I am not fit for any command of importance, when it has been thought proper to give the command of Seringapatam to Colonel Wellesley, while he, at the same time, continues to hold the command of the Nizam's detachment. In camp it is rumoured to have been at my own request that another officer was appointed to the command of Seringapatam; you, Sir, must know that this is not the case; the request, if made, must have been made by me to you, and, so far from its ever being my intention to make such a request, *if, after the assurances* I have repeatedly received from you, that

you would take the first opportunity of placing me in a situation more adequate to the rank I hold, than that of the command of a brigade, I had deemed it necessary to make any request to you, it would have been to be placed in the command of Seringapatam; and when I reflected that my two seniors, belonging to the coast army, continued to stand appointed to the northern and southern divisions of the Carnatic, and that the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, the next junior to me, stood appointed to the command of an army, while I remained in charge of a brigade, I should have felt I was hinting a doubt, which I never entertained, of the sincerity of those assurances, if I made a particular application for the command of Seringapatam; indeed, I could not think it necessary. Some mistake may have arisen from my having, through Major Beatson, expressed a desire that the whole storming party might be relieved from camp, so that order might be established, and troops more equal to take the fatigue of guard-mounting during the night be placed in the fort; and I wished to be relieved for a short time, that I might myself have had the honour of reporting our success, and informing you in person of every particular relating to the storm. This not having been found convenient, I desired Captain Young, deputy adjutant-general of his Majesty's troops, who was proceeding to camp at daylight next morning, to inform you, that, as I was much recovered from the fatigues of the preceding day, I wished not to be relieved till I had examined the state of the works, and ascertained the number of cannon captured. I received a letter from Captain Young, long before Colonel Wellesley superseded me, informing me that he had made my request known to you. I cannot but feel obliged by your having enabled me to act so distinguished a part in the storm, though I find so little attention has, in every other instance, been paid to my requests, that I am almost led to believe my being employed on that occasion was owing to my being the only officer of rank who had made a voluntary offer of his services. I request that copies of this letter may be transmitted to his royal highness the commander-in-chief, for the information of his Majesty, that, at the same *time* he is informed of my having been twice super-

seded by Colonel Wellesley, he may be in possession of such reasons as you shall think proper to give for it, that he may be satisfied the measure was dictated by necessity, and not by any want of capacity on my part to fill the situation.—I have the honour, &c.,

"D. BAIRD."

The military secretary of General Harris was directed to acknowledge the receipt of this "very improper letter," and to convey his opinion, "that an officer who thinks himself authorized to remonstrate with his immediate superior can never be usefully employed in the army he commands," with his permission, if Major-General Baird "continued to hold sentiments so opposite to the principles of military subordination," to proceed to Fort St. George.

The major-general, in return, expressed his astonishment at the letter he had received. "Conceiving myself injured," he said, "and my military character in some degree impeached, in the repeated preference that had been shown to my junior, the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, in nominating him to distinguished commands, whilst I, serving with the same army, am still left in my original situation of commandant of a brigade; and feeling, as I conceive every military man in a similar situation would have felt, on being superseded by the same officer in the command of the important fortress of Seringapatam, I thought it due to my own character to address you on that subject; and I can safely affirm that, in the address, it was my firm intention to make to you the most respectful statement of facts." He then asked to be allowed to clear himself before a general court-martial, and intimated, in conclusion, that if ordered from the army on account of his letter, he should make the circumstances which occasioned it public.

In reply, the military secretary was instructed to state that the major-general's "explanation" had produced no change in the general's sentiments; that "he never can admit the right of any subordinate officer to remonstrate with him on the propriety of *measures he* has adopted for the public service, or on his selection of *officers for situations* of public trust;" that he still thought the

major-general had been wanting in discretion and respect, and that he desired that that letter might conclude a correspondence which the major-general was at liberty to make as public as possible.

Although General Harris justified his nomination of Colonel Wellesley to this important post upon the high grounds of the rights of supreme authority and the exigency of the public service, as far as regarded the first nomination, it was made, as already mentioned, in the ordinary routine. The private papers of Lord Harris, as published by Mr. Lushington, with this gentleman's explanations, fully exonerate the commander-in-chief from the charge of "partiality originating in a servile deference to the secret commands and private wishes of the Earl of Mornington," made by Mr. Hook, the biographer of Sir David Baird. It may be observed, in passing, that, so far from there being any desire on the part of General Harris to exaggerate the services and claims of Colonel Wellesley, the former are by no means prominently noticed in the general's orders of the 5th of May, which merely state that "the gallant manner in which Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe, the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel Moneypenny (and four others), conducted the attacks on the several outworks and forts of the enemy, demands to be recorded."

It appears from General Baird's first letter that, on the evening of the assault, he conveyed to the commander-in-chief his desire that he and the storming party might be relieved that night, which could not be done, for, although Colonel Wellesley, the next officer on the roster, was put in orders that night, the introduction of fresh troops would have added to the confusion which prevailed in the city. The relief, therefore, was necessarily delayed until sunrise. A memorandum of a conversation between the commander-in-chief and the deputy adjutant-general, Major Turing, on the occasion (found amongst Lord Harris's papers), sets the question of selection at rest. Upon receiving Major-General Baird's application to be relieved, the commander-in-chief communicated it to Major Turing, and asked who was the next officer for duty, "Colonel Roberts," replied the Major. "Then put him in orders to go," replied General Harris. *Presently* after, Major Turing, looking more attentively

over the order, said, "No, Sir; I have made a mistake; Colonel Wellesley is the next for duty, not Colonel Roberts." "Then let Colonel Wellesley be put in orders for the relief," said General Harris. Colonel Wellesley, therefore, went in the common routine of military duty, expecting himself to be relieved whenever the commander-in-chief should think fit.

The condition of the place, on the morning of the 5th, may be understood from the following letters written by Colonel Wellesley to General Harris:—

"Ten A. M. 5th May.

"My dear Sir,—We are in such confusion still, that I recommend it to you not to come in till to-morrow, or, at soonest, late this evening. Before I came here, General Baird had given the treasure in charge to the prize agents. There is a guard over it, and it appears to be large.

"As soon as I can find out where the families of the great men are, I shall send guards to take care of them. At present, I can find nobody who can give me any information upon the subject. I have here now the 12th, 33rd, and part of the 73rd, and the 2nd of the 5th, 2nd of the 9th, and 2nd of the 7th. These troops ought to be relieved this day, as early as possible, by two regiments of Europeans and three of sepoys. I am, dear Sir, &c.,

"Lieut.-Gen. Harris. "ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

"There are some tigers here, which I wish Meer Allum would send for, or else I must give orders to have them shot, as there is no food for them, and nobody to attend them, and they are getting violent."

"Half-past Twelve.

"My dear Sir,—I wish you would send the provost here, and put him under my orders. Until some of the plunderers are hanged, it is vain to expect to stop the plunder.

"I shall be obliged to you, if you will send *positive* orders *respecting the treasure*. I am, my dear Sir, &c.

"*Lieut.-General Harris.* "ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

" Seringapatam, May 5, 1799.

" My dear Sir,—Things are better than they were, but they are still very bad; and until the provost executes three or four people, it is impossible to expect order, or indeed safety. There are, at this moment, sepoys and soldiers belonging to every regiment in your camp and General Stuart's in the town. It would surely be advisable to order the rolls to be called constantly, and to forbid any people to leave camp. For a few days, likewise, it would be very advisable that the officers of the army should suspend the gratification of their curiosity, and that none but those on duty should come into the town. It only increases the confusion and the terror of the inhabitants. Till both subside in some degree, we cannot expect that they will return to their habitations. I am, my dear Sir, &c.,

" ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

" I hope the relief is coming, and that I shall soon receive your orders respecting the treasure."

On the 6th of May, the day after he had assumed the command of the place, he thus wrote to the general :—

" Seringapatam, May 6, 1799.

" My dear Sir,—Plunder is stopped, the fires are all extinguished, and the inhabitants are returning to their houses fast. I am now employed in burying the dead, which I hope will be completed this day, particularly if you send me all the pioneers.

" It is absolutely necessary that you should immediately appoint a permanent garrison, and a commanding officer to the place; till that is done, the people will have no confidence in us, and everything must be in confusion. That which I arrange this day, my successor may alter to-morrow, and his the next day; and nothing will ever be settled. A garrison which would be likely to remain here, would soon make themselves comfortable, although it might be found convenient hereafter to change some of the corps sent in: but these daily reliefs create much confusion and distrust in the inhabitants; and the camp is at such a distance, that it is impossible for the officers, or soldiers, or sepoys, to get down their dinners.

"I shall be obliged to you, if you will order an extra dram and biscuit for the 12th, 33rd, and 73rd regiments, who got nothing to eat yesterday, and were wet last night.

"In hopes that you will attend to my recommendation to send a garrison in to-morrow, I shall look out for a place to accommodate one or two battalions of Europeans, and three or four of sepoys. I am, my dear Sir, &c., "ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

For the very sufficient reasons assigned by the writer of this letter, General Harris determined to appoint a permanent garrison, and a permanent commandant, and, fully alive to the peculiar qualifications of the temporary commander for a post which demanded many qualities besides those of a military leader, probably thought that his accidental occupation of it was a fortunate incident, inasmuch as his appointment thereto permanently could give just umbrage to no one, whilst his removal would have worn the ungracious aspect of a supersession. Colonel Wellesley was accordingly, on that day, named to a command in which not only a soldier's skill, but prudence, discretion, and the talents of a statesman were indispensable.

This matter seems to have set certain tongues in motion in the camp. Writing privately to Lord Mornington (June 28th), General Harris says: "Ill-intentioned people talk nonsense, I hear, of your brother's appointment to command in Seringapatam; but I can defend it on principles most militarily correct, if it were worth while to attend to the words of the idle." He then relates the manner in which the first appointment was made, quite in accordance with the memorandum before quoted; adding: "He was afterwards permanently appointed by me from my believing him more equal to the particular kind of duty than any other officer in the army." Lord Mornington's reply was as follows:—

"With respect to the language which, you say, people have held of my brother's appointment to command in Seringapatam; you *know that* I never recommended my brother to you, and of course *never even suggested* how, or where, he should be employed; and

I believe you know also, that you would not have pleased me by placing him in any situation in which his appointment could be injurious to the public service. My opinion, or rather knowledge and experience, of his discretion, judgment, temper, and integrity, are such, that, if you had not placed him in Seringapatam, I would have done so of my own authority, because I think him in every point of view the most proper for that service."

The misrepresentation of the facts connected with this appointment is to be regretted, because it misled Sir A. Alison into a remark, that the transaction constitutes "one of the few blots" in the administration of Lord Mornington.

The duties which devolved upon the officer in command of Seringapatam, in consequence, not merely of the tumult and disorder necessarily resulting from the assault, but of the sudden dissolution of the Sultaun's government, and the dispersion of all the public functionaries, were numerous, complicated, and delicate, embracing, as already said, civil and political, as well as military arrangements. He had even to regulate the coinage, with the details of which subject Colonel Wellesley showed he was familiar. The most pressing of these duties was to prevent excesses against the inhabitants, to which the new commander applied himself with energy, going into the houses of the principal families, with safeguards, and threatening severe penalties for the infraction of his orders. The execution of four plunderers convinced the people that their governor was in earnest, and those who had quitted the city soon returned to their homes and occupations. In a few days, the bazars (markets) were stocked with provisions and merchandise, the streets were crowded with their usual throngs, and confidence was completely restored.

The entire subjugation of Mysore, a recently-formed state, was the immediate consequence of the fall of the capital and the death of the ruler. The sons of Tippoo (thirteen in number), together with Purneah, the dewan (or finance minister) of the late Sultaun, and all his sirdars (chiefs) of note, surrendered to the British *general. The* necessary measures were taken for occupying the

forts in the interior, and for subjecting the country to British authority, which were carried into effect with scarcely any opposition, the strongest disposition being manifested everywhere to obey the orders of General Harris, supported by the requisitions of the Meer Sudder, or general superintendent of garrisons, under the late government. It was at first the intention of Lord Mornington to proceed to Seringapatam, personally, to superintend the partition and settlement of the conquered territories; but, relinquishing that design, he nominated a commission, composed of General Harris, Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, Colonel Wellesley, the Hon. Henry Wellesley (his brother, afterwards Lord Cowley), and Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, to carry his arrangements into effect. The "painful but necessary measure" of removing the families of Hyder Ali, and of the late Sultaun, to the British fortress of Vellore, was committed to Colonel Wellesley. "It cannot," observed the Governor-General, in his instructions, "be intrusted to any person more likely to combine every office of humanity with the prudential precautions required by the occasion, than Colonel Wellesley, and I, therefore, commit to his discretion, activity, and humanity, the whole arrangement, subject always to such suggestions as may be offered by other members of the commission."

After mature consideration, the Governor-General, from motives of policy, as well as of moderation, determined upon the following scheme of partition of the Mysore territories.

The conduct of the Peishwa had been such as to disentitle him to participate in the acquisitions. Lord Mornington repeatedly complained of the "pride, imbecility, and falsehood" of Bajee Rao, his "jealousy, distrust, and evasion;" of his making no effort in the common cause, and his favouring Scindiah's views against the Company and the Nizam. In April, 1799, his lordship wrote thus to Colonel Palmer, the resident at Poonah: "Your despatches have abounded with the proofs of a system of studied neglect, of mysterious reserve, and of ungenerous suspicion, wholly irreconcilable with the character and spirit of alliance and friendship." In the *proposed partition*, therefore, a small portion of territory was

reserved for the Peishwa, contingent upon his receiving a subsidiary force at Poonah (which he had hitherto strenuously resisted), and consenting to an adjustment, by arbitration, of all points in dispute between him and the Nizam. Larger shares, equal in extent, were apportioned to this prince and to the East-India Company, whereby the Hyderabad state recovered substantial strength, without danger, however, to the British power. A part of the country was set aside, in order to be formed into a state to be bestowed upon the ancient royal family of Mysore, whose rights had been usurped by Hyder Ali, and who acquired, under this humane and wise arrangement, a larger territory and a more considerable revenue than their ancestors had ever enjoyed, extensive powers of control being, at the same time, vested in the East-India Company.

The circumstances attending the restoration of this family, who were in a state of great indigence, form a moving narrative. The Settlement Commissioners, on proceeding to the place of their residence, in the old town of Mysore, to announce the grateful intelligence, found that the ancient palace of the Mysorean princes had been converted into a store, and they were received in a mean apartment of a mean abode, a part of the room in which the rajah —a delicate child of five years of age,—sat, with his male relations, being screened off by a sorry curtain, behind which were the rajah's mother and the other females. The Rani (queen), through one of the attendants, acknowledged, in the warmest terms of gratitude, the generosity of the English nation in raising the oppressed family from their long and deep humiliation. In a few days, the infant rajah was solemnly inaugurated. Under a royal salute and volleys of musketry, he was conducted by General Harris and Meer Allum, the Nizam's minister, to his throne,—the very musnud used by the rajahs of Mysore, which had been found at Seringapatam,—and received, in due form, the seal and signet, the symbols of power, amidst the shouts of a vast concourse of his people.

9.—*Suppression of Dhoondiah Waugh.*

The provinces of Mysore which fell under British authority were,

after the settlement of the commissioners, formed temporarily into a distinct command, which was committed to Colonel Wellesley, independent of any local authority, his orders being received from the supreme government at Calcutta. The treatment of the family of Tippoo, and the principal men of the kingdom, is admitted, even by Mr. Mill, to have been "considerate and generous." The former, it is true, were transferred from Seringapatam to the fortress of Vellore; but their new residence was furnished with all the accommodations suited to their rank, and their allowance was more liberal than that which they had received from Tippoo himself. There is reason to conclude that this kind and magnanimous consideration for the fallen family may in a great measure be attributed to the representations of Colonel Wellesley, amongst whose despatches at this time occur various recommendations of pensions to be paid out of the "Family Fund." The chief men were all provided for by jaghires (grants of land for life), or stipends, "with a generosity," says Mr. Mill, "which not only contented, but greatly astonished, themselves." The policy of this proceeding was soon manifested in the facility with which the settlement of the country was effected; the character of the English inspired such confidence, that the chiefs made their submission without hesitation. One of Tippoo's generals, at the head of a considerable force, when treated with, declined to stipulate for terms, saying, "he cast himself entirely upon the generosity of the English." Colonel Wellesley availed himself of the services of the most intelligent and experienced of Tippoo's officers, whom he replaced in their former posts, the tenure of which, they were told, depended upon the correct discharge of their duties. The minute details to which his attention was directed are seen in his despatches to various officers, located in different parts of the country, to whom his instructions are clear, prompt, and decisive. "Your man has been with me," he writes to one officer, "with a statement of the quantity of timber which he wanted; I diminished it to that which he thought *would* be sufficient to complete the buildings you told me you *intended to begin immediately*. He has got the carts and bullocks

to bring the earth for the wells. I have established the zabeta (tax) for the shops in the fort. It is to be paid annually, and when Symonds comes, we can make an arrangement for its collection, and for that of the land-rent of the island after the present year. The shops in Ganjam are rent-free till the 4th of May, 1800, by agreement." To another: "In my opinion, the rule of proceeding between (British) officers and amildars (native functionaries employed in the collection of the revenue) is, to take the most serious notice of the former, when it appears to have been such as to deserve the complaint of the latter, and never to pass over any disrespect from the amildars to the officers. We well know the character of the natives of this country; when they are likely to be supported, they are the most tyrannical and impudent of men, and there is no falsehood which they will not tell in support of, or as an excuse for, their conduct." He writes to Colonel Close: "By the letters from government, it does not appear that I have any authority to grant any further pensions; I therefore think that you had better give this man," an old servant of the late government, "a sunnud," that is, an appointment to some office. Again: "I do not yet know how many bullocks are added to each karkana in consequence of the arrangement which I made some time ago; but if any of the calves are of a size and age fit for work, it will be desirable to have them as soon as possible." Again: "The best way of paying the Bombay troops at Nuggur and at Chittledroog will be by means of our paymaster: he makes advances to the commanders of corps upon their receipts, and they settle abstracts, accounts, &c., with the officer at Bombay." Again: "I gave Butcha Rao a letter yesterday to send to Captain Deas, with 100 horse-keepers and four gram-kettles. It would be very desirable to have an order given out, stating the number of coolies which an officer may call for from a village, the distance he may be allowed to take them, and the amount he is to pay for each." All these trivial matters, with the adjustment of disputes respecting brass swamies (idols), complaints about dooley-boys, the regulation of shroffs, or money-changers, are mingled with others of higher import,

the state of the Wynaad country, the march of troops, and operations against the Pyche rajah of Cotiote, the politics of the court at Mysore, transactions with that of the Nizam, visits to the interior, and arrangements for a grand survey of the Company's territories by Lieutenant (afterwards Colonel) Lambton, showing that the late duke, at the age of thirty, could withdraw his attention from subjects large enough to engross the mind of a great statesman, and concentrate it upon little things. His activity, his discernment, his decision, and, above all, his impartiality, won the gratitude of the people.

A conquered country in India cannot altogether escape a visitation which is incidental to all changes of government, and is peculiarly so in the East. The tranquillity of Mysore was interrupted, and the final settlement of the apportioned districts was for a while delayed, by the enterprises of Dhoondiah Waugh, or Dhoondajee,—one of those adventurers who have often subverted the ill-cemented thrones of oriental monarchs, and founded dynasties,—who raised a formidable disturbance in the province of Bednore.

This individual, whose history has been related by Colonel Wilks, was born in Mysore, of Mahratta parents, and was originally in the service of the Pathan (or Affghan) state of Savanore; but he afterwards entered, as a private horseman, into the cavalry of Hyder Ali. Being of a restless and ambitious disposition, weary of the restraint of regular warfare, and disappointed of the advancement he expected, he deserted Hyder's service, and collecting a small party of predatory horse in Dharwar, plundered the country north of the Toombudra. Having been defeated by the Peishwa's troops, he was tempted, in 1794, by promises of forgiveness and employment, to return, with his small troop, to Mysore, then under the rule of Tippoo, who, with his characteristic treachery and baseness, threw him into prison, and forced him to become a Mussulman. He was employed by the Sultaun, who, detecting or suspecting his treachery, again placed him in irons, and he had endured a long and rigorous confinement at Seringapatam, when its capture opened the dungeons *in which many victims* of Tippoo's barbarity were incarcerated.

Dhoondiah, being released, with other prisoners, by the hasty and indiscriminate humanity of the conquerors, made an ungrateful use of his liberty. Collecting a considerable force of horse and foot from Tippoo's disbanded army, together with freebooters of desperate fortune like himself, he entered into an understanding with certain poligars (petty independent chiefs) and killedars (commandants of forts), and made an irruption into the rich districts of Bednore, which he laid under severe contributions, perpetrating throughout the province the most atrocious acts of rapine and cruelty. The hope of plunder soon swelled his band into an army, which inflated his hopes, and made him aspire at the founding a dynasty in the south.

The terror created by this man is described by Sir Thomas Munro, then a military collector in Canara, who was in frequent friendly correspondence with Colonel Wellesley,—congeniality of character often bringing men together by a sort of secret sympathy. Major Munro, in his letters, speaks of the robberies and murders committed by Dhoondajee's "rabble of 20,000 horse and foot;" of his partisans enlisting men, and of the "mobs of ryots" who beset the young collector, imploring protection against the freebooters.

At first, a light corps of cavalry and some native infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple, moved against the marauders from Chittledroog, which overtook a party of 600 of them, horse and foot, to whom, as an example, no quarter was shown. Another light corps, under Colonel Stevenson, advanced on the other side towards Bednore. Both detachments, after taking sundry forts, crossed the Toombudra, and united to make a combined attack upon Dhoondiah, who had likewise passed the river, and encamped at Shirkapoor. Here he was attacked by the British commanders on the 17th of August, 1799. His cavalry, after suffering much loss, were driven into a deep nullah; the infantry were routed and dispersed, the fort of Shirkapoor was taken, and Dhoondiah narrowly escaped by re-crossing the river in a boat. He was closely pursued, however, but took refuge in the Mahratta territory, where Colonel Stevenson saw him quietly encamped, re-assembling the remnant of his banditti,

which could have been easily destroyed, but the Governor-General had strictly forbidden any violation of the Mahratta frontier.

Although sheltered in the territory of the Peishwa, under whose name he had masked his proceedings, Dhoondiah found that a professional robber and murderer was not protected by public law, especially amongst the Mahrattas. A division of the Peishwa's army stripped him of guns, baggage, and plunder; even his followers' horses were taken from them, and Dhoondiah fled to the north, a destitute wanderer, and was for a short time lost in obscurity.

But, at that period, the territories beyond the pale of the British power swarmed with disorderly bands, ever ready to unite under an enterprising leader, and Dhoondiah, in a short space of time, repaired his broken fortunes, and reappeared on the frontiers of Mysore with 5,000 horse. More stringent measures were, therefore, necessary to put down so dangerous an enemy to the tranquillity of the country, and Colonel Wellesley, who, in September, was appointed by General Harris (upon his leaving Seringapatam for Madras) to the chief command of the troops above the Ghauts, took the field against Dhoondiah in person, with authority to enter the Mahratta frontier, if necessary, and to "hang the marauder on the first tree."

Shortly before he commenced his operations, Colonel Wellesley received, in May, 1800, a proposition from Lord Mornington to be joined with Admiral Rainier in an expedition against Batavia, in Java, not to subdue it by force, but to induce the settlement to accept of British protection. The offer was accompanied by a letter from Lord Clive, the governor of Madras, in which his lordship stated that he had "made it his earnest request to Lord Mornington to select some other officer for this service," and recommended Colonel Wellesley in the strongest terms, nay, even requested him, to remain in a situation which he had filled with such singular advantage; "a situation," he added, "in which, for the prosperous settlement of our new acquisitions, integrity and vigilance of conduct *are indispensable*; in which your acquired knowledge and *experience, especially* in the event of active operations, must give

you the advantage over other men; and in which I should find it not only difficult, but impossible, to replace you to my satisfaction." Colonel Wellesley, though "he could not deny that he should like much to go," sacrificing, with a patriotic spirit, his inclination to his duty, left Lord Clive to decide the question "according to his sense of the public convenience;" and his lordship still pressing for his continuance in Mysore, the Governor-General (then created Marquis Wellesley) thought his brother could not accept the command.

The opinion which Colonel Wellesley had formed of the character of the man he was about to encounter, and of the circumstances which imparted an extrinsic importance to his position, is thus expressed in a letter to the Governor-General:—

"Dhoondiah is certainly a despicable enemy; but, from circumstances, he is one against whom we have been obliged to make a formidable preparation. It is absolutely necessary to the peace of this country of Canara and Malabar, that that man should be given up to us; and I doubt not that, before now, you will have made a demand for him upon the government of Poonah. If we do not get him, we must expect a general insurrection of all the discontented and disaffected of these countries. I have information that letters have been received by most of them, either from him, or from others written in his name, calling upon them to take the opportunity to rebel against the Company's government, or that of their allies; and his invasion of our territory is looked to as a circumstance favourable to their views. The destruction of this man, therefore, is absolutely necessary for our tranquillity; and nothing will be more easy, if the Mahrattas are really disposed to enter into the plan. If they are not, it will be a matter of difficulty, and it may become a question whether the whole power of the Company ought not to be turned to this object."

Having drawn a portion of his force together, Colonel Wellesley passed the Toombudra on the 24th June, and carried Ranny Bednore by assault on the 27th. From that date until the 2nd July, he was occupied in clearing the Nugger country of Dhoondiah's cavalry.

when he pushed for the Warda river, which he crossed on the 11th. Here he learned that Dhoondiah was on the march to offer him battle, and he moved briskly on, taking the town of Savenoor, and encamping in front of it. Dhoondiah approached within about four miles of the British position, and closely reconnoitred it, but did not venture to attack, and retreated to Hoondgul, whither, on the 14th, Colonel Wellesley followed him; but Dhoondiah evacuated the place and escaped, though the town was taken by storm. "I have given Dhoondiah one run," he writes to Major Munro, "and I have established an opinion of our superiority in our own people, in his army, and in the country in general; his people begin already to leave him."

The pursuit was recommenced on the 15th. On the 19th Colonel Wellesley was joined by some Mahratta cavalry of the Peishwa, who had tardily and reluctantly joined in the object. Hearing that Dhoondiah was encamped at a place called Soondooty, to cover the passage of his baggage over the Malpoorba, he determined to attack him and his baggage at the same time, in conjunction with Colonel Bowser, commanding a detachment intended to act in co-operation with him. Upon his approach, however, Dhoondiah broke up from Soondooty, and sent away his army in three portions, one of them with the baggage, to the right (or south) bank of the Malpoorba. This latter portion Colonel Wellesley determined to attack on the 30th July, by a rapid march of twenty-six miles, with the cavalry alone. He surprised the camp, and drove into the river, or destroyed, all the combatants in it (about 5,000), taking all the baggage; the camels, bullocks, and horses; the women and children, and six guns. Dhoondiah, who was not with this portion of his army, escaped with the remainder (owing to the neglect or treachery of the Mahratta horse), through the jungles of Kittoor, round the sources of the Malpoorba, towards the Nizam's country.

But the respite was a short one, and the fate of the "King of the Two Worlds," as this miscreant had presumptuously called himself, *was approaching.* The sudden fall of the Malpoorba had facilitated *his escape, and the* transport of artillery and war stores, by the

route he had taken, would have been almost impracticable. Boats were, therefore, employed to convey the troops, whilst a light detachment was despatched to harass his rear, and other parties occupied the passes of the river. On the night of the 9th September, after many forced marches, and a variety of movements conducted with great skill, Colonel Wellesley found himself within a few miles of Dhoondiah's main force. Bad weather, exhausted men and jaded horses, compelled him to make a short halt. The chief, misled by his pursuer's previous movements, and misinformed by his spies, was ignorant of the proximity of the British troops. His army, which had been strengthened since his arrival in the south, numbered at least 5,000 cavalry, and was drawn up in a strong position, when, after a night of anxiety, Colonel Wellesley rode forward with his horse, composed of British dragoons and native cavalry. They were rapidly formed, and in one resolute charge, led by the colonel in person, the freebooters were cut up or dispersed, everything in their camp was taken, and Dhoondiah slain. The letter in which he communicated the tidings to his friend Major Munro is worth inserting at length, as containing a brief and clear report of the action, and as a specimen of the writer's familiar style:—

"Camp at Yepulpurry, Sept. 11, 1800.

"My dear Munro,—I have the pleasure to inform you that I gained a complete victory yesterday, in an action with Dhoondee's army, in which he was killed. His body was recognised, and was brought into camp on a gun attached to the 19th dragoons. After I had crossed the Malpoorba, it appeared to me very clear, that if I pressed upon the King of the two Worlds, with my whole force, on the northern side of the Dooab, his majesty would either cross the Toombuddra, with the aid of the Patan chiefs, and would then enter Mysore, or he would return into Savanore and play the devil with my peaceable communications. I therefore determined, at all events, to prevent his majesty from putting those designs in execution, and I marched with my army to Kanagerry. I sent Stevenson towards Deodroog, and along the Kistna, to prevent him from

sending his guns and baggage to his ally, the rajah of Soorapoor, and I pushed forward the whole of the Mahratta and Mogul cavalry, in one body, between Stevenson's corps and mine.

"I marched from Kanagerry on the 8th, left my infantry at Rowly, and proceeded on with the cavalry only, and I arrived here on the 9th—the infantry at Shinnoor, about fifteen miles in my rear.

"The King of the World broke up on the 9th from Malgerry, about twenty-five miles on this side of Rachoor, and proceeded towards the Kistna; but he saw Colonel Stevenson's camp, returned immediately, and encamped on that evening about nine miles from hence, between this place and Bunnoo. I had early intelligence of his situation; but the night was so bad, and my horses so much fatigued, that I could not move. After a most anxious night, I marched in the morning, and met the King of the World with his army, about five thousand horse, at a village called Conagull, about six miles from hence. He had not known of my being so near him in the night,—had thought that I was at Shinnoor, and was marching to the westward, with an intention of passing between the Mahratta and Mogul cavalry and me. He drew up, however, in a very strong position, as soon as he perceived me, and the victorious army stood for some time with apparent firmness. I charged them with the 19th and 25th dragoons, and the 1st and 2nd regiments of cavalry, and drove them before me till they dispersed, and were scattered over the face of the country. I then returned and attacked the royal camp, and got possession of elephants, camels, baggage, &c. &c., which were still upon the ground. The Mogul and Mahratta cavalry came up about eleven o'clock, and they have been employed ever since in the pursuit and destruction of the scattered fragments of the victorious army.

"Thus has ended this warfare; and I shall commence my march in a day or two towards my own country. An honest killedar of Shinnoor had written to the King of the World by a regular tappall, *established for the* purpose of giving him intelligence, that I was to *be at Rowly on the* 8th, and at Shinnoor on the 9th. His majesty

was misled by this information, and was nearer me than he expected. The honest killedar did all he could to detain me at Shinnoor, but I was not to be prevailed upon to stop, and even went so far as to threaten to hang a great man sent to show me the road, who manifested an inclination to show me a good road to a different place. My own and the Mahratta cavalry afterwards prevented any communication between his majesty and the killedar.

"The binjarrie bags must be filled, notwithstanding the conclusion of the war, as I imagine that I shall have to carry on one in Malabar.—Believe me yours most sincerely,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

The flow of easy humour conspicuous in his letter, written in the midst of occupation and fatigue, may serve to confirm the report of Lord Teignmouth, of the playfulness and gaiety of the late duke in his earlier years.

"The complete defeat and dispersion of the enemy's force, and above all, the death of Dhoondiah, puts an end to this warfare," was the observation with which Colonel Wellesley closed his official report of the action to the military authorities at Madras, who highly complimented him for "the judgment with which his measures had been planned, and the vigour which had marked every movement of his force;" for "the indefatigable activity displayed in his operations, and the distinguished ability manifested in his masterly dispositions." The Governor-General of India in Council, in a despatch (October 3rd) to the Secret Committee at home, after a minute and lucid narrative of the details of the campaign, proceeded thus: "In our despatch of the 31st August, it was our public duty to express our sense of the able and spirited conduct of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, in the former part of the campaign against Dhoondiah. The same obligations of public duty and of justice to merit require that we should declare to your honourable committee, that Colonel Wellesley's subsequent operations have realized every expectation which we were induced to form from our

confidence in his professional knowledge, in his skilful management of his resources and supplies, and in his enterprising and active spirit. The manner in which the expedition against Dhoondiah Waugh has been conducted and terminated has effectually removed the immediate danger which menaced the possessions of the Company, and of their allies and dependants, in the peninsula of India; and the impression made by our success against this insurgent cannot fail to contribute, in an eminent degree, to the permanent establishment of tranquillity in our recent conquests, and on the whole line of our new frontier." The importance of the service rendered to India as well as to England may, perhaps, be inferred with more confidence from the following passage of a private congratulatory letter of Major Munro, a man thoroughly embued with a knowledge of Indian politics: "A campaign of two months has put an end to the earthly grandeur, at least, of the Sovereign of the two Worlds; had you and your regicide army been out of the way, Dhoondiah would undoubtedly have become an independent and powerful prince, and the founder of a new dynasty of cruel and treacherous sultans."

10.—*Expedition to the Red Sea.*

Colonel Wellesley was ordered to remain in the country which had been the scene of the campaign; and, in writing to Major Munro, from Hoobly, one of Dhoondiah's forts, in the valley of Pursghur, on the 6th October, 1800, he pretty plainly intimates that plans were then in contemplation for inflicting a chastisement upon the Mahrattas. "I fancy," he says, in the lively spirit which pervades all these private letters, "that you will have the pleasure of seeing some of your grand plans carried into execution. All that I can say is, that I am ready primed, and that, if all matters suit, I shall go off with a dreadful explosion, and shall, probably, destroy some *campoos* (brigades) and *pultuns* (battalions), which have been indiscreetly pushed across the Kistna—that is to say, if the river remains full." Indeed, in Colonel Wellesley's *letter to Lord Clive*, on the 16th September, upon receiving his *lordship's orders to* remain where he was, he says, "I shall look

forward to the measures to be further adopted in case of the occurrence at Poonah of either of the two events which the Governor-General thinks possible at the present crisis."

These plans were, however, suspended by the appointment of Colonel Wellesley to a new service. In the beginning of November, he received directions to break up the army, sending part into the ceded districts, part into Wynaad, and the remainder across the Toombudra to Seringapatam.

On the 5th of November, Marquis Wellesley formally announced to his brother that he had appointed him to the command of a force, to be assembled at Trincomalee, in the island of Ceylon, for service to the westward. In consequence of the state of the war in Europe, and of the strength of the French power in Egypt, the marquis had countermanded the intended expedition to Batavia, and the force now to be assembled, consisting of four king's regiments, 1,000 Bengal volunteers, with artillery, from Bengal, and a large reinforcement of European and native troops from Madras, was, in conjunction with a naval force, to proceed either up the Red Sea, and co-operate with any British army employed in Egypt, from the side of the Mediterranean; or to any point which the French might menace on the western side of the peninsula; or, lastly, to the Isle of France, against which the intelligence received by the marquis had satisfied him that a blow might be struck with every prospect of success.

Colonel Wellesley, accordingly, sailed with his force, which numbered about 5,000 men, and arrived at Trincomalee towards the end of December. After waiting a month there, and hearing no tidings of Admiral Rainier, who was to have acted in concert with the force, Colonel Wellesley wrote to the Governor-General, acquainting him with certain circumstances which, in his opinion, altered the state of affairs with reference to the projected attack upon the Mauritius; one of which was, that the design was known to the French authorities on the island. "Indeed, before I arrived at Madras, and before it was known that I was going there," he says, "I received letters from the western coast, stating that the armament was destined

either for the Mauritius, Egypt, or Batavia." Further; this knowledge of state secrets would appear to have oozed out, at that time, in a rather suspicious way, from head-quarters. "Mr. Webbe informed me," continues Colonel Wellesley, "of a circumstance at Madras, which proves that the French must receive intelligence from what they must deem the best authority. A French lady, residing at Madras, knew that an expedition was about to sail against Mauritius, and she had been desired to make known the names of her friends upon the island, in order that they and their property might be protected." Colonel Wellesley naturally concluded, therefore, that the French must be prepared.

On the 24th of January, 1801, the Governor-General wrote to Colonel Wellesley, that, in consequence of advice of an unfavourable tenor from Admiral Rainier, he was compelled to delay the expedition against the Isle of France, and he now proposed to resume the expedition against Batavia, with the force assembled at Ceylon; that he had judged it expedient to appoint Major-General Baird to the chief command of that expedition, and Colonel Wellesley second in command, who was to take the chief command of a force against the Isle of France, to proceed directly from Java, immediately after the reduction of Batavia. It has subsequently transpired that the objection of Admiral Rainier to the expedition against the Isle of France was a somewhat extraordinary one; namely, that it could not be undertaken without the express command or sanction of the King, signified in official form to the government of India and the commander of his Majesty's forces there. These questions of etiquette, which detained the troops in total inaction at Trincomalee, to the great annoyance of their commander, were happily set at rest by a despatch from England, conveying the King's commands that a force of 1,000 Europeans and 2,000 native infantry should proceed to Mocha, in the Red Sea, to be ready to co-operate, in conjunction with Sir Home Popham, with Sir Ralph Abercromby, in expelling the French from Egypt.

Upon receipt of a copy of Mr. Secretary Dundas's letter, with *communication from* the Governor-General that this was to be the

destination of the force, Colonel Wellesley, impatient probably at being cooped up for nearly two months in Ceylon, deemed it proper that measures should be immediately adopted for proceeding towards the rendezvous pointed out by the Secretary of State, and he announced to the Governor of Bombay his intention of sailing to that presidency forthwith, with the 10th, 80th, and 88th regiments, a detachment of the 86th, the 1st battalion Bengal volunteer sepoys, and the artillery. In letters to the Governor-General and to Admiral Rainier, he set forth his reasons for forming this determination, which did not, however, meet with the concurrence of the Governor of Ceylon (the Hon. F. North), and some rather sharp correspondence ensued between him and Colonel Wellesley. The latter, with his usual firmness, maintained his point, observing: "I conceive the grounds upon which I have determined to go to Bombay are so strong, and the urgency of the measure is so great, and will appear so to all those who have to judge of my conduct, that I persist." The force was accordingly embarked on the 15th February, 1801.

It would appear from a despatch of Marquis Wellesley, that he did not, at first, approve of his brother's acting upon Mr. Dundas's letter before he had received any intimation of his own intentions with respect to the mode of prosecuting the expedition to the Red Sea. This act of Colonel Wellesley, moreover, was attended with this inconvenience, that he left Trincomalee in entire ignorance of the fact, that Major-General Baird had been appointed to the chief command of the expedition (Colonel Wellesley to serve under him), and that the major-general was on his way from Calcutta to Trincomalee. There was something strangely infelicitous in these accidental crossings between the two officers. Learning this fact whilst on the voyage, Colonel Wellesley wrote to General Baird, explaining the motives that had urged him to take this step, which the Governor-General subsequently entirely approved.

Lord Wellesley stated candidly to his brother the reasons which had weighed with him in nominating Major-General Baird to the chief command of the force, and him (Colonel Wellesley) to the second,—namely, that its extent rendered it necessary to appoint a genera

officer to its head, whilst the sudden call to active service precluded the possibility of removing his brother from the second command without injuring his character; or of leaving him officially the option, without exposing the administration of the marquis to the reproach of partiality. He allowed him, however, to exercise his own judgment upon the propriety of desiring leave to return to Mysore. The marquis, at the same time, transmitted to his brother an extract of a letter from the Duke of York, the commander-in-chief of the army, wherein his royal highness said: "Having the pleasure of knowing personally Colonel Wellesley, I am thoroughly acquainted with his merits," and that he should lay his name before the king, to be placed upon the staff in the East Indies, as soon as his standing in the army should admit of his being promoted to the rank of major-general. It would seem to have been intended by the authorities at home that Colonel Wellesley should command the force sent to the Red Sea, for he was gazetted as a local brigadier-general in India.

His "supersession," as he termed it, appears to have been deeply felt by Colonel Wellesley, and it extorted from him, in his private correspondence, remarks which, in any other individual, would be thought to approach a tone of querulousness. "I shall always consider these expeditions," he says, in a letter to his brother Henry, "as the most unfortunate circumstances for me, in every point of view, that could have occurred; and, as such, I shall always lament them. I was at the top of the tree in this country; the governments of Forts St. George and Bombay, which I had served, placed unlimited confidence in me, and I had received from both strong and repeated marks of their approbation. Before I quitted the Mysore country, I arranged the plan for taking possession of the ceded districts, which was done without striking a blow; and another plan for conquering Wynaad, and reconquering Malabar, which, I am informed, has succeeded without loss on our side. But this supersession has ruined all my prospects, founded *upon any service* that I may have rendered. It must have been *occasioned either by* my own misconduct, or by an alteration of the

sentiments of the Governor-General. I have not been guilty of robbery or murder, and he has certainly changed his mind; but the world, which is always good-natured towards those whose affairs do not exactly prosper, will not, or rather does not, fail to suspect that both, or worse, have been the occasion of my being banished, like General Kray, to my estate in Hungary."

Colonel Wellesley arrived at Bombay about the middle of March. Sir David Baird not having appeared, and learning that Sir Ralph Abercromby had commenced his operations in Egypt, his ardour for the public service tempted him to incur another responsibility, by proceeding with the troops to the Red Sea without waiting for the commander of the force. In mentioning this intention to his brother Henry, he added, "I have never had much value for the public spirit of any man who does not sacrifice his private views and convenience when it is necessary." The arrival of Major-General Baird, on the 30th March, obviated the necessity of this bold step, and the receipt of a letter from the Governor-General, intimating that "his talents, skill, and activity might now be employed with more public benefit in the chief command of the troops stationed in Mysore, than in the post he then held," with "permission" to return thither, Colonel Wellesley relinquished his command in the Red Sea expedition, which sailed from Bombay in the beginning of April. His determination was influenced by several reasons:—first, he was attacked by a fever, and by another disorder, an eruption over the body, of which, he said, the medical men did not know the nature, requiring the use of nitrous baths, and which he thought it probable would oblige him to go to a cold climate; secondly, he had grounds for believing that Sir Ralph Abercromby's invasion of Lower Egypt would be relinquished. He added that there were "many other good reasons which made him desirous not to go." That any jealousy or antipathy towards Sir David Baird was one of these reasons is completely negatived by a letter addressed by Colonel Wellesley to that officer, which is highly honourable to both. "I will freely acknowledge," he says, "that my regret at being prevented from accompanying you has been greatly increased by the kind,

candid, and handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me; and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such treatment, but that my wishes, before you arrived, regarding going upon the expedition, were exactly the reverse of what they are at this moment." He placed in the Major-General's hands a "memorandum of operations in the Red Sea," embodying sound views and sagacious hints upon the subject.

In the month of April, 1801, Colonel Wellesley returned to Seringapatam, and resumed the command of the forces in Mysore. He was promoted to the rank of major-general on the 29th April, 1802.

11.—*Restoration of the Peishwa.*

During the remainder of 1801 and the year 1802, Major-General Wellesley was fully occupied, as his voluminous correspondence shows, in organizing the civil and military administration of the Mysore territory. As before, his attention was diffused over a vast variety of subjects,—courts martial, frauds of dubashes (agents), duties at chokeys (internal custom-houses), diplomatic matters, suits from native ladies claiming kindred with Tippoo,—upon these and other multifarious topics, his letters, written with his own hand, are full, precise, and decisive. In one instance, he had to pronounce a judicial opinion, which is elaborately given, upon the jurisdiction of the Seringapatam Cutcherry Court, in a case of divorce between a Moorman and his wife. Detailed and comprehensive memoranda upon the politics, the relations, the defences, of the Mysore state are interspersed amongst his official papers of this date, which make them a mine of practical knowledge to the student of Indian history.

But a scene was now opening in which his military talents were to be called again into action upon a scale calculated to test their quality. This was no less than a war with the Mahratta powers.

It has been already stated that the empire of the Mahrattas, founded by Sevajee, had resolved itself into a nominal confederacy *of five powerful* chieftains, the Peishwa, Scindiah, Holkar, the *Berar Rajah, and the* Guicowar, all acknowledging a species of fealty

to the descendant of Sevajee, the Ram or Sahoo Rajah of Sattara, and respecting the office of Peishwa, as the Rajah's executive authority; but all these chiefs were in fact independent. Scindiah, it has been already stated, had acquired an absolute control in the councils of the Peishwa, Bajee Rao, which was viewed with extreme jealousy by his rival Holkar, who, conscious of the strength Scindiah derived from his regular troops disciplined and officered by Europeans, employed adventurers from Europe, chiefly French, to discipline and lead his troops. The infantry establishments of these two chieftains, as well as that of the Peishwa, were in 1800 principally officered by Europeans, three-fourths of whom were natives of France.

Although the court of Poonah had professed to acquiesce in the justice of the war against Mysore, yet the Peishwa, being under the control of Scindiah, who maintained a secret correspondence with Tippoo during the whole of the contest, not only did not fulfil his stipulations with the British Indian government, but gave the Governor-General abundant reason for complaint against his deceitful and unfriendly conduct. "The Peishwa," he wrote to General Harris, in April, 1799, "appears to have entered into Scindiah's views against the Company and the Nizam." To Colonel Palmer, the resident at Poonah, he says, in the same month, "The accounts of the treacherous designs of the Peishwa, and of Doulut Rao Scindiah, are rendered probable by the weakness and profligacy of both." He adds that the conduct of the former would justify a declaration of war. In consequence of this unfriendly, if not hostile, behaviour, and because he refused to accede to the treaty of Mysore, and to accept a subsidiary British force, the Peishwa was excluded from participation in the conquests from Tippoo, his reserved share being divided between the Company and the Nizam, the Governor-General of India suggesting, at the same time, that "the benefits which accrued to the Mahratta state from the subversion of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions, were of much greater importance than the acquisition of territory."

The British resident at Poonah obtained sufficient evidence, which

was confirmed by the anxiety of the Peishwa to keep all negotiations between them from the knowledge of Scindiah, that this chief was the real source of the obstructions, maintaining, as he did, an exclusive and despotic sway over the councils of the weak and capricious Bajee Rao. Propositions of an amicable nature were offered to Scindiah (although his secret correspondence with Tippoo had been discovered in the archives of Seringapatam), but all friendly overtures were rejected by him. "The Mahratta empire in its present distracted state," observed the Governor-General and his Council, in 1800, reporting the failure of the negotiations at Poonah, "is, in fact, rendered incapable of forming or of maintaining any engagement with other states, and the weakness and instability of the councils of Poonah are become more conspicuous, as well as more desperate, from the perverse and intractable character of Bajee Rao."

The influence which the government of British India was desirous of obtaining at Poonah, was sought with the view (as Lord Wellesley stated to Mr. Dundas) of restoring the Peishwa to a certain degree of credit and power, and of reducing Scindiah in the same proportion; and he observed, with his usual foresight, "I shall not be surprised if, ultimately, the subsidiary force, which I am so anxious to establish at Poonah, should be required with equal anxiety by the Mahratta state, as the only means of restoring order, and of saving the whole of that country from plunder and desolation."

The subjection of Bajee Rao to a chief who professed to acknowledge the Peishwa as the legitimate executive authority of the empire, and the accomplishment by Scindiah of this usurpation by a powerful army, commanded by French adventurers, in the opinion of Lord Wellesley, dissolved the alliance between the Mahratta powers and the British government. To prevent such a combination of these powers as would menace the peace of India was the wise policy of this great Indian statesman, and notwithstanding frequent disappointments, his negotiations at Poonah for an alliance were renewed, though fruitlessly, whenever the Peishwa's authority was *exposed to* hazard by the violence and ambition of his feudatory *chiefs.*

In June, 1802, the successes of Jeswunt Rao Holkar (son of the late Tuckojee Holkar) against the forces of Scindiah, with the design of wresting from him his control over the Peishwa, raised a new element of danger. Even still, this prince, though manifesting considerable anxiety to accept the proffered engagements with the British government, under the terror of the ascendancy which Scindiah, whilst absent in Malwa, maintained over him, hesitated and delayed, until an event occurred which subverted his authority, expelled him from Poonah, endangered his personal safety, and subjected his territory to devastation and plunder.

Holkar, in the execution of his purpose, suddenly crossed the Nerbudda, marched upon Poonah, and arrived in its neighbourhood. Scindiah, upon this intelligence, despatched a force under Suddasheo Bow to co-operate with the Peishwa's troops in the defence of the city. The combined army advanced against that of Holkar, but in a general action, fought on the 25th of October, 1802, the former sustained a complete defeat, the Peishwa flying into the Konkan, and leaving his capital and country to the mercy of the victors.

On the morning of this day, the Peishwa sent his minister to the British resident with a paper requiring a subsidiary force, and offering to conclude forthwith a general defensive alliance. The Governor-General ratified this engagement, and signified his determination to employ every effort of the British power for the restoration of his Highness's just authority.

The escape of the Peishwa (whose person it was the object of the Mahratta chief to secure) forced Holkar upon another expedient to forward his views, and he placed upon the vacant musnud a relative of the family, Amrut Rao, under whose name the affairs of the government were conducted, in conformity to the wishes of Holkar. Both these persons expressed their solicitude for the preservation of peace, professing friendship for the British government, and even earnestly asking the advice and mediation of the resident in effecting an accommodation with the Peishwa. Scindiah likewise condescended, at this crisis in his affairs, to solicit the friendship of the Governor-General of British India, whose advances he had hitherto scorn-

fully repelled. The resident, however, left Poonah on the 28th of November.

On the 31st of December, a treaty of alliance was concluded at Bassein (whither Bajee Rao had proceeded) between the British government and the Peishwa, under which the restoration of this prince was to be effected (upon the supposition that the majority of his subjects desired it), in such a manner as to preclude all risk of the future establishment of any preponderating influence at Poonah by other Mahratta chiefs. By an article of this treaty, the Peishwa was restrained from negotiating with any power without the concurrence of the British Government.

The distractions of the Mahratta empire had induced the Madras government, as a measure of precaution, in November, 1802, to assemble a considerable force at Hurryhur, on the north-western frontier of Mysore, under General Stuart, and the Bombay government had wisely prepared the disposable force of that presidency for any emergency. The force at Hurryhur amounted to 19,000 men, including 3,500 European cavalry and 2,800 European infantry. The whole of the Nizam's subsidiary force, about 8,000, with 6,000 of his Highness's disciplined infantry and 9,000 of his cavalry, assembled, to co-operate, on the western frontier of his dominions, about 116 miles from Poonah.

Lord Clive, the governor of Madras, under whose immediate supervision the operations in the Mahratta territory were to be conducted, left it to the judgment of General Stuart to determine the amount of the force (not less than 7,000 men) necessary to be detached from the main body of the army, to advance upon Poonah; but his lordship observed: "Under the peculiar circumstances of delicacy which attach to the execution of the orders of the Governor-General, from the various combinations of political as well as of military considerations arising from the execution of this eventful service, I deem it to be of the highest importance, that the officer appointed to the command of the advancing detachment should possess, in an eminent degree, the qualifications requisite to the successful discharge of this arduous and complicated duty. The practical

experience obtained by Major-General the Honourable A. Wellesley, on the immediate theatre of the intended operations, combined with the personal intercourse established between that officer and the Mahratta chiefs on the frontier, and supported by the great ability uniformly manifested by that officer in various situations of difficulty, renders me solicitous that he should be selected for the command of the advancing detachment."

General Stuart adopted this suggestion without hesitation, and placed under the command of Major-General Wellesley (who had proceeded from Seringapatam for that purpose) a detachment, consisting of one regiment of European and three regiments of native cavalry, two regiments of European and six battalions of native infantry, with a due proportion of artillery, amounting altogether to upwards of 10,000 men; and to this force was added 2,500 of the rajah of Mysore's horse. The instructions of General Stuart left much to the major-general's own judgment, but directed his attention to the chief objects in view, namely, to encourage the southern jaghiredars (petty chiefs) to espouse the cause of the Peishwa; to form a junction with his highness, or his troops; to open a communication with the Nizam's auxiliary force under Colonel Stevenson, and to proceed eventually to Poonah, and establish an order of things in that capital favourable to the return of the Peishwa. Rapidity of motion was urged as of essential importance.

Major-General Wellesley moved from Hurryhur on the 9th of March, 1803, and crossed the Toombudra on the 12th. The British troops were received in the Mahratta territory as friends, and almost all the chiefs in their route joined them with their retainers; this amicable feeling being much promoted by the respect entertained for their commander, and the fame acquired by him and the British troops in the campaign against Dhoondiah Waugh. Goklah, the commander of the Peishwa's army, joined the major-general, with his troops, on the 28th; and Appa Saheb's 10,000 Pindarries were taken into pay, lest they should assist the enemy *or plunder* the country. "The march of a British force

through this distracted country," observed Major (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm, who accompanied the detachment, "has had the happy effect of reconciling its contending chiefs, and of giving confidence to its oppressed inhabitants." On the 15th April, Major-General Wellesley was joined, near the confluence of the Beema and Neera rivers, by Colonel Stevenson, whose detachment he reinforced from his own by a king's regiment.

Holkar had, in the meanwhile, on the advance of the British troops, quitted Poonah, leaving Amrut Rao there with 1,500 men, and removed his army with great expedition to Chandore, 130 miles from that capital. Under these circumstances, Major-General Wellesley thought it unnecessary to take all the troops to Poonah, and, making arrangements for the disposition of Colonel Stevenson's force, he continued his advance with his own detachment. Having received intimations that Amrut Rao intended to burn Poonah on the near approach of the British troops, in order to counteract this design and to protect the Peishwa's family remaining in that city, Major-General Wellesley made a hasty march with the cavalry and a native battalion, in the night of the 19th of April, over a most rugged country, and through a difficult pass (the Little Bhore Ghaut), of about forty miles, and reached Poonah with the cavalry at three o'clock on the 20th, making the total distance marched by the cavalry with the general at their head nearly sixty miles, performed in thirty-two hours. This celerity of movement preserved the city; Amrut Rao retired precipitately, leaving it uninjured.

The British troops and their commander were welcomed as deliverers by the few inhabitants who remained, and those whom Holkar's oppression had driven to the hills returned to their homes, and resumed their occupations. "It is a circumstance equally honourable to the British character and propitious to British interests in that quarter," observes Lord Wellesley, in his notes upon this campaign, "that the first effects of the British influence in the Mahratta dominions should have been displayed in rescuing the capital of the empire from impending ruin, and its *inhabitants* from violence and rapine."

On the 6th of May, the Peishwa, escorted by a strong British force, arrived in Poonah from Bassein, and, proceeding to his palace, resumed his seat upon the musnud, under salutes fired from the British camp.

12.—*Rupture with Scindiah.*

Whilst these transactions were taking place at Poonah and its neighbourhood, Holkar had been moving about in various directions, sometimes threatening the Nizam's frontier, and occasioning Major-General Wellesley a little uneasiness in regard to the force he had left under Colonel Stevenson, whom he directed to move to the northward, towards Aurungabad. He also wrote to Holkar himself, urging him to refrain from the plunder of the Nizam's territories, into which he, nevertheless, made an irruption. Scindiah had collected a large force at Oojein (his capital), with the professed view of opposing Holkar, which, in February, 1803, he led towards Poonah, reaching Boorhanpoor on the 23rd of that month. A few days after, Colonel Collins, the British resident, arrived at Scindiah's camp, and his reports, coupled with intelligence from other quarters, induced Lord Wellesley to believe that Scindiah, being now freed from apprehension by the removal of Holkar, meditated an accommodation with that chief, and a confederacy between them and the rajah of Berar, for the purpose of subverting the alliance between the Peishwa and the British government, which menaced their common interests or ambition. Colonel Collins, at an audience with Scindiah, requested an explanation of his intentions, when that chief, to whom duplicity and falsehood cost scarcely an effort, positively assured him that he had no intention whatever of impeding the arrangements between the British government and the Peishwa; but, on the contrary, that he desired to cultivate and improve the friendship of both. Colonel Collins was instructed to test these professions by requiring the immediate return of Scindiah to the north of the Nerbudda, and an explanation of the nature of his negotiations with Holkar and the Berar rajah; apprizing him that, in the event of his refusing the

explanations and assurances demanded, and of his continuing to prosecute military operations, in opposition to its remonstrances, the British government would adopt measures of precaution on every boundary of his dominions. Scindiah haughtily declared, in public durbar (open court), that he could not afford the satisfaction required, until a meeting had taken place between him and the rajah of Berar,—who was approaching Scindiah's camp at Eidabad, with a considerable army,—when the British resident, he said, should be informed "whether it would be peace or war."

In order that the Berar rajah should not be ignorant of his intentions, Lord Wellesley, in the month of May, 1803, apprized him, by letter, that the treaty of Bassein, which provided for the restoration and stability of the Peishwa's just authority, effectually protected the feudatory chieftains of the empire against any molestation either on the part of the Peishwa or of the British government, unless any chief should place himself in the condition of a public enemy to the state; and that any attempt to obstruct that treaty, which it was reported the rajah was endeavouring to do, must be deemed an act of hostility against both the contracting parties. He exhorted him, therefore, to return peaceably to his territories.

The state of affairs, in reference to the Mahratta feudatories, convinced the Governor-General of the necessity of constituting a temporary authority at the least possible distance from the scene of negotiation or hostilities, with full powers to conclude, on the spot, whatever arrangements might be necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war. "Your approved ability, zeal, temper, and judgment," he wrote to his brother, "combined with your extensive local experience; your established influence and high reputation among the Mahratta chiefs and states; and your intimate knowledge of my views and sentiments concerning the British interests in the Mahratta empire, have determined me to vest these important and arduous powers in your *hands.*" The marquis, accordingly, appointed Major-General *Wellesley to the chief* command of all the troops, British and allied, *in the territories of the* Peishwa, of the Nizam, or of any Mahratta

state (subject only to the orders of General Stuart and General Lake, the commander-in-chief in India), and empowered him "to assume and exercise the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British government" in those territories.

Armed with these large powers, and having full instructions from the Governor-General for his guidance, Major-General Wellesley addressed himself to the execution of a duty of formidable responsibility.

Both Scindiah and the rajah of Berar, in their letters to the Governor-General, declared that they had no hostile intentions, but, on the contrary, desired to maintain relations of amity with the British government. General Wellesley, however, considered that these professions were made merely for the purpose of gaining time, and that their acts were the only true expositors of their intentions. "Their measures," he observed to the British resident with Scindiah, on the 14th of July, "are not prepared; they have not yet brought Holkar into them; the British troops are ready for action and they are not; by the delay of hostilities the rivers will fall. I am, therefore, decidedly of opinion," he concluded, "that, if the rajah of Berar does not withdraw to Nagpore, and if Scindiah does not remove his army to stations usually occupied by his troops north of the Nerbudda, their intentions must be considered hostile, and we ought to take advantage of our position, and attack them without loss of time." He wrote an admonitory letter to this effect to Scindiah.

The suggestion of the major-general was fully verified; every effort made by Colonel Collins, the resident, to obtain a compliance with his demands, or a satisfactory reply from Scindiah and the rajah, was met with procrastination and evasion; and all endeavours to avert hostilities having been exhausted, he was directed to quit the Mahratta camp, which he did on the 3rd of August.

If evidence were needed of the determination of these chiefs, who had no ground of complaint, to try the issue of a contest with the British troops, it may be found in the secret orders of Scindiah

to General Perron to prepare his troops for a campaign with the British, and his endeavours to incite the Rohilla chief, Gholam Mahomed, to raise commotions in our territories.

13.—*Campaign in the Deccan.—Battle of Assaye.*

On the 6th of August, 1803, Major-General Wellesley published a "memorandum," wherein he narrated the various proceedings which had taken place, with respect to the treaty of Bassein, the offers he had made to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhonslah, the rajah of Berar, of peace, on terms of equality, and honourable to both parties; their refusal of those terms, and their choice of the alternative of war, which compelled him to commence operations against them, in order to secure the interests of the British government and its allies.

The force under the immediate command of Major-General Wellesley consisted of one regiment of European and three regiments of native cavalry, two regiments of European and six battalions of native infantry, making, with artillery, 8,900 men; to which must be added 5,400 Mysorean and Mahratta horse. The forces under Colonel Stevenson numbered 24,000 men, all, except the Scotch brigade, natives.

The army of Scindiah consisted of 18,500 cavalry and 8,200 infantry; that of the Berar rajah, of 20,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry. Their joint forces numbered nearly 53,000 men, with 240 guns. The accession of Holkar to the cause would have swelled the confederated army to little short of 100,000 men, including 50,000 horse and 30,000 regular infantry. With such a force, augmented by Pindarries and other hordes of mercenaries, who at that period infested India, the Mahratta powers might have inflicted a severe, if not an irreparable, blow upon the British power in India.

But Scindiah, like Tippoo, rejected prudent advice, and Holkar was not only jealous of Scindiah, but had a private grudge against *Ragojee Bhonslah*, who had seized and confined Juswunt Rao after

the death of his father. De Boigne, the creator of Scindiah's disciplined infantry, had strongly advised him not to provoke hostilities with the British government; but Perron, the successor of De Boigne, was less discreet, and Scindiah was hurried into the execution of ambitious projects before Holkar had embraced them, much less concerted with him a plan of combined operations.

The power of Scindiah was, moreover, undermined by family dissensions, and by the continued hostility of the baees (widows of Madhajee), whose partisans plundered his territories, and committed depredations of all kinds. His minister, the notorious Shirzee Rao Ghatgay (whose daughter he had married), by his enormities, of which his master shared the odium, alienated the minds of his subjects. The character of Dowlut Rao himself must not be overlooked in considering the causes of his fall.

Although his understanding was above mediocrity, he was naturally indolent, and when matters of business called for his attention, he would turn a deaf ear to them, or resort to every artifice of procrastination. His time was almost wholly occupied in amusements, tiger-hunting, and fish-shooting,—he was the best shot of his tribe, —abroad; music and dancing-women within. He was fond of retiring to gardens, of which he had many, where, with his chiefs, he feasted, and abandoned himself to revelry and buffoonery. One of his favourite pastimes was elephant-fighting, to indulge in which, he collected the finest of these animals to be procured in India. But his passion was flying of kites, in which amusement, requiring considerable skill, he was a great adept. It is thus managed in the East: the string is covered with a paste made of pounded glass and glue, and the art is to bring two rival kites in contact, so that, by the friction of the strings, one is cut, which event decides great wagers. A month or two months in the year was always devoted to this frivolous recreation. In public, and in his intercourse with envoys, the manners of Scindiah were urbane and dignified.

A very graphic description of the person of this celebrated chieftain has been given by Colonel Tod, who was upon familiar terms with him.

"In person, Dowlut Rao Sindhia was about five feet seven inches in height, stout built, his complexion dark, his visage round, with a rather flat nose; his expression commanding, yet benevolent, with great dignity of deportment. His dress and manners strongly recalled Holbein's portrait of our own Henry VIII. This arose partly from his mode of wearing the turban, which was small, twisted in the fashion of a rope, and placed on the side of the head. His garb was very simple; a white ungah, or tunic, and gootunna, or tight silk trowsers, down to the knee, common amongst the Mahrattas. His necklaces were gorgeous, consisting of many rows of pearls, as large as small marbles, strung alternately with emeralds. The pearl (*mooti*) was his passion, and the necklace was constantly undergoing change, whenever a finer bead was found: the title of 'Lord of a Hundred Provinces' was far less esteemed by him than that of *Mootiwalla*, the 'Man of Pearls,' by which he was commonly designated in his camp."

The attention of Lord Wellesley had been seriously employed, from the beginning of the year 1803, upon the prospect of a Mahratta war, and he had determined upon the objects which should be kept in view, in the event of hostilities with Scindiah; namely, to seize all his possessions between the Ganges and Jumna; to take the person of the Mogul, Shah Aulum, under British protection; to form alliances with the Rajpoot and other minor states beyond the Jumna, for the purpose of excluding Scindiah from the northern districts of Hindostan; and to occupy Bundlecund, and thus strengthen the provinces of Benares against Scindiah or the rajah of Berar. When the transactions at Poonah and the confederacy between Scindiah and Ragojee Bhonslah increased the probability of hostilities, the marquis drew out, in the form of notes, suggestions to enable General Lake, the commander-in-chief in India, to frame a plan of military operations for accomplishing the preceding objects; and, ultimately, a large force was collected at Cawnpore and Futtyghur, of which that able general took the command, with power to exercise the direction and control of all political negotiations connected with the movements of his army, distinct from

those of the forces acting against Scindiah and the Berar rajah, in the Deccan, under Major-General Wellesley.

This officer, who had, during the protracted negotiations with the two Mahratta chiefs, occupied a position within one march of Ahmednuggur, belonging to Scindiah, on the 8th of August, commenced his march against that fortress, the possession of which and of the Adjuntee Pass, was his first object. On the same day, he attacked and carried by escalade the pettah (fortified town) of Ahmednuggur, which was held by a body of Arabs and a battalion of Scindiah's disciplined infantry, who made an obstinate resistance; and on the 10th the batteries opened against the fort, which surrendered on the 12th. The capture of this fortress, garrisoned with 1,400 men, and full of stores, one of the strongest in the country, which covered Poonah, and was an important point of support to the future operations to the northward, was effected with trifling loss. Its acquisition gave General Wellesley possession of districts which yielded an annual revenue of upwards of six lacs of rupees, or £60,000, and which, as well as the fortress, were occupied by him in the joint names of the Company and the Peishwa.

The judicious course of proceeding adopted by General Wellesley, whereby his military movements were so much facilitated, is evinced in the instructions given by him to Captain Graham, whom he appointed collector of the conquered districts:—"I wish you would bear in mind the fact, that, to keep this country in a state of tranquillity, and to secure for the use of the troops under my command its resources, and a free communication through it with Poonah and Bombay, are objects of far greater importance than to collect at present a large revenue from it: I wish you, therefore, to refrain from pressing the country, with a view to raising the collections as high as they can go; indeed, as these districts have been the scene of the operations of the different Mahratta armies for many years, it is probable that they will not be able to pay much revenue."

Meanwhile, he had much anxiety respecting Guzerat (included in his extensive command), which he feared would be invaded by Holkar, and he drew up and submitted to the Bombay government

a plan for the distribution and organization of the troops there, and in the countries dependent upon Surat, which would secure the defence of the whole. He likewise received "rather unpleasant accounts from Colonel Stevenson," who, hearing that a party of horse was passing the Adjuntee hills, instead of dashing at them, had called in a battalion and some horse which were in his front, and meditated a defensive operation. The bolder and wiser scheme of his commander is indicated in his comment upon this proceeding. "We must get the upper hand, and if once we have that, we shall keep it with ease, and shall certainly succeed; but if we begin by a long defensive warfare, and go looking after convoys which are scattered over the face of the earth, and do not attack briskly, we shall soon be in distress."

On the 21st of August, the army crossed the Godavery, a very wide and deep river, the passage being effected in wicker boats, made by the troops from materials in the jungle, and covered with bullock-hides. North of the river, the country was completely exhausted by the Pindarries; the villages were depopulated, and large tracts of excellent land lay uncultivated. This was a serious impediment to the advance of the army. "We have lost such numbers of our cattle," writes the general, on the 24th of August, "by the length of our march and starvation, that we have none to carry grain for our followers." Scindiah and the Berar rajah retired, as the British forces approached, from the Adjuntee Ghaut to the eastward, towards Badowly (one of the passes into the Nizam's territories), sending their heavy baggage to Boorhanpore. Colonel Stevenson moved in a parallel line with them. Taking advantage of his movement, and passing him, they entered the territories of the Nizam on the 24th, and gave out that they intended to march to Hyderabad. "I am afraid," writes General Wellesley, "that Stevenson has been deceived by the Mussulmans. I hope," he added, "to prevent this design, and to strike a blow at their myriads of horse in a few days, if I should not be so unlucky *as to* have the Godavery become fordable about six weeks sooner *than usual,"*— *an* event which, though almost unprecedented, actually *happened!*

Upon arriving at Aurungabad, on the 29th of August, he secured his baggage at that place, and, directing Colonel Stevenson to move with expedition upon the enemy, he prepared to do the same, the difficulty of obtaining sufficient supplies being still a serious obstacle to rapid movements. Owing to the exhausted state of the country,—which is described in the despatches as "shocking,"—the Mahratta forces were suffering great distress, which was augmented by the efforts of the amildars, amongst whom the major-general had circulated letters, promising rewards to those who should withhold supplies from the enemy.

Holkar had hitherto committed no hostilities against the East-India Company or their allies, having maintained the position he had occupied for several weeks, between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, up to the beginning of September. The confederated Mahrattas still declared that he would join them, and from the difficulty of communicating with him, General Wellesley could not determine what line of conduct that chief would probably adopt. Under these circumstances, it became necessary to guard against contingencies, and concluding it was most probable that he would not join Scindiah and the rajah of Berar, but would carry on a distinct predatory operation to the southward of the Kistna, General Wellesley provided against such an emergency by instructing Major-General Campbell, who commanded a division of reserve at Moodgul, to watch over the Company's territories, and to check the insubordinate propensities of the officers of the Peishwa and of the Soubah of the Deccan.

In the meanwhile, General Lake had commenced hostilities against Scindiah in Upper India, by attacking M. Perron's force before Allyghur, on the 29th of August, taking the fort by assault, —a feat which General Wellesley pronounced the most extraordinary he had ever heard of in India,—and, on the 11th of September, routing Scindiah's force at Delhi, thereby delivering the Mogul from Mahratta thraldom.

Between the 8th and the 18th of September, the forces of Scindiah and the rajah in the Deccan had been joined by some campoos (brigades), including some battalions of regular infantry and a large

train of artillery, under the command of French officers, and on the 20th they were collected about Bokerdun and Jaffierabad. On the following day, General Wellesley, who had been moving eastward, along the left bank of the Godavery, was near enough to Colonel Stevenson's division to confer with that officer, and they concerted a plan to make a joint attack upon the enemy on the 24th, which failed through imperfect information regarding his position. Colonel Stevenson having marched by a western route to the defiles, General Wellesley proceeded by the eastern, round the hills between Budnapore and Jaulna, and on the 23rd arrived at Naulniah, where he received an erroneous report that the two chiefs had moved off that morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, but were still in camp about six miles distant. Believing this information to be true, the general determined to march at once and attack them, sending a message to Colonel Stevenson to apprize him of his intention.

On coming up, however, he found the whole combined army of Scindiah and the rajah of Berar, nearly 50,000 men, encamped on the opposite bank of the Kaitna; their right, which consisted entirely of cavalry, was about Bokerdun, and extended to their infantry, which, with the guns, was in the neighbourhood of a village named Assaye. Although he came first in front of their right, he determined to attack their left, as he would thereby throw their cavalry out of the action for some time, and the defeat of the infantry was most likely to be effectual. Accordingly, he marched round to their left flank, covering the movement of the column of infantry by the British cavalry and the Mahratta and Mysore horse. Having passed the Kaitna, at a ford beyond the enemy's left flank, he formed the infantry immediately in two lines, with the British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an open space between the river and a nullah, or small river, with steep banks, running parallel to it. The Mahratta and Mysore cavalry occupied the ground beyond the Kaitna, on the left flank of the British troops, and kept in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry, which had followed the movement from the right of their

own position. The artillery played hotly upon the British troops, as they emerged from the river and formed upon the opposite bank; and the orderly dragoon, riding close to the general, had his head carried off by a cannon-shot.

The enemy had altered the position of their infantry previous to the attack. It was no longer, as at first, along the Kaitna, but extended from that river, upon which its right rested, across to the village of Assaye, upon the nullah, which was upon the British right. Its front presented a vast battery. The troops advanced under a very hot fire, "the execution of which," the general says in his despatch, "was terrible." The enemy's cavalry made an attempt to charge the 74th regiment, at the moment when it was most exposed to the fire of the guns on the left of the enemy's position, near Assaye; but they were cut up by the British cavalry, which moved on at that moment. At length, the general directed the infantry to advance with the bayonet; the enemy's line gave way in all directions, and the British cavalry dashed in amongst their broken infantry. Some of their corps, however, went off in good order, and a fire was kept up on our troops from many of the guns, from which the enemy had been driven, by individuals who had been passed by the line, under the supposition that they were dead. A large body of the enemy's infantry, which had retired, formed again, and was charged by the British cavalry, in which operation Colonel Maxwell, its commander, fell. The enemy's cavalry, too, still hovered near; but at length, when the last-formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, leaving 98 pieces of cannon, and seven stand of colours, in the hands of the victors. In one of the last charges, led by the general in person, at the head of the 78th regiment and 7th native cavalry, his horse was killed by a cannon-shot, and fell under him.

General Wellesley commended very highly the conduct of the British troops in this hard-fought battle; "they advanced," he said, "in the best order, and with the utmost steadiness, under a most destructive fire, against a body of infantry far superior in numbers, who appeared determined to contend with them to the

last, and who were driven from their guns only by the bayonet." The British loss was severe, upwards of 2,000 (nearly one-third of the force), of which number 164 Europeans and 245 natives were killed. The enemy lost 1,200 killed, and their wounded were scattered in all parts of the country.

In a "memorandum of the battle of Assaye," subsequently written, General Wellesley says: "When I found the intelligence I received at Naulniah was false, that I had their whole army in my front, and that they had a most formidable position, three or four times my number of infantry only, and a vast quantity of cannon, I deliberated whether I should withdraw, and attack on the following morning, according to the plan. The consequence of my withdrawing would have been, that I should have been followed to Naulniah by their cavalry, and possibly should have found it difficult to get there. They would have harassed me all that day, and, as I had only ground fortified by myself to secure my baggage in, it was ten to one whether I should not have lost a part of it during the attack on the following morning. Besides this, there was, on the other hand, a chance, indeed a certainty, that the enemy would hear that Colonel Stevenson also would move upon them on the 24th, and would withdraw their infantry and guns in the night; I therefore determined to make the attack." The memorandum also details various incidents relative to this celebrated battle. The enemy neglected to secure the ford over the Kaitna (the banks of which were steep), by which the army crossed that river. When the general saw that the enemy had altered their position, and got their left to Assaye, he changed his plan, determining to manœuvre by his left, and to push them upon the nullah, or little river Juah. Orders were given accordingly; but, by an unlucky accident, the officer commanding the picquets, which were upon the right, led immediately up to the village of Assaye, and the 74th regiment, on the right of the second line, ordered to support the picquets, followed them; there being a large break in the line between these and those on the left, they were exposed to a most *terrible* cannonade from Assaye, and charged by the cavalry.

Another bad consequence resulting from this mistake was the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the action at too early a period.

In a private letter to Major (then Colonel) Munro, written on the 1st November, General Wellesley gives some further minute details respecting this action, with the view of obviating certain objections or criticisms of his friend. He says, he did not detach Colonel Stevenson; their separation was necessary, first, because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one day; secondly, because if one of the roads through the hills had been left open, the enemy might have passed to the southward, and evaded them. Colonel Stevenson and he were never more than twelve miles distant from each other, and on the 23rd not more than eight. The hircarrahs (common scouts) reported the enemy at Bokerdun. Their right was at Bokerdun, which was the principal place in their position, and gave the name to the district; but their left, in which was their infantry, was at Assaye, about seven miles from Bokerdun. He directed his march so as to be within twelve or fourteen miles of their army at Bokerdun, as he thought, on the 23rd; but when he arrived at the ground of encampment, he found he was not more than five or six miles from it. Believing the report that the cavalry had marched, and not being in a condition to reconnoitre without his whole force, he determined to attack their infantry, and desired Colonel Stevenson to move forward. Upon marching on, however, he discovered not only their infantry, but their cavalry, encamped in a most formidable position. For the reasons assigned in his memorandum, he determined not to withdraw, but to attack. Desperate as the action was, he says, the loss would not have been half so great but for the mistake of the officer who led the picquets, upon whom he did not wish, he added, to cast any reflection, for no man could lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the picquets against Assaye. "After all," he concludes, "notwithstanding the attack upon Assaye by our right and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the corps collected there, till I made a movement upon it with some troops taken from

our left, after the enemy's right had been defeated; and it would have been as well to have left it alone entirely till that movement was made." Colonel Munro, in a letter dated in February, 1804 (after the aforegoing was written), thus expresses his deliberate opinion: "If there was anything wrong at Assaye, it was in giving battle; but in the conduct of the action, everything was right. General Wellesley gave every part of his army its full share, left no part of it unemployed, but supported, sometimes with cavalry, sometimes with infantry, every point that was pressed, at the moment that it was most necessary."

This victory,—a "transcendant" one, as it is characterized in the general orders of the Indian government,—was one of the most remarkable ever achieved in India. The victors had to contend not only against a force nine or ten times their number, but with troops disciplined and led by French officers, supported by an enormous artillery (128 guns being in their camp), which silenced that of the British, who won the battle with the bayonet and sabre. The enemy's infantry, the duke afterwards declared, was the best he had ever seen in India, excepting our own, and their equipment far surpassed that of Tippoo's. "I assure you," he wrote to Major Malcolm, "that the fire was so heavy, I much doubted whether I should be able to prevail upon our troops to advance, and all agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India." Besides the commander of the force (who lost two horses, one shot, another piked), almost all the officers of the staff had horses shot under them. The native troops (of whom 88 officers and 1,380 men were killed or wounded) vied with the Europeans in steadiness and spirit. "Our troops behaved admirably, the sepoys astonished me," is the observation of the general in the letter just quoted. The troops engaged were his Majesty's 19th light dragoons, the 1st and 2nd battalions of Madras artillery, a detachment of the Bombay artillery; his Majesty's 74th and 78th regiments of foot; the 4th, 5th, and 7th regiments of native cavalry; the 1st battalions of the 2nd, 4th, 8th, and 10th, and the 2nd battalion of the 12th native infantry.

The action has been the subject of much criticism; but except that

Mr. Mill doubts the wisdom of "sacrificing so many men for the only object which could be attained," it has done ample justice to the admirable qualities displayed in it by the Duke of Wellington, confirming the judgment pronounced by the Governor-General of India in Council, that the skilful plan formed by the general precluded the escape of the enemy, and reduced the combined army to the necessity of hazarding an action, in which "the conduct of Major-General Wellesley united a degree of ability, of prudence, and of dauntless spirit, seldom equalled and never surpassed."

The consequences resulting from this triumph were commensurate with the splendour of the action: an irreparable blow inflicted upon the efficiency of Scindiah's military resources in the Deccan, the expulsion of a large predatory force from the territories of our ally the Nizam, and the moral effect produced by this seasonable check to Mahratta pride and ambition in the other provinces of India.

14.—*Negotiations with Scindiah.—Battle of Argaum.*

Whilst the British arms, under the conduct of Major-General Wellesley, were prospering in the Deccan, General Lake was pressing the enemy with vigour and success in Upper India. On the 24th of September (the day after the battle fought at Assaye), the commander-in-chief,—whose "energy and perseverance, military skill and invincible intrepidity," were warmly eulogized by the Indian Government,—marched from Delhi in the direction of Muttra and Agra, leaving Colonel Ochterlony at the former city, with a garrison, to protect the person of the emperor. On his march, several of Scindiah's French officers surrendered to the general, who informed the government that no French officers of any distinction remained in the service of the confederated Mahratta chieftains. On the 2nd of October, the army arrived at Muttra, and General Lake concluded a treaty of general defence and guarantee with the Jat rajah of Bhurtpore, who despatched a detachment of 1,200 cavalry to co-operate with the British forces, which, on the 9th, appeared before Agra. After defeating a body of the

enemy's troops under the walls of the fort, the town was occupied. On the 17th the breaching batteries opened upon the fort, which in the evening of that day capitulated and surrendered. The acquisition of this important fortress, added to the possession of Delhi and Muttra, completed the reduction of the territory of Scindiah on both banks of the Jumna, and facilitated the operations of General Wellesley, by distracting the attention of the former, and infusing alarm into both the confederate chiefs, the rajah of Berar being, at the same time, threatened with an invasion of his own territory by a British force.

Meanwhile, the conqueror of Assaye lost no available advantage through inactivity, though the care of his wounded (many of whom were not dressed for nearly a week, for want of medical men) necessarily delayed his own movements. "Visiting the sick officers and the wounded," says General Nicolls, in his journal, "we heard of General Wellesley's liberality to them; the evening we left he sent a dozen of Madeira from his stock, and that wine is neither cheap nor plentiful: to-day he was amongst them before the camp was pitched, making inquiries which are as honourable to his feelings as they are agreeable and gratifying to the poor invalids." It was dark when the action on the 23rd of September ceased, the cavalry was not in a condition to pursue the enemy, and the victorious but crippled army passed the night on the field of battle. Colonel Stevenson had not received the general's letter until the evening of that day, and in moving upon Bokerdun, he got entangled in a nullah in the night, and did not arrive at that place, eight miles off, until the evening of the 24th. The enemy passed the night of the 23rd about twelve miles from the field of battle, twelve from the Adjuntee Ghaut, and eight from Bokerdun, but moved off in trepidation as soon as they learned that Colonel Stevenson was advancing to the latter place, never stopping until they got down the Ghaut, where they arrived in the night of the 24th, Colonel Stevenson being in no state to follow them until the 26th, when they hurried in much confusion to Boorhanpoor, on the north of the Taptee. This place was taken by the colonel,

who likewise took Asseerghur, the key of the Deccan, and the last of Scindiah's possessions in that province, on the 21st of October.

Meanwhile, an insidious but abortive attempt had been made by the Mahratta chiefs to arrest the triumphant career of the British armies. On the 5th of October, communications were received both by General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson from one Ballojee Koonjur, requesting that Captain Johnson (Persian interpreter to the Nizam's force) and Rajah Mohiput Ram (an officer of the Nizam) might be sent to Scindiah's camp, "agreeably to the desire of the Nawab Moein-ool-Moolk, who says that, by God's grace, everything between the governments may be settled." This Ballojee Koonjur was originally a dependant of the Peishwa, and had been despatched by that prince from Bassein to Scindiah, to explain the nature of the engagements contracted under the treaty, but, with the versatility and treachery habitual to Mahratta politicians, he attached himself to the service of Scindiah. It was difficult to divine the object of this proposal,—whether really to commence a negotiation, or to raise the spirits of the enemy's troops by the appearance of a British officer in their camp, as it would be said, "to sue for peace." However, the proposition was made in so extraordinary a manner,—there being no mention of Scindiah or the rajah,—that the general declined to send a British officer. His answer to the communication (and the Indian government subsequently approved of it) was to this effect: "I am not acquainted with the Nabob Moein-ool-Moolk, or in what character or by whose authority he writes; nor does it appear that these gentlemen would be received by the Maharajah, even if I had any propositions to make, and should be inclined to send them; but I have no proposition to make to the Maharajah, and therefore must decline to send Captain Johnson and the Rajah Mohiput Ram, as you have desired. The Maharajah has many sirdars in his service, and if he or the rajah of Berar has any proposition to make to me, he may select one of them to convey it. Any person whom the Maharajah may think proper to send shall be treated with the respect and attention due to his rank; and I shall lose no time in

taking into consideration the wishes of the Maharajah which he may communicate."

General Wellesley, who compared himself to a man fighting with one hand, and defending himself with the other, remained on the Nizam's frontier to protect both his territories and Poonah. The enemy first threatened the latter through the Casserbarry Ghaut, when the general moved to the southward, and "made a dash down" to Phoolmurry, sixteen miles north of Aurungabad. He then found that the rajah of Berar and Scindiah had separated their forces, and, whilst the former marched towards Chandore, the latter meditated the recapture of Asseerghur; whereupon the general hastened to the southward, descended the Adjuntee Ghaut, and stopped him. Scindiah then moved to the eastward, through the valley of the Taptee and Poorna rivers, whilst the rajah of Berar, having recruited his forces, marched to the south, towards the Godavery, through the hills which formed the boundary of Candeish. General Wellesley thereupon ascended the Ghaut, on the 25th October, and marched southward, 120 miles in eight days; by which rapid movement he saved all his convoys, and the Nizam's territories. During these harassing operations he had the satisfaction of learning that Scindiah was being daily deserted by his horse. The general had been near the Berar rajah, who marched five times in two days, to avoid a dreaded collision, and was supposed to have retired to his own territories. "If that is the case," writes the general to his friend Munro, "I shall soon begin an offensive operation there."

It had been the boast of the Mahrattas that our regular system of warfare was incapable of contending with their predatory system, an error which was sufficiently demonstrated in this campaign, but was thoroughly exposed in the great Mahratta and Pindarry war, conducted by the Marquis of Hastings, in 1817-18. The sound judgment of the Duke of Wellington detected the inherent weakness of such a system, which he thus laid open, in a letter to Colonel Collins, in August, 1803:—"A system of predatory war *must* have some foundation in strength of some kind or other; but

when the chiefs avow that they cannot meet us in the field—when they are obliged to send the principal strength of their armies, upon which the remainder depend, to a distance, lest it should fall into our hands, they must have little knowledge of human nature, if they suppose that their lighter bodies will act, and still less of the British officers, if they imagine that, with impunity, they can do the smallest injury, provided only that the allies, who are to be first exposed to their attacks, are true to their own interests." But, in this contest, the condition last mentioned was wanting. He complains, in his private letters, of the "deplorable weakness of these things called allied governments," and that he feared the exertions he was making against the confederate chieftains could not last. "And yet," he says, "if they are relaxed, such is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country, that it must fall. It makes me sick to have anything to do with them, and it is impossible to describe their state." Notwithstanding the efforts made to maintain the authority and defend the territories of the Nizam, that prince, Mirza Secunder Jah, son and successor of the late Nizam (who died on the 6th August, 1803), seemed wholly insensible of the support he received.

General Wellesley thought it probable, and communicated this opinion to the Governor-General, that the two chiefs to whom he was opposed would soon commence negotiations for peace. The events in Upper India tended to accelerate their movements.

General Lake marched from Agra on the 27th of October, in pursuit of the Mahratta force, composed of the brigades which had been detached from the Deccan in the early part of the campaign, and of the few battalions which had effected their escape from Delhi, with a numerous artillery. He overtook them at Laswaree, where, on the 1st of November, after a vigorous resistance, they were totally defeated, all their battalions being cut up or taken, and seventy guns, their whole baggage, bazars, &c., left in the possession of the victors. So complete was this victory, that the general had reason to believe that, "with the exception of upwards of 2,000, who had been taken prisoners, very few escaped the general slaugh-

ter." This victory annihilated the force of Scindiah on that side of India.

The anticipations of General Wellesley were soon fulfilled. On the 11th of November, after some preliminary propositions, a vakeel (envoy), named Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, a man of rank, was sent to the general to treat for peace, and on the 23rd an armistice was concluded between the British commander and Scindiah, which stipulated that there should be a cessation of hostilities between the troops of the respective parties in the Deccan and in Guzerat; and that the former should take up a position in Berar, twenty coss (forty miles) eastward of Ellichpoor. The Berar rajah not being included in this armistice, there was apparently a division of interests between the two chiefs; General Wellesley, therefore, resolved to make Berar the seat of the war, and gave instructions to Colonel Stevenson to attack Gawilghur, an important fortress in that country.

Meanwhile, negotiations, of a somewhat irregular nature, went on with Scindiah; but the terms offered by General Wellesley (under instructions from the Governor-General) were too hard for that chief to digest. They required the cession of all his territories north of Joudpore and Jynaghur, the forts of Broach and Ahmednuggur, and all his territories southward and eastward of the Adjuntee hills; the renunciation of the *choute*, and all other claims upon any allies of the British government, and an engagement never to entertain in his service any Europeans belonging to a country at war with Great Britain. Counter-propositions were continually brought forward by unauthorized persons, the details of which and of the conferences are tedious and bewildering, there being a scramble in Scindiah's camp as to who should conduct the negotiations with General Wellesley. The records of the conferences contain such matter as the following: "Rajah Mohiput Ram, vakeel from the Nizam, was anxious to ascertain from General Wellesley what particular countries and districts were likely to fall to the lot of his master, in consequence of the treaty of peace; for various reasons, the major-general declined giving any information on the subject, *whereupon* Mohiput Ram offered the general five lacs of rupees

(£50,000) for it; to this the general replied, 'Can you keep a secret?' The rajah answered eagerly, 'Yes:' 'And so can I,' said the general."

Scindiah had not ratified the armistice, nor complied with its terms, by removing to the required position, but remained at Sersooly; nevertheless, as the conferences and negotiations continued, the vakeels pressed the general not to attack their master's troops; but he replied that he should attack the enemies of the Company wherever he met them. Finding that the rajah of Berar was moving towards his own territories, he descended the Ghauts by Rajoora on the 25th of November, to support and cover Colonel Stevenson's operations against Gawilghur. A junction having been effected on the 25th of November, both divisions, after a march of twenty-six miles, on a sultry day, reached Paterley on the 29th, where the armies of Scindiah and the rajah were seen reunited and in march from Sersooly. Bodies of horse appeared in the British front, with which the Mysore cavalry skirmished, and when General Wellesley went out to push forward the picquets of the infantry to support the Mysore horse, and take up ground for the encampment, he could perceive distinctly a long line of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, regularly drawn up on the plains of Argaum, immediately in front of that village, and about six miles from Paterley. Although it was late in the day, and the troops were fatigued, he determined immediately to attack them. Accordingly, he marched on in one column, the British cavalry leading, in a direction nearly parallel to that of the enemy's line, covering the rear and left by the Mogul and Mysore horse. The enemy's line extended above five miles, having in the rear the village and gardens of Argaum, and in the front a plain, very much cut by water-courses, &c. The Berar infantry and guns were on the left of their centre, with a body of cavalry on their left; Scindiah's army, consisting of one very heavy body of cavalry, was on the right, having upon its right a body of Pindarries and other light troops. Scindiah and Manoo Bappoo, brother of the rajah of Berar, commanded in person.

General Wellesley formed his army in two lines; the infantry in

the first, the cavalry in the second, and supporting the right, and the Mogul and Mysore cavalry the left, nearly parallel to that of the enemy, with the right rather advanced, to press upon the enemy's left. When formed, the whole advanced in the greatest order. The 74th and 78th regiments were attacked, as the line moved on, by a large body of men, supposed to be Persians, who were all destroyed. Scindiah's cavalry charged the 1st battalion 6th regiment of native infantry, on the left of the line, and being repulsed with great loss, the enemy's whole force retired in disorder, leaving thirty-eight pieces of cannon and all their ammunition in the hands of the British. Our cavalry pursued them for several miles, and destroyed great numbers. The British loss was forty-six killed and 308 wounded; that of the enemy was very great, and with one hour more of daylight, the general said, "not a man would have escaped."

An important fact, not mentioned in his official despatch, was disclosed at a later period in one of the general's private letters, which shows upon what a slender thread this victory hung, as well as the uncertain quality of the best sepoys. When the cannonade commenced, the native infantry were panic-struck, and got into confusion. "What do you think," he says to Major Shawe, "of nearly three entire battalions, who behaved so admirably in the battle Assaye, being broke and running off, when the cannonade commenced, at Argaum, which was not to be compared with that at Assaye? Luckily, I happened to be at no great distance from them, and I was able to rally them and re-establish the battle. *If I had not been there, I am convinced we should have lost the day.* But, as it was, so much time elapsed before I could form them again, that we had not daylight enough for everything that we should certainly have performed."

15.—*Treaties with the Berar Rajah and Scindiah.*

Notwithstanding the great fatigue which the troops had endured, General Wellesley having been on horseback from six in the *morning* until twelve at night, the army moved, on the day after

the battle, to Gawilghur. This promptitude gave a spur to the negotiations, which still lingered on, and, on the 2nd of December, a vakeel, from the rajah of Berar, came into the British camp. "Every Mahratta is so haughty and so prone to delay," is the remark of General Wellesley, in his private correspondence, "that I suspect both Scindiah and Ragojee Bhonslah will be ruined, rather than submit to the conditions I must require of them."

He now engaged actively in the siege of Gawilghur. This was strong fortress, standing upon a lofty and rocky height, in the range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee, so secured by fortifications as to appear inaccessible. It consisted of one inner fort, fronting the south, where the rock is steepest, and an outer fort, which covered the inner to the west and north. This fort had a third wall, which guarded the approach to it from the north. All the walls were strongly built and fortified by ramparts and towers. The heavy ordnance and stores for the siege had to be dragged by hand over mountains and through ravines, under heat so excessive as to render the toil almost insupportable. "The series of services which the troops of Colonel Stevenson's division went through, are," the general said, "such as I never before witnessed." The garrison was numerous, consisting of Rajpoots, who offered a resolute, though unscientific, defence.

Ground was broken before the fort on the 12th December; on the 13th, the batteries opened upon it; on the night of the 14th, the breaches in the walls of the outer fort were practicable; on the following day the place was taken by assault, the columns on the north storming by the breaches, the troops on the south entering by escalade. Our loss (126 men) was comparatively small. The enemy suffered severely, vast numbers being killed, including the killedar, and Beny Sing, the commander of the Rajpoots.

When General Wellesley entered the fort, we are told by General Nicolls, in his journal, he inquired for the killedar, to whose house he immediately went. His son, a fine lad, ten years old, said he had gone out about two hours before, and had not returned. Search was made, and, near the gateway, the body of

the killedar, with that of Beny Sing, was found under a heap of slain. It further appeared that these two men, of good Rajpoot families, having determined to die in defence of their trust, according to the custom of their race, had taken measures, before they met their own fate, to have their wives and daughters put to death, in order to save them from disgrace. For some reason or other, either through want of resolution, or a better motive, in the agents, this cruel sacrifice to honour was imperfectly performed, and only three or four of these devoted females were dead when our men discovered them; others lay bleeding. The general visited the survivors, and ordered that they should receive every care and respectful attention.

Two days after the fall of this fortress, the rajah of Berar sent a vakeel, duly accredited, to the camp of General Wellesley, to treat for peace. The object being a sincere one, the negotiations were brief, and on the following day, the 17th of December, a treaty of peace was concluded between the East-India Company and their allies on the one part, and Sena Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhonslah on the other, whereby the latter ceded to the former the province of Cuttack, including the fort and district of Balasore, all the territories of which he had collected the revenues in participation with the Soubah of the Deccan, and those of which he might have possession to the westward of the river Warda; the frontier of the rajah, towards the territories of the Nizam, was to be formed to the west by that river, from its issue in the Injardy hills to its junction with the Godavery; he was to have the hills on which were the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur, but everything south of these hills and west of the Warda was to belong to the British Government and its allies. Further, the rajah engaged never to take into his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other power at war with the British Government, and he renounced for himself and his successors all adherence to the confederacy of the Mahratta chiefs to attack the Company or their allies, and engaged not to assist them.

These were severe terms, and the general, in transmitting the *copy of the treaty* to the Indian Government, stated that, "in the

course of the conferences, the rajah's minister declared repeatedly, and I have reason to believe with some truth, that the demands made were of the finest and most valued parts of his territory." Severe as the terms were, however, the rajah had wantonly brought himself into this dilemma. When his vakeel exclaimed against the exorbitance of the demands, which were sufficient, he said, not only to reduce, but to destroy, the state of his master, the general calmly replied that "the rajah, being a great politician, ought to have better calculated his chances of success before he commenced the war; but that, having commenced it, before he got out of the scrape, it was proper he should suffer." Having no alternative, on the 23rd he ratified the treaty.

By one of the articles, it was agreed that an accredited minister from each government should reside at the court of the other; and General Wellesley selected, for the temporary occupation of the post of British minister at Nagpore, the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, who had been present in all the actions fought in that quarter during the war, and whose familiarity with the native tongues, and with the politics of the Mahratta courts,—which had been most serviceable to General Wellesley,—peculiarly fitted him for its functions. This choice of a gentleman who has since so highly distinguished himself as an author, as well as a diplomatist and statesman, is one proof amongst many that the duke possessed, in common with his brother, that rare talent for command which is manifested in the discernment of great though latent qualities: "He has seldom been surpassed," observes Mr. Mill of Marquis Wellesley, "in the skill with which he made choice of his instruments."

General Wellesley now gave notice to the vakeels of Scindiah, conformably to the terms of the armistice, that the suspension of hostilities would cease on the 27th of December.

This hint was, perhaps, reinforced by an incident which may have tended to quicken the decision of the "Man of Pearls." The state of affairs at Hyderabad, on the death of the late Nizam, and the intention manifested by the Mahratta chiefs to proceed towards that

capital, rendered it advisable that the division of the army, serving in the Dooab, under Major-General Campbell, should occupy a position favourable for a speedy advance upon Hyderabad. He accordingly proceeded to the Kistna, and made preparations for passing that river. But the peaceable state of the city, and the successes of the British arms north of the Godavery, removed the necessity for his further march in that direction, and intelligence having been received, in the month of October, by General Wellesley, whilst he was in constant and rapid movement after the rajah of Berar, calculated to excite suspicions of the views of the Mahratta jaghiredars in the south, he requested Major-General Campbell to enter the country and watch their conduct. In the execution of this service, the major-general, on the 27th of December, received information that a body of Pindarries, amounting to 10,000 horse and foot, had crossed the Kistna, at Dharoor, and were proceeding towards the Toombudra and the Company's frontier, committing dreadful excesses by the way. They were headed by a Mussulman, who assumed the title of faqueer (or saint), and the once formidable name of Dhoondiah Waugh. General Campbell commenced his march in pursuit of the plunderers on the 28th, with his cavalry and the flank companies of his infantry; after a forced march of considerable length, he came up with them, and dispersed the whole body, killing and wounding upwards of 3,000.

On the 30th of December, a treaty of peace was signed by the vakeels of Scindiah at Surjee Anjengaum, whereby that chief ceded to the East-India Company and their allies all his forts, territories, and interests in the country between the rivers Jumna and Ganges, and in the countries northward of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud, the forts of Broach and Ahmednugger, and the territory dependent on the latter, with certain exceptions; and all the territories which belonged to him previous to the breaking out of the war to the southward of the Adjuntee hills, including all the forts and districts between that range of hills and the river Godavery; he renounced all claim upon the Mogul and upon some of his own *feudatories;* he recognised certain claims of the Peishwa, subject

to the arbitration of the East-India Company; and engaged never to take into his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any power at war with the British government. In order that the diminution of the power, reputation, and military resources of Scindiah, under this treaty, should not expose him an easy prey to Holkar, whose resources being unimpaired, his relative strength had been much increased thereby, an article was introduced into the treaty, by which Scindiah was allowed the option of acceding to the subsidiary alliance between the Company and the Nizam, in the event of which, the Company, "with a view to the future security of the Maharajah's territories," engaged to furnish him with a force, the expense of which was to be provided for out of the cessions made under the treaty. An accredited minister was to be sent by each court to the other, and the British envoy to the durbar of Scindiah was another highly distinguished man in after-years, Sir John (then Major) Malcolm, whom the general furnished with a copious and admirable "memorandum" of instructions.

Major Malcolm, writing from Scindiah's camp, related an incident that occurred at his first audience, and which is thus communicated by General Wellesley to his brother;—those who remember Sir John Malcolm will easily recognise his vein of humour: "At first Scindiah received him with great gravity, which he had intended to preserve throughout the visit. It rained violently, and an old officer of the escort, Mr. Pepper, an Irishman, sat under a flat part of the tent, which received a great part of the rain that fell. At length it burst through the tent upon the head of Mr. Pepper, who was concealed by the torrent, and was discovered after some time by an 'Oh Jasus!' and a hideous yell. Scindiah laughed violently, as did all the others present; and the gravity and dignity of the durbar degenerated into a Malcolm riot—after which they all parted upon the best terms!"

The Indian government approved of both these treaties. That with the rajah of Berar it considered "in the highest degree advantageous, honourable, and glorious to the British government:" that with Scindiah (which was conformable to the general tenour of the

instructions furnished by Marquis Wellesley) was pronounced "highly honourable and advantageous to the British government and its allies, and calculated to secure permanent tranquillity to the Company's dominions and to all the native powers of India."

Thus ended the Deccan war of 1803, in which the share taken by the Duke of Wellington, then only thirty-four years of age, raised his military reputation to a very high pitch, and earned, in the just opinion of one of his biographers, "glory enough for a single life."

16.—*Conclusion of Sir Arthur Wellesley's Services in India.*

Although the labours of Major-General Wellesley in the field had ceased, the more perplexing and embarrassing toils of the closet succeeded. Over these it is necessary here to glide lightly—although they imposed a severe tax upon faculties which were exerted in after-years with so much advantage to Europe, as well as to Britain, in diplomatic and civil affairs. Those who would form a correct judgment of the Duke of Wellington's capacity for civil administration, should study his voluminous despatches and correspondence, occupying upwards of three hundred pages, in Colonel Gurwood's collection, "after the treaties of peace." Besides a multitude of subordinate matters, these papers embrace the following subjects:—The construction of the treaties and the adjustment of territorial questions arising under them—the settlement of the affairs of Amrut Rao, of the Putwardhun family, and of the southern Mahratta jaghiredars—military arrangements in Guzerat—and disputes occasioned by the shuffling conduct of the Nizam's officers. The conduct of the Peishwa caused him infinite annoyance and vexation. It was in vain he endeavoured to see and remonstrate with the prince, who avoided one whose plain and straightforward dealing was not congenial to the slippery tactics of a Mahratta court. In one of his official letters General Wellesley enumerates eight distinct proofs of the duplicity and even hostile conduct of a man who had recently owed his dominions and even his life to British interference. "The Peishwa," he observed, "is callous to *everything* but money and revenge." The memoranda prepared by

General Wellesley, during the year 1804, upon important political questions, include one on the affairs of Scindiah; a second, on the freebooter system in India; a third, on the Indian military establishment, pointing out its defects, and suggesting remedies; a fourth, on Holkar, and the views and military strength of that chief; a fifth, upon the intelligence department in the army, from the inefficiency of which he suffered so severely in the action at Assaye. In the second of these papers General Wellesley seems to have predicted the future Pindarry war, which had for its main object the extinction of the freebooter system, from which, he thought, we ran a great risk. "It is not known to the Governor-General," he wrote to Major Shawe, his lordship's secretary, "and you can have no idea of the great extent to which it has gone; and it increases daily. Conceive a country, in every village of which there are from twenty to thirty horsemen, who have no means of living except by plunder. This is the state of the countries of the Peishwa and the Nizam."

It was against a party of this description that his last military service in the field in India was performed by Major-General Wellesley. A banditti appeared on the Nizam's western frontier, against whom he marched in January, 1804. The expedition, although short and almost bloodless, was severe.

Since the peace, the major-general had moved to the southward. Having crossed the Godavery, and made one or two marches, he agreed to grant *cowle* (pardon, or quarter) to the chiefs of the bands,—who had been in the service of Scindiah and the Berar rajah,—on condition that they dismissed their followers, and came into his camp within five days. As they failed to do so, and kept their men assembled, in the Nizam's territories, between Perinda and Toljapoor, he determined to endeavour to cut them off, hoping to surprise them by making forced marches, though the distance was eighty miles. He began his march on the 4th of February, with the 19th Light Dragoons, the 74th regiment, the 1st battalion 8th regiment, and 500 men belonging to other native corps, and the Mysore and Mahratta cavalry. On approaching Perinda, after a

march of twenty miles, he found that the enemy had broken up their camp and come nearer, being then not farther than twenty-four miles, and he set off again the same night, to attack their camp before daylight. Unfortunately, the road was bad; the enemy had received intelligence of his approach, and had begun to retreat when the British troops arrived. The major-general followed them with the British cavalry in one column, acting upon the right of their rear, the Mysore and Mahratta horse pursuing the centre and left. The enemy formed a large body of cavalry to cover the retreat of their guns and baggage, and the British cavalry were disposed in two lines to attack them, in which order they were followed from height to height, and cut up, great numbers being killed, and all their guns, ammunition, bazars, and baggage, were taken. "The result of the day," the major-general wrote, "is the complete defeat of a numerous and formidable band of freebooters, who were the terror of the country, and were daily increasing in numbers; they had already defeated a body of the Soubah's troops, and had taken from them the guns which I have retaken."

This expedition has often been mentioned by the Duke of Wellington as the greatest march he ever made. Only one man was returned killed, and he (a native horseman) died of fatigue.

Having performed this service, he quitted the army on the 23rd February, and proceeded to Poonah, where he had a long and troublesome conference with the minister of the Peishwa about his highness's affairs. From that city he took his departure for Bombay, where he arrived in March, and received a public address from the British inhabitants of that presidency, congratulating him upon the conspicuous share he had personally borne in "one of the most decisive, brilliant, and rapid campaigns ever known in the annals of British India," having proved himself at its close, "equally great in the cabinet as in the field."

Some of his closet reflections, indeed, are still valuable guides to Indian statesmen. In a memorandum upon the treaty of Bassein, he has the following remarks upon the policy of Asiatic governments: —"*European governments* were, till very lately, guided by certain

rules and systems of policy, so accurately defined, and generally known, that it was scarcely possible to suppose a political event, in which the interest and conduct of each state would not be as well known to the *corps diplomatique* in general, as to the statesmen of each particular state. The Asiatic governments do not acknowledge, and hardly know of, such rules and systems. Their governments are arbitrary, the objects of their policy are always shifting; they have no regular established system, the effect of which is to protect the weak against the strong: on the contrary, the object of each of them separately, and of all of them taken collectively, is to destroy the weak; and if, by chance, they should, by a sense of common danger, be induced for a season to combine their efforts for their mutual defence, the combination lasts only so long as it is attended with success; the first reverse dissolves it; and, at all events, it is dissolved long before the danger ceases, the apprehension of which originally caused it."

He has recorded his opinion respecting the extension of our territory in the East, in a private letter to Colonel Munro:—"In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and the description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandize ourselves at the expense of the Mahrattas, we increase this evil. We throw out of employment and of means of subsistence all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies at the same time that by the extension of our territory our means of supporting our government and of defending ourselves are proportionably decreased. Upon all questions of increase of territory, these considerations have much weight with me, and I am in general inclined to decide that we have enough; as much, at least, if not more than we can defend."

His sentiments upon the subject of amnesties for political offences

in Native India are noble: "I have received," he says, in a letter to Colonel Close, at Poonah, "a letter and message from Baba Phurkiah; he throws himself upon the mercy of the Company, and asks only for a place in which his life will be in safety. The war will be eternal, if nobody is ever to be forgiven; and I certainly think that the British Government cannot intend to make the British troops the instruments of the Peishwa's revenge. You must decide what is to be done with this person. I have ordered him to quit the Nizam's territories, and not to come near this army. The answer of the vakeel is natural. It is: 'Where is a man to go, who is not to be allowed to remain in the territories of the Company or of the Company's allies?' When the empire of the Company is so great, little, dirty passions must not be suffered to guide its measures."

Before he left Poonah, at a meeting of the principal officers of the army of the Deccan, they resolved to present their general with a gold vase (a service of plate was afterwards substituted), value two thousand guineas, as a token of their esteem, with an inscription commemorating the battle of Assaye. A sword, value one thousand guineas, was likewise voted to him by the British inhabitants of Calcutta.

In April, 1804, whilst at Bombay, the Governor-General transmitted to him the copy of a despatch he had addressed to General Lake, apprizing him of his determination to commence hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, from Hindostan and the Deccan, at the earliest practicable period of time, and he directed General Wellesley to co-operate with the commander-in-chief in the manner which might appear to him best calculated to make an early impression upon the power and resources of Holkar. The position of a body of troops under the command of that chief, his conduct and language, which was arrogant and insolent, his intrigues against the British government, and the murder of three of its subjects, had rendered it indispensably necessary, in the opinion of the Indian government, *either* to adopt measures for the compulsory reduction of his preda-

tory force, or to frame some arrangement with him for that object. The latter being ineffectual, in consequence of Holkar's extravagant pretensions, the marquis determined upon war.

Upon the receipt of these instructions, Major-General Wellesley took active measures for placing the troops under his command in a proper state of equipment for service. Their wants were such as to require prompt remedies. They were all in need of clothing; some had no coats. Instead of waiting for supplies of this indispensable article in the usual dilatory way, we are told by General Nicolls that he procured cloth, which was divided into the quantities necessary for each sepoy's jacket, and these were given to the men, who managed to clothe themselves. "It was no small matter," General Nicolls adds, "to clothe upwards of 5,000 men, in a few weeks, in this manner, who must otherwise have passed the monsoon in rags."

Major-General Wellesley did not propose to take the field against Holkar in person. Severe service, in such a climate, began to act even upon his hardy frame, and to impair his health. He complained of being "much annoyed by the lumbago," the effect of living in tents: "If I do not go into a house soon," he playfully writes to the marquis, "I am afraid I shall walk like old Pomeroy for the remainder of my life." At a later period he spoke of the increase of the rheumatism, "which had been hanging about him for the last eighteen months, and was attended by all the symptoms and inconveniences of fever, and required the same remedies."

It must not be concealed that he also felt, whether justly or not, a strong sense of disappointment at the treatment he supposed he had experienced from the home authorities, whom he did not scruple, in his private correspondence, to tax with injustice. "In regard to staying longer," he writes to Major Shawe, "the question is exactly whether the Court of Directors or the king's ministers have any claim upon me, strong enough to induce me to do anything so disagreeable to my feelings (leaving health out of the question) as to remain for a great length of time in this country. I have served the Company in important situations for many years, and have

never received anything but injury from the Court of Directors, although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all the governments, and in communication with all the political residents, and many civil authorities, and there is not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of my acts, or a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill-temper, from any one of the political or civil authorities in communication with whom I have acted. The king's ministers have as little claim upon me as the Court of Directors. I am not very ambitious, and I acknowledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations that military services in India would be considered in the scale in which are considered similar services in other parts of the world. But I might have expected to be placed on the staff in India; and yet, if it had not been for the lamented death of General Fraser, General Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary. This is perfectly well known to the army, and is the subject of a good deal of conversation. If my services were absolutely necessary for the security of the British empire, or to ensure its peace, I should not hesitate a moment about staying, even for years; but these men or the public have no right to ask me to stay in India, merely because my presence, in a peculiar quarter, may be attended by convenience."

The duke might have had good reason to complain of the neglect of the king's ministers; but the Court of Directors, who had no rank or title to bestow, appear to have recognised, upon all occasions, in grateful terms, the eminent merits of the victor of Assaye. It is not improbable that the reduction of certain allowances made to him by the government of Madras, and approved by the Governor-General, for the purpose of defraying the extraordinary charges of his command in Mysore,—which act was deeply resented by Marquis Wellesley,—may have been at the bottom of his dissatisfaction with the court. Nor is it likely that they and the king's ministers were altogether uninfluenced by the *representations* (groundless as they have been shown to be) made by the

partisans of Sir David Baird, whose mortification could not have been healed by the celebrity acquired, through what his flatterers still persuaded him was an unjust preference, by one whom Sir David's biographer calls "his constant rival." Certain it is, that General Harris, and many of the gallant men who served with distinguished honour in the Mysore war, were treated by the king's government with pointed neglect. General Harris himself was not presented at court by the minister after his return to England; his claim to the prize-money was long litigated, with the countenance of the government, and it was not until 1815,—when Wellington had fought his way to a dukedom,—that the conqueror of Seringapatam in 1799 was raised to the peerage.

Having placed the army under his command in the Deccan in a state of complete efficiency, Major-General Wellesley appointed Colonel (afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir John) Murray to conduct the operations against Holkar's possessions in Malwa, furnishing him with ample instructions. The advice he gave this officer, as well as to all his subordinates, was not restricted to mere technical details, but embraced points rather of civil than military moment, but which materially facilitated field operations in India. "You have now," he writes to Colonel Murray, "a great game in your hands; but all will depend upon your management of the natives with whom you will have to co-operate. I have only to recommend to you to conciliate them as much as possible; to treat them with the greatest kindness and attention is the only mode of drawing from them any assistance. At the same time, you must not lose sight of the fact, that they are Mahrattas; that there is not one of them who can be implicitly trusted; and that, most probably, all are in correspondence with the enemy's camp. You must not allow them to perceive that you distrust them. You will excuse me for saying this to you. I have acted successfully as I now recommend to you; and my conduct and this recommendation are the result of long experience."

His attention to the native classes was, indeed, as politic as it

was humane; the brinjarries, or grain-dealers, were often tempted thereby to bring supplies, intended for the enemy's camp, to the British. "General Wellesley," observes General Nicolls, in his journal, "has always made it a point to encourage these people by kindnesses, presents, indeed, by every kind of liberality, to attend our camp, and collect grain for the army. He advances them money—takes their grain when not immediately required—gets duties remitted—procures permits—gives escorts—provides guards, and wherever extraordinary losses are incurred, he balances them by the price. In one case he gave the cutwal (head native civil magistrate in camp) a heavy pair of gold bangles (bracelets), of which he considerably enhanced the value by putting them on his wrists with his own hands. This simple attention of General Wellesley has, no doubt, raised the cutwal very much in his little city, the Bazar."

The retrograde movement of Colonel Murray, together with the disastrous retreat of Colonel Monson,—a memorable event in the military annals of India,—extorted from General Wellesley the remark, in a private letter to Major Malcolm, that "both appear to have been afraid of Holkar, and to have fled from him in different directions. I do not think," he adds, "that the commander-in-chief and I have carried on the war so well by our deputies as we did ourselves."

He now (May, 1804) received the Governor-General's directions to proceed to Calcutta, "for the purpose of communicating with him and with the commander-in-chief upon the various important and military questions depending in India." Previous to proceeding thither, he applied, first, to the commander-in-chief, and then to the Governor-General, for permission to return to England, assigning, as reasons, the state of his health, the prospect of service in Europe, and, lastly, that "he did not think he had been very well treated by the king's government. It is now about two years," he observed, "since I have been a major-general, and nearly as much since I was appointed to the staff at Fort St. George, by *Gene*ral Stuart. Since that time, it has been perfectly well known *that I had led a body* of British troops into the Mahratta territo-

ries; and, supposing that I had no other pretensions to be placed on the staff, I might have expected a confirmation of General Stuart's act, under those circumstances. The staff in India had been under consideration, and another officer had been appointed to it." The reply of General Lake was to this effect:—"I can only assure you, that, however reluctant I may feel to part with your services, advice, and exertions, to carry on the operations we are at present entering into, I shall not, from any selfish motive, withhold the permission you request to proceed to Europe, at whatever time you may wish to avail yourself of it."

Quitting the army, and resigning, on the 24th of June, 1804, the military and political powers vested in him by the Governor-General in the same month of the preceding year, General Wellesley proceeded by way of Seringapatam and Madras to Fort William. At the former place, the scene of his civil rather than military triumphs, he received an address of the native inhabitants, the genuine and touching eloquence of which must have been highly grateful to him. It was as follows:—

"We, the native inhabitants of Seringapatam, have reposed for five auspicious years under the shadow of your protection. We have felt, even during your absence, in the midst of battle and of victory, that your care for our prosperity had been extended to us in as ample a manner as if no other object had occupied your mind. We are preparing to perform, in our several castes, the duties of thanksgiving and of sacrifice to the preserving God who has brought you back in safety, and we present ourselves in person to express our joy. As your labours have been crowned with victory, so may your repose be graced with honours. May you long continue personally to dispense to us that full stream of security and happiness, which we first received with wonder, and continue to enjoy with gratitude; and when greater affairs shall call you from us, may the God of all castes and all nations deign to hear with favour our humble and constant prayers for your health, your glory, and your happiness."

He arrived at Madras in July, and in the following month at

Calcutta, where he received the votes of thanks, transmitted by the speakers of the two houses of parliament, for his "important, brilliant, and memorable" services in the Deccan. The state of affairs in that province now appeared so alarming, that his presence there was necessary, in order to prevent his old antagonists, Scindiah and the rajah of Berar, from becoming parties in the war, and, if possible, to march a corps of cavalry to join the troops acting in Malwa under Colonel Murray. He was, as before, armed with extensive powers, all the residents at the Mahratta courts being placed under his control, and he was empowered to act, in any state of circumstances, without reference to the Governor-General's authority. On reaching Seringapatam, in November, 1804, however, he heard of the defeat of Holkar's army, and had reason to believe that Scindiah and the rajah desired to remain at peace. Under these circumstances, he did not move from Seringpatam until the period approached for his embarkation for Europe, when he proceeded to Madras, where he arrived in the beginning of February, 1805. Here he received a letter from Earl Camden, notifying to him that his Majesty, in order to evince his sense of his eminent and brilliant services, had created him a Knight of the Bath. Here he also received an affectionate address from his regiment, the gallant 33rd, expressing their sense of his "very friendly and paternal attention," and another from the garrison of Seringapatam, paying a tribute to the "exalted talents and splendid achievements" of their late commandant. The European inhabitants and native officers of Fort St. George, likewise, sought and obtained permission to place his portrait in the Exchange room, amongst the portraits of illustrious characters which already adorned its walls.

The last general order of "Major-General the Honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B.," to the troops lately under his command, dated Fort St. George, 9th March, 1805, announcing his approaching departure for Europe, and thanking them for the services they had performed and the difficulties they had surmounted, which, he *declared*, he should never forget, closes with a word of advice to the

officers of the army, which, coming from so great a commander, deserves to be constantly kept in mind:—"He earnestly recommends to the officers of the army, never to lose sight of the great principles of the military service, to preserve the discipline of the troops, and to encourage, in their respective corps, the spirit and sentiments of gentlemen, and of soldiers, as the most certain road to the achievement of everything that is great in their profession."

One of his latest acts, before he quitted India, was to provide for Salabut Khan, the son of Dhoondiah Waugh, whom he had taken under his protection, and maintained out of his own funds, since the death of the youth's father. He now left him a sum of money, placed him under the guardianship of the court at Seringapatam, and recommended Purneah, the excellent dewan (or minister) of the rajah of Mysore, to take him, should he prove worthy, into the rajah's service.

In March, 1805, he sailed from Madras in his Majesty's ship *Trident*, and arrived in England in September.

At the close of Sir Arthur's career in India, Lord William Bentinck, then Governor of Madras, in a letter to the Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East-India Company, after stating that it was impossible to describe the sensations of universal concern expressed at his departure, bore the following disinterested testimony to his public character and services:—"In justice to my own feelings, I cannot forego the occasion of expressing my sense of Sir Arthur Wellesley's eminent merits and services, and of conveying a public testimony of my sincere regard for those talents and virtues which have so powerfully contributed to strengthen the foundation of the British empire in India, and to raise our military character in the country to the highest pitch. The attention of the Court of Directors has been frequently drawn to the high degree of prosperity which the territories of Mysore have obtained under the British influence, and the important benefits which have been derived from the existing state of affairs. In viewing these happy consequences, I feel it to be an act of justice due to Sir Arthur

Wellesley, to state my entire belief that there is no cause to which they can be so immediately traced as to the judgment and talents of that officer, which have been invariably directed to every means connected with the public interest. He has left his command amongst the regret of all individuals, civil and military, European and native. In tracing such parts of this officer's conduct which may not have appeared upon the public records, it is my duty to state the order and economy with which every department of the service, during the late war, has been carried on. The regularity with which the disbursements of each month have been transmitted could not have been greater in profound peace. I can assert, that the general arrangement, the correctness and minuteness of every detail of supply and of account, have been admired by every public and civil officer at the presidency."

A retrospect of the salient points of the duke's conduct in India, and of the most striking acts of his brief military service in that country, will amply justify this spontaneous tribute. His administration of the Mysore country, after its conquest, secured the peaceable possession of a vast territory, which his sword had contributed to win; the suppression of the freebpoters protected the new acquisitions from an evil of which he was the first to perceive the mischievous consequences; his rapid march upon Poonah removed to a distance one of the most powerful of the Mahratta chieftains; his name as well as his talents exercised a salutary control over the base and treacherous Peishwa; whilst his exploits in the Deccan war, his two great victories over a numerous and well-disciplined enemy,—one of these triumphs being due to his own personal valour and conduct,—and the diplomatic skill which foiled Mahratta artifice, and perfected in the cabinet the work he had so successfully commenced in the field,—laid a foundation for the British rule in India which was the surer from its being rooted rather in the hearts and affections than in the fears of the people.

It does not fall within the scope of this sketch to chronicle, far

less to review, the events which made the further military career of the Duke of Wellington so illustrious. After six splendid campaigns in Portugal and Spain; after following the French armies into their own country, and defeating their ablest generals; after crushing the great Napoleon, and pursuing the wreck of his army to Paris; after civil services of high importance rendered to his king and his country, abroad and at home, for thirty-five succeeding years,—the great duke closed a life of almost unexampled activity and peril, tranquilly, at a good old age, on the 13th of September, 1852.

Many able pens, foreign and domestic, have been exercised, with more or less success, in drawing the character of the Duke of Wellington. The late Lord Byron,—no prodigal dispenser of indiscriminate praise, and prone rather to dispute than to confirm the world's estimate of merit,—long before the duke had touched the culminating point of his renown, pronounced his eulogy in four short words:—

HE *IS* A MAN.

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